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Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence Initiative’ by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic 
aims of BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and non-African scholars to work 
jointly in the field of African Studies and to offer a center of creative and innovative PhD training 
and research. On 15th June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded ‘Centers of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5 years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior 
fellows from 25 African, American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this 
experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research environment based upon three 
clearly defined general Research Areas which are: 
◼ Uncertainty, Innovation and the Quest for Order in Africa  
◼ Culture, Concepts and Cognition in Africa: Approaches through Language, Literature and 
Media  
◼ Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development  
The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies sensitive to emerging basic 
problems; they also take into account practical questions and problems of the African continent. 
Thus, the BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African universities’ network. It brings together African and 
European networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of Bayreuth and 
universities in Africa but also between the universities in Africa themselves. Six African Partner 
Universities, namely the University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University, Eldoret 
(Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco), Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 
Maputo (Mozambique), the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa), and Addis Ababa 
University (Ethiopia) cooperate closely with BIGSAS in recruitment, selection, training and 
mentoring of doctoral students. Other partners are the Universities of the Africa-Europe Group 
for Interdisciplinary Studies, AEGIS.  
PhD training in BIGSAS is based on various strategies which ensure a quality in the field of African 
Studies: multi- and interdisciplinary research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist aca-
demic training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual Research Training 
Plans (IRTP). Also of high importance are: the offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, 
individual career planning, early integration into the international academic community, shorter 
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time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements or specific support of female Junior 
Fellows.  
Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable experience in coordinated research 
programs, integrating various disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies. 
The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and coordinates African studies at 
the University of Bayreuth in 12 subject groups distributed over four of the six faculties of the 
university. 
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With BIGSASworks! we aim at offering Junior Fellows at the Graduate School of African Studies a 
platform for publishing research-related articles. This new online-working paper series provides 
an excellent platform for representing and promoting the idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for 
showcasing ongoing research, creating transparency of the work carried out by Junior Fellows 
and providing a space for present articles and working jointly on them towards further publica-
tion. Each issue focuses on a certain thematic field or theoretical concept and Junior Fellows from 
any discipline are invited to submit papers, enabling common interests beyond the predetermined 
BIGSAS research areas to flourish. At the same time BIGSASworks! offers its workgroup partici-
pants deeper insights into and practical experience of what it means to be an editor. Last but not 
least, BIGSASworks! makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), (i.e. us!), visible before our theses are 
published.  
The name BIGSASworks! had various implications when we first chose it. First and foremost, it is an abbreviation of “BIGSAS Working Papers!” Secondly, it is meant to show the work of our BIGSAS “work groups”, so indeed it is the works that are resulting from a structure like BIGSAS. Thirdly, taking “works” as a verb, it demonstrates the work that we as BIGSAS Fellows carry out, with 
BIGSASworks! guaranteeing us a visible output in addition to our theses.  
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Studies, University of Bayreuth, Germany under the DAAD Graduate School Scholarship Pro-
gramme. She teaches history of gender, sexuality, marriage, women in Africa in the Department of 
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Gender is a highly contested terrain within African communities. It is part of everyday negotiations 
in families and communities, but it is also part of discourses on belonging and identity. While some 
argue that gender is a Western concept and that, before colonialism, the binary division between 
men and women was not common in many African societies (Amadiume 1987; Oyèwùmí 1997), 
others stress that African societies had been patriarchal even before colonialism subjugated 
African women and men. This debate reflects not only the diversity and complexity of pre-colonial 
gender arrangements, but also indicates that gender plays an important role in the attempt to 
reconstruct tradition and the pre-colonial social order. Moreover, this also points to the diversity 
of women and men, and the entangled character of processes of stratification: Gender 
relationships can only be understood using an intersectional lens on differences and power 
relations within societies. Additionally, in doing gender research, it is important to grasp the 
mutual constituting of social categories. Gender does not exist by itself but is constituted by other 
categories of difference. A woman is never just a woman; she has an age, belongs to a family, a 
social class and a nation state. This is often neglected in scholarship on gender relations in Africa 
and African women (and men) are constructed as homogenous groups, all suffering from the same 
patriarchal structures. This is often criticized by African feminist scholars and can be explained 
by the colonial legacy of African studies, but also by the close entanglement of scholarship on 
gender in Africa with the development industry. Gender is part of the development discourse and 
this has largely influenced the debates on gender in African societies. On the one hand, activists 
and NGOs refer to development and the universality of human rights in fighting for equal rights of 
women and LGBTs, on the other hand, it is argued that Western gender discourses colonize 
African societies and are part of the post-colonial global order. While powerful stakeholders tend 
to follow one argument or the other depending on which supports them in their attempt to 
maintain their power and justify policy interventions, the ambiguity of the mainstream gender 
discourses is reflected in recent scholarship on African gender orders. For instance, it is mirrored 
in publications on masculinities and femininities, on legal pluralism and gender, on religious revival and women’s agency in orthodox religious movements, and on rituals and customs such 
as FGM/FGC or other initiation ceremonies.  
The 23rd volume of BIGSASworks! “Gender and Social Encounters: Experiences from Africa” 
represents these dimensions of gender debates within African scholarship. It reflects the diversity 
of gender arrangements in African communities and societies. Moreover, it contributes to the 
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understanding that gender is crucial for the way African people and communities position 
themselves in debates on modernity versus tradition, on globality versus locality and on religious 
or secular ways of living.  
The contributions in this volume on gender and its social encounters in African societies deal with 
gender arrangements in Kenya, Nigeria, and Niger. While these alone reflect the diversity of 
gender arrangements in Africa, the contributions also reflect the ambiguity of gender discourses 
and the complexity of gender arrangements within African communities. This is on the one side 
due to legal pluralism but also to the positionality of different stakeholders. For instance, the 
articles by Morenikeji Asaaju and Najoum Alhassane discussing the brideprice in West Africa 
show that economic and social change, the codification of customary rules and practices, and the 
commercialization of social relations were beneficial for some women and men and detrimental 
for others. The two articles draw a complex picture of partly contradicting processes of social and 
economic change, which shapes the experience of different groups of people.  
How the entanglement of customary rules and practices with national law and global gender 
norms is negotiated on the local level is discussed in the contribution by Shillah S. Memusi. Memusi also shows that the integration of global gender norms can open up “spaces of equality” 
within communities, which are based on customary laws and regulations and resist integration 
into the nation state. To describe new emerging spaces is also the objective of Umar Ahmed’s 
contribution. He scrutinizes how the concept of gender equality is discussed in Nigerian print 
media by Nigerian feminist writers and how Western liberal feminism is appropriated on the 
national level.  
Spaces for LGBTs in Kenya are rather hidden; they exist at night and are descried by Hanna Lena 
Reich. Her study reflects that the rights of LGBTs are not acknowledged and are not part of the mainstream “gender equality discourse” which has been adopted in many African countries. Reich’s paper also contributes to the conceptualization of agency, another crosscutting issue in 
the contribution of this volume. While Reich and Memusi refer to the conventional understand-
ing of agency as an expansion of choice, the paper by Adeyemi Balogun on the veiling of Yoruba women takes up Saba Mahmood’s conceptualization of agency by understanding agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of subordination, but “as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable” (Mahmood 2001: 210). By using the case of 
Yoruba women, Balogun shows that religious movements can also create spaces for women and 
that gender arrangements in African communities are much more complex than the often-used 
binary division between tradition and modernity indicates.  
The articles also point to the benefits of interdisciplinary work, which is central for BIGSAS. 
Interdisciplinarity in the context of BIGSAS not only means publishing papers written by authors 
from different disciplinary background in one volume, but also mirroring each of the articles due 
to the interdisciplinary academic culture of the graduate school. Furthermore, the background of 
the authors also indicates that gender debates within African studies are being more and more 
conducted by young male and female African scholars. Based on my experiences of the last 20 
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years, this is not surprising as gender is discussed widely in African universities. However, it is 
worth mentioning here because publications on women and gender in Africa were monopolized 
for a long time by non-Africans reflecting the post-colonial hierarchies within academia and the 
development industry. 
Prof. Dr. Ulrike Schultz 
Theologische Hochschule Friedensau, Germany 
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 Gender in Africa is shaped by social encounters that are informed by rules, norms and practices 
across formal and informal institutions. Focusing on these encounters deepens our understanding 
of the institutions that shape and inform the rules and roles of gender in society. The interconnectedness of formal and informal institutions is rooted in the continent’s colonial 
history, especially through the codification of norms as either civic or customary (Oyèwùmí 1997). 
Engaging the gender debate in Africa therefore requires an understanding of the rules of the 
cultural public as well as those of the civic public, and how the two convene to inform attitudes 
towards men and women, their roles and the unwritten rules on what is appropriate and expected 
of individuals in a society. Chappell (2006) refers to the operation of these unwritten rules as a 
logic of appropriateness which defines individual conduct as well as reactions and consequences 
that follow. 
The heterogeneity of contemporary African societies means that approaches to gender differ, not 
just at the different national levels, but also within singular cultural environments. This 
notwithstanding, African countries have, in various ways, adopted legislative measures towards 
equality and equal rights across socio-economic and political spheres. Krook (2008) explains that 
this trend is informed by the realisation that equality is at the heart of sustainable development, 
which is an important goal for these countries. The effects of these efforts have been widespread 
in different countries.  
In the face of globalisation, different approaches are also adopted by individuals in these societies 
to ascertain individual agency, at the same time maintaining a collective identity. This need for belonging is rooted in the benefits of ‘‘identity and psychological security’’ (Ekeh 1975: 171) that 
are derived from membership and adherence to appropriate conduct in the cultural public space. 
This quest for agency as both individual and collective means that approaches to gender can 
sometimes be confrontational, especially in the present global society where different forms of 
mordernities compete for space. This is especially the case with the issue of sexuality, which Okolo 
(2014) notes is riddled with contradiction and confusion. This comes to the fore in the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) debate, which has been branded un-African and evil, 
fuelling homophobia across the continent.  
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For many people across Africa therefore, embracing certain approaches to gender can be a source 
of conflict, especially where this is in opposition to traditional narratives of equality, sexuality and 
culture; it introduces a battle of what to keep and what to let go, and how to be a member of a 
community whose socio-cultural ideals one does not wish to conform to. Hodgson (1996) 
provides a classic example of this in the case of a daughter who took her dad to court, to stop him 
from forcing her into an arranged marriage. Her course of action, informed by her awareness of 
her rights as a Tanzanian citizen, conflicted with the expectations by her Maasai community that 
she is not to defy her elders, even when this means defying her own wishes. As an unmarried 
woman, her wishes are secondary to agreements between her father and community leaders. In 
the end therefore, her decision to take her father to court, followed by the court’s decision to stop 
the father from marrying her off, led to her being publicly shamed and disowned by her father and 
her clan. As this case demonstrates, belonging and decisions on what cultural practices to abide 
to are made difficult by differences in the speed of acceptability of change between the individual 
and communal levels, and the social costs for defiance of socio-cultural norms.  
Beyond such conflict, formal gender norms tend to be more responsive to global debates and 
therefore fast changing, in contrast to the slow pace at which informal norms change. At the same 
time, formal norms of the state can act to suppress individual freedoms of the private realm, as is 
the case with the criminalisation of homosexuality in countries such as Uganda, Nigeria, and most 
recently, Tanzania. This creates an environment where individuals lack a safe space to ‘live their truth’. In the end, experiencing and ‘living’ gender becomes the product of the choice between 
pursuing individual interests at a high social cost, suppressing individual choice for social capital, 
or creating new spaces altogether and forming new gender spaces.  
This volume contributes to the academic debate on gender in Africa (Abdullah 1993; Awumbila 
2007; Imam 2001; Oyèwùmí 2005). For instance, Oyèwùmí (2005) interrogates the basic Western 
assumptions that have informed the study of gender in Africa in relation to their local 
understandings. Through case studies, her study shows how gender is constructed and lived in 
different socio-historical African contexts, while calling for the need to situate a new 
understanding of the concept within the social experiences of its people. In the present volume, 
the contributors also draw on diverse experiences that help to conceptualise how gender is 
articulated and shaped in everyday encounters. They evince not only reactions and consequences, 
but also the agency of men and women in shaping and reshaping social and power relations. By 
highlighting the voices of men and women under different social encounters in Kenya, Niger and 
Nigeria, the articles in this volume enrich the body of literature on the range of perspectives on 
gender relations.  
The contributors explore different questions from a multidisciplinary perspective, reflecting their 
different research backgrounds. Through individual case studies, the authors focus on the 
complex social encounters regarding marital relations, religion, sexuality, equality, agency, 
identity and the public discourses that shape these experiences. The case studies explore how the 
social encounters inform choices and agency, thus deepening our understanding of gender 
relations in contemporary Africa.  
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One of these case studies which focuses on bride price, examines how the impact of colonialism 
shaped the dynamics of marriage and gender relations. The provision of bride price is an 
important aspect of traditional African marriages, and one that is subject to a lot of politics. 
Focusing on this in colonial Akure, Southwestern Nigeria, Morenikeji Asaaju presents a historical 
account on how the colonial system, which introduced a new economic system that led to a change 
in labour demands and access to wealth, also caused a shift from the use of gifts as bridewealth to 
the use of money. This shift empowered many unwedded women to demand for higher bride 
prices. Young men of Akure contested the prices set by these women, which they argued did not 
take prevailing socio-economic conditions into account. By seeking legal redress to a customary matter, the subjects in Asaaju’s article demonstrate how gender relations are reconstructed to 
reflect changing socio-cultural dynamics, mediated between formal and informal institutions. The 
relevance of this debate transcends the colonial period. In present-day Niger, Najoum Alhassane 
shows how the weight of the matter remains relative to individuals and ethnic backgrounds. Using 
the case of Niamey, Alhassane shows how bride price has remained an essential part of marriage 
negotiation processes, and that its lack or insufficiency could signal the end of a negotiation 
process. At the same time, contemporary monetization of dowry has introduced some challenges, 
with reimbursement in divorce processes being the most critical. The two authors thus 
demonstrate how, across time, agency is shaped by responses to changing socio-economic and 
political realities, genders experiences, agency and positions of power in society. 
The issue of gender equality has been warmly received by feminists and human rights advocates 
across Africa. As Tamale and Oloka-Onyango (1995) point out, it is a debate that has managed to project the issue of women’s rights in Africa to the international platform. Several strategies have 
been employed to push for the acceptability of the agenda in the largely patriarchal African 
communities. Using the case of Nigeria, Umar Ahmed explores the use of various discursive 
strategies and linguistic structures such as the topoi of usefulness, justice and human rights, 
democracy, gender partnership, and religion, by female authors in the country to make a case for 
equal treatment of all genders. He employs methods and insights from Feminist Critical Discourse 
Analysis and Systemic Functional Grammar, to show how these strategies have been used in 
Nigerian print news media to advocate for equality of the genders, as a way of engendering social 
change in society. This change is necessitated by, among others, the realisation that patriarchy has contributed to women’s marginalisation in public decision-making processes and politics in general. Ahmed’s argument is that the attempt of the female authors at legitimization of gender 
equality and equity does not always serve as an instrument of achieving domination and 
hegemony. It also functions as a strong instrument to resist domination. Departing from this 
viewpoint, Shillah S. Memusi uses the case of the Maasai community in Kenya to demonstrate how patriarchal considerations have created barriers to women’s public agency, and how this is 
challenged by gender equality laws. She goes further to investigate how these formal state laws 
intersect with socio-norm environments, thereby reconstructing spaces for equality. Despite the barriers against the women’s public agency, Memusi argues that alternative gender equality 
pathways which are informed by contextual realities are still possible. Exploring these 
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alternatives thus creates room to navigate formal and informal norms environments that 
determine the equality status of women in society. 
Beyond the sphere of politics, Hanna Lena Reich focuses on the fact that strides in achieving 
gender equality in Africa have not extended to the LGBTQ community. There is still a lot of stigma 
associated with non-heterosexual relations, with limited spaces being available for non-
heterosexuals to meet and interact freely. Without laws to support gender transitions, Reich 
reports on experiences of transgenders in Nairobi, Kenya, where incidents of violence are 
common, and are compounded by a general lack of understanding of gender-identity struggles. 
This has therefore created a quest for safe spaces, which she reports are available after sunset. 
Beyond the experiences of trans persons, Reich prompts us to consider the night, which is mostly 
associated with n negativity, as a safe place and a context that allows concepts like gender to be 
contested and challenged. Her study thus sheds light on the conflict that ensues from a disconnect 
between identity and belonging, subject to societal expectations on gender and individual 
conduct.  
A discussion on gender and societal expectations would not be exhaustive if the role of religion 
was not considered. Change in religious identities is also important in the complexities of how 
gender may be understood in Africa. Since the 1980s, for instance, there has been an increase in 
veiling by Muslim women in many parts of Africa. This turn, part of the global Muslim revivalist 
movement, saw many Muslims ordering their lives toward piety and challenging traditional 
practices. However, this also led to different reactions which include Islamophobia. Of relevance 
to this volume, it raised the question on the agency of veiled Muslim women in modern society in public discourse and academia. Adeyemi Balogun’s study of Muslim women who embraced veiling 
in Yoruba society contributes to this debate. Drawing from different sources, his study illustrates 
how these women understood Islam and how they reacted to societal challenges in Yoruba society 
through protest, court action and negotiation in different social contexts. Following Mahmood’s (2005) study, he argues that the women’s turn to veiling is part of their effort to achieve piety, and 
that they activated their agencies not only through veiling, but also in their reactions. His study 
thus encourages us to see how Islam, which is understood in many western feminist discourses 
as perpetuating Muslim women’s subjugation, actually contributes to shaping the agency of 
women. 
References 
Abdullah, Hussaina (1993). Transition politics and the challenge of gender in Nigeria. Review of 
African Political Economy 56: 27-41. 
Awumbila, Mariama (2007). Challenging contexts: Gender studies and geography in Anglophone 
African Countries. Belgeo, Available at: http://belgeo.revues.org/11172. DOI: 
10.4000/belgeo.11172. (Accessed on 25.01.2019). 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   5 
Chappell, Louise (2006). Comparing Political Institutions: Revealing the Gendered “Logic of Appropriateness.” Politics and Gender. 2: 223-235. 
Ekeh, Peter (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1): 91–112. Hodgson, Dorothy (1996). “My Daughter… Belongs to the Government Now”: Marriage, Maasai 
and the Tanzanian State. Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des 
études africaines, 30(1): 106-123. Imam, M. Ayesha (2001). The Muslim religious right (“fundamentalists”) and sexuality. In Good sex: Feminist perspectives from the world’s religions, edited by P. B. Jung, M. E. Hunt, and 
R. B Alakrishnan. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Krook, Mona L. (2008). Quota Laws for Women in Politics: Implications for Feminist Practice 
Retrieved from: http://www.mlkrook.org/pdf/social_politics_2008.pdf. (Accessed on 
25.01.2019).  
Mahmood, Saba (2005). Politics of piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Okolo, Ifeyinwa (2014). Interrogating Sexual Preoccupations in Tanure Ojaide’s The Activist. 
Marang: Journal of Language and Literature. 24: 108-122. 
Oyèwùmí, Oyèrónke ́  (ed.) (2005). African Gender Studies: A reader. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Oyèwùmí, Oyèrónke ́  (1997). The Invention of Women. Making an African Sense of Western 
Gender Discourses. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Tamale, Sylvia / Oloka-Onyango, Joseph (1995). The personal is political, or why women's rights 
are indeed human rights: An African perspective on international feminism. Human Rights 
Quarterly. 17(4): 691 - 731. 
  
1 Introduction  
The quotation in the title of this article is taken from a written petition addressed to the Assistant 
District Officer and the Akure Native Authority. The request reported about a resolution that an assemblage of young unmarried men, under the name “The Boys”, had agreed upon in February 
1942 about bride price and bridewealth in Akure, a town in southwestern Nigeria. According to 
them, bridewealth had “soared so high”, and the girls of Akure have further complicated the 
situation by:  
being costly, after giving them £10.10 for love, you will have to give their father £10.10 
again, then they request about £15 for gold and £10 for clothes, these demands are 
unaffordable to most youths.  
They accused their elders (fathers) and women of “exploiting marriageable youths and encouraging the girls in their exorbitant demands.” Therefore, they decided to write the District 
Officer and Akure Native Authority to make and enforce laws for the reduction and regulation of 
bride price, failing which they may be forced not to marry women from their town or remain 
bachelors forever (National Archives Ibadan NAI, AkDivCo.2, 197/2, Marriage Rules 1942). Two 
similar organisations, the “Ijebu Mohammedan Youngmen Friendly Society” and “Ijebu Anti-High 
Bride Price League” (both in southwestern Nigeria) in 1943, directed its members not to pay more 
than £20 for a bride, irrespective of the educational status of the girl. So intense was the situation 
that some members of the Ijebu Native Authority met with the members of the organisations to 
assure them that each of their concerns would be investigated and addressed (NAI, Ije Prof 
Marriage Rules 1954). This anecdote reflects a broader trend in how conflicts over bridewealth, a 
sociocultural obligation and requirement for traditional marriage, were representative of gender 
relations and the intergenerational crisis in colonial southwestern Nigeria. 
The clamouring and the resolve of the young men fitted adequately into the prevailing culture of 
negotiating choice in the wake of new economic openings, institutions and political exploitation 
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by influential people. The young men’s call to regulate bride price and their threats not to marry 
women from their town, to remain bachelors forever, and not to pay more than £20 for a bride 
(irrespective of the educational status of the girl) emphasises the changing circumstances of the 
twentieth century, when young people increasingly appealed to new understandings of marriage 
pioneered by European missionaries, and further advanced by British administrators to gain agency against perceived injustice. The youth linked and equated marrying a wife to “getting into debt.” By the late 1920s, bride price and bridewealth were among the highest expenses incurred 
by unmarried young men in southwestern Nigeria. Consequently, one of the debates at the 1937 
conference of Yoruba chiefs was the need to enforce a uniform bride price across towns and 
communities in southwestern Nigeria (Fadipe 1970). Beyond its link to economic crisis, the youth 
were also emphasising cultural nationalism, by suggesting inter-ethnic marriages as another 
possibility in a multi-ethnic colonial Nigeria. However, the narrative of exorbitant bride price and 
bridewealth was not unique to Akure, Ijebu, or communities and individuals in southwestern 
Nigeria; individuals and groups across Nigeria persistently lamented the impact of high bride 
price on gender and generational relations. For example, by 1954 or even earlier, the problem had 
become so serious that the government of Eastern Region of Nigeria set up a committee to “investigate the social effects of the payment of bride price” and to “make recommendations for 
the removal of any anomaly or hardship” (Aderinto 2015).  
This study demonstrates how the junior men created an important status for themselves as they 
negotiated the authority of the senior men (chiefs and fathers) who facilitated marriage relations 
and served as cultural guardians. I then link this struggle to the larger legal debates on marriage. 
As young men stated their perspectives on marriage payments, they continuously unveiled a 
number of sociocultural and economic matters that connect intensely to the broader social change 
under British colonialism. 
2 Rethinking gender, marriage and related practices in colonial Africa 
in African historiography 
This study is situated at the intersection of literature on gender, marriage and marriage-related 
practices and law in colonial Africa (Asaaju 2018; Byfield 1996; Mann 1985). Historians of Africa 
have documented the transformation of marriage as part of the wider sociocultural and economic 
impact of colonialism. The central thesis of this large and growing body of work is that the 
entrenchment of colonialism led to the monetization of the society and the rise of urban centres, 
mining and plantations - the hub of colonial economic power. Bridewealth, the symbolic transfer 
of money, wealth and services from a groom and his family to that of the bride before marriage, 
has been a central point of discourse and debate by, gender historians. These debates have mostly 
developed around the purposes, meanings and implications of bridewealth. Bridewealth payment, 
which used to be made with agricultural produce and farm labour in precolonial times, was 
substituted with cash under colonial rule. Thus, marriage payments became monetized and 
commoditized, and this resulted in many rural communities imposing new financial commitments 
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on young men who migrated to work in the cities, in mines or on farmsteads to raise money for 
bride price and other marriage related expenses.  
Some comparison to bridewealth practices in other cultures helps to illuminate the changes that 
took place in southwestern Nigeria. Exploring the theme of bridewealth which focuses on three 
Native American ethnic groups, Jane Fishburne Collier argues that the meanings of bridewealth 
vary widely between people of common ethnicities. Collier demonstrates that bridewealth 
payments generally indicated personal wealth and family cohesion. Explaining this, she contends 
that when the groom pays the bridewealth from his personal resources, the gifts and the ability to 
give them demonstrate his personal ability and material comfort. In situation where the family 
paid the bridewealth in support of the groom, bridewealth was a demonstration of kin cohesion and an indication of the groom’s “worthiness and commitment” (Collier 1993). In the colonial 
history of certain communities in Asia and the Middle East, bridewealth was a means of striking alliances, “ending feuds and cementing a political alliance between families” (Moghadam 1999). 
In Africa, where several societies have a long historical tradition of bridewealth exchange, the 
debates about bridewealth are more extensive. These debates have placed significant importance 
on the purposes and significances of bridewealth. The central argument in this debate emphasises 
that the transfer of bridewealth suggests an economic investment in which families are involved 
in economic and social relationships that produced returns in the form of a wife’s productive and 
reproductive labour (Stephens 2009).  
In recent times, debates concerning bridewealth in African history have centred on the effects of 
colonialism on the institution. This growing body of scholarship examines how Africa’s integration 
into global market economies reshaped bridewealth cultures. The general argument suggests that 
colonialism and its interrelated economic effects led to tremendous increase in the cost of 
bridewealth, which eliminate the ability of young men to make marriage unions. Racheal Jean-
Baptiste contends that colonialism affected bridewealth amongst the Mpongwe ethnic group in 
colonial Gabon. She writes that bridewealth increased from transferring iron for a bride during 
the precolonial era to the payment of 15,000 to 20,000 francs in cash in addition to items such as “liquor, guns, ammunitions, knives, tobacco, cutlery and pricey European clothing during the 
colonial era” (Jean-Baptiste 2014). Yet, increasing bridewealth had clear-cut implications in 
different African societies because of the multiplicity of African cultures and colonial 
organisational structure. For example, in Gabon, increase in bridewealth forced some men to 
marry later than their predecessors, as men had to take a longer time to gather enough cash and 
goods for the bridewealth. This situation also created some increased enduring inter-racial 
concubine relations between young Mpongwe women and French traders who had the means to 
pay high bridewealth (Jean-Baptiste 2014).  
On the implication and connections of bridewealth to the questions of female consent, Brett Shadle’s exploration of court disputes in 1940s colonial Gusiiland, Kenya is significant. He 
explored the importance colonial courts attached to bridewealth, parental consent and female 
consent in deciding marital disputes between young women, their lovers or husbands, and their 
parents (Brett 2003). In her study of educated Yoruba elites in early colonial Lagos, Kristin Mann 
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investigated bridewealth and consent. She argues that societal norms placed greater emphasis on 
family consent on the choice of spouse. However, from the late 1880s young prospective brides 
and grooms (educated elites) increasingly “expressed strong feelings about whom they wanted to wed, and their kin often heeded their wishes.” This change in priority from family consent to the 
consent of prospective spouses was enhanced by the codification of customary law in colonial 
Lagos (Mann 1981: 1985). Similarly, Temilola Alamu examines the complications surrounding 
bridewealth, betrothal, conversion and marital consent in pre-colonial Abeokuta (Yorubaland). 
Using the journals of western-trained Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) evangelists in 
Abeokuta, she demonstrates that the conflicts surrounding bridewealth existed prior to colonialism. However, the advent of the CMS’s activities in the region enabled free young men and 
women a measure of agency within marriage negotiations. Thus, young free women in Abeokuta 
used the changing social landscape to their advantage either by pleading with their parents, 
refusing their matches or going to the mission house where they found partners (Alanamu 2015). 
Besides the exorbitant bridewealth payment which scholars have termed “marriage crises” in 
Africa (Brett 2003), new colonial laws such as those on marriage and divorce empowered women 
by giving them the opportunity to leave unhappy marriages (Asaaju 2018). The improvement of 
transportation system also increased women’s presence in urban centres and lessened the grip 
that rural patriarchy exerted on them (Coplan 2001; Little 1973). This article does not counter the 
established historical fact that marriage underwent significant transformations that varied from 
one part of Africa to another but focuses on the situation it created and how people responded to 
it in accordance with how it affected them. In doing this, I open up new perspectives for exploring 
the impact of colonialism on men and on gender and generational relations by retrieving the 
voices and opinions of young men from the court records, colonial archival documents and the 
pages of newspapers. Using a range of sources this article demonstrates that disputes over 
marriage and marriage payments were symbolic of larger tensions over decreasing and unequal 
access to political and economic resources which manifested themselves in conflicts across, and 
within, gender, status and generations.  
By deploying a variety of sources for investigating marriage, this article offers the following 
methodological perspectives to explain the gendered perspectives of debates and contestations 
over marriage in southwestern Nigeria. First, the depiction of men and marriage in the petitions 
in the colonial archival documents and newspapers of southwestern Nigeria took the debate over 
marital relations from its conventional domain - the colonial native courts and private family 
meetings - to a much wider public, providing young unmarried men, both literate and illiterate, 
the opportunity to criticise their subordinate position, sometimes using fictitious names, and 
writing under the name of a group to escape the sanctions and punishments of their activities. The 
petitions and newspapers were an important platform through which boyhood and maleness 
were achieved, shaped and reshaped. Second, the petitions and print media as an arena for 
expressing grievances and public debate did not only give young men the opportunity to exchange 
information about marriage across regions and places, but it also allowed them a great feeling of 
solidarity as common victims of marriage racketeering and fraudulent marriage practices. When 
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young men wrote about exorbitant bridewealth, they highlighted that they were being oppressed 
and suppressed. This situation, they argued constantly put them against the hegemonic influence 
of the senior men, whom they accused of exploiting hardworking young men and preventing them 
from fulfilling cultural obligations and the initiation ceremony into adulthood. 
The third perspective involves rereading the correspondence between colonial officers and native 
authorities and the native court records. From these records, it is evident that among the 
colonialists and the colonised not all men had the same opportunities and status. Local and foreign 
notions of gender roles, modernity and sociocultural obligation produced complex consequences 
of how men perceived themselves and how they were considered at different phases of their lives 
under shifting circumstances. Indeed, colonialism shaped marriage, gender and generational 
relations through the entrenchment of missionary education, wage labour, new colonial marriage 
laws and the institutions. It also transformed the pre-existing laws and customs and created new 
sets which were inconsistent with traditions and custom for achieving and preserving marriage, 
gender and generational relations. The colonial court records allow us to identify two categories 
of men: the elder men and fathers who imposed bridewealth and the subordinate young man who 
worked hard in the cities to obtain the necessary resources to fulfil marriage rites and obligations. 
These young men, mostly single and of a lower class who felt the negative impacts of marriage 
payments, were generally concerned about fulfilling cultural and financial expectations within 
their immediate communities. They repeatedly sought the intervention of the British 
administrators as the solution to the exploitation of the unmarried young men. While directing 
their grievances to their own kinsmen, they called for a just system that reduced the difficulty of 
meeting the financial requirements for marriage.  
Although gender and intergenerational conflicts manifested in several ways - from socialisation 
to morals and dressing, this conflict was most evident in the choice of a partner because marriage 
is important in the society. Marriage provided the basis for society. It is a process through which 
family was formed and is fundamental to the preservation of social identities that ensures 
protection. Marriage gave men and women the chance to achieve any status in society and, simply 
put, to be considered an adult. Marriage is an important relationship that closely linked different 
groups. With marriage peoples and groups extended kinship connections in different directions, 
establishing links with people with whom they previously had little or no relation. Thus, this study 
shows that marriage was important for the young men who expressed their complaints about 
marriage payment in petitions, newspapers and in the courts because they were troubled about 
developments in their immediate communities and cultures regarding the cost of bridewealth. 
3 Exploring the marriage crises: social and economic transformations 
in an era of colonial consolidation 
It is impossible to understand the gendered perspectives of the marriage payments exhibited in 
petitions on the pages of newspapers and in courts without highlighting the economic, political 
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and social changes that characterised southwestern Nigeria in the twentieth century and how 
women and men responded by adapting, negotiating and contesting their rights and duties over 
marriage which imposed new possibilities and limitations. These contestations played out in a 
number of complex and inconsistent processes: first, the integration and growing impact of the 
world economy on the Yoruba society; second, British imperialism and colonial marriage laws; 
and third, the establishment of the native courts. The most enduring legacies of these 
developments were the opportunities for wage labour and the establishment of the native courts. 
The opportunities for wage labour led to the emergence of a new group of working-class men 
whose personalities and incomes shaped the social expectations imposed on them by individuals 
and institutions that exerted immense power. Colonialism was a male-centred structure that 
placed men at the centre of state-building. Men, not women, dominated the wage employment 
such as mining, military and railway. 
Although the introduction of Christianity and Islam into Yorubaland has a great influence on 
fabrics of the culture and social institutions, it did not alter the significance of bridewealth 
payment. Irrespective of whether the parties practiced Christianity, Islam or Yoruba religion, 
without bridewealth there was no marriage. Infact, marriage could not exist independently from 
bridewealth. The exchange of bridewealth legitimised a union. Bridewealth linked two families, guaranteed a woman’s rights at her husband’s home and established the man’s sole sexual access and rights to a woman’s reproductive labour and by implication he could claim compensation 
from adulterers. Whereas aspects of these rights were debated, the extensive arrangement was 
not. Without bridewealth, any relationship between a man and a woman was illegal and 
recognised as something merely temporary, subject to be broken at any time, with neither party 
holding any privileges over the other.  
While the unique circumstances in the twentieth century and particularly opportunities for wage 
labour afforded young men and women the opportunity to be parties within marriage 
negotiations, the incorporation of Yorubaland into global market economies transformed 
bridewealth cultures. Thus, leading to astronomical increase in the cost of bridewealth, effectively 
reducing, and in some instances eliminating in total the ability of young men to contract marriage 
unions. The amount involved in bridewealth proved formidable for most men. Edward Ward 
wrote that in Ondo Province in the early 1930s a new bride could get £10.12 plus dashes for herself 
and her family, for a total of about £20. By 1938, the minimum he reported was about £14.10, 
compared with an average daily wage of 9 pence; marriage payments in this case implied about 
sixteen months labour. These figures correspond with amounts specified in Ibadan and Abeokuta 
court cases from the 1930s (Ake Native Court, Civil Record Book CRB 1930; Bere Ibadan Native Court 1952). Karin Barber’s informants narrated that between 1920 and 1950, bride price in the 
town of Okuku was between £6 and £7, plus other expenses which were up to £40 (Barber 1991). 
In fact, the standard bride price in this community was greater than the total cash value of a household’s yearly food consumption. A 1950 survey revealed that in the cocoa growing areas marriage expenses were estimated at £50, or about a year’s agricultural wages (Galletti et al. 1956; 
Ward 1937). 
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Conversely, bride price was only a part of the total cost of marriage. While courting, a suitor was 
expected to visit his fiancée’s parents frequently and to give them and their daughter small gifts 
of money. Once or twice a year during the engagement and throughout the period of the marriage, 
the suitor and his relatives or agemates were also requested to perform free labour for his father-
in-law. This often involved clearing farmland or repairing the house. Although this practice was 
fading out by the mid-1930s, payments were not. Several Abeokuta court cases even in the 1950s 
stated money spent to help a prospective father-in-law build a house (Ake Native Court, CRB 
1952). As the bride-to-be’s consent was essential for marriage, she also received payments. More than half of the total expenses were made to her in the form of gifts, or “friendship money” 
(Bascom 1969; Bier 1955). At the turn of the century more expenditures had been required; a 
suitor could be called upon to help defray unusual expenses incurred by any of his prospective in-
laws as well as his future father-in-law’s debts. This almost unlimited liability for the financial 
commitments and obligations was one reason why men across generations sought wage labour, 
abandoning agricultural work and migrating from their villages to the cities. These men were 
attracted to wage labour because of the opportunities to acquire money to fulfil obligations 
imposed by their communities. In a 1945 divorce case, the husband Olayemi, testified that when he married Olayeni in 1950 he loaned £10 to Olayeni’s father to prevent him from pawning his 
cocoa farm (Ake Native Court, CRB 1945). Also, in a 1950 case, an Itoku (Abeokuta) man sued to 
break the engagement of his daughter because he claimed the suitor had provided neither money 
nor labour (Ake Native Court, CRB 1950). Similarly, in 1950 Adesegun Gbadamosi sued to recover 
the marriage expenses he paid for Amuda Abeke. He testified that: 
When I first befriended the defendant, she got £3 from me to consult the oracle about 
our marriage. One month later, I gave her £5 to return to her former friend who was 
keeping her [her former fiancé who made payments on her]. A week after that she got 
1£ from me to cook food for her sister who was married. I gave her £2 when she was 
going to see her mother who had injury. I gave her £3 to buy a pair of shoes, £10 
friendship money, £1 when her brother named a child and £1.50 on eight occasions 
when I visited her (Ake Native Court, CRB 1950). 
While money meant married status; itemising expenses made announced that status and also served as a sign of the man’s commitment to the relationship. Informing the community about how much he has spent was a man’s way of showing his seriousness about the union (Allman / 
Tashjian 2000; Lindsay 2003). It is safe to argue that in colonial Yorubaland, to a good number of 
people marriage was all about money. Men were expected to make some payments to prospective 
brides and their families, while any of the parties could disrupt the marriages because of 
insufficient money. In a 1930 Ake court case, a woman named Jojolola was betrothed to someone 
else, but she married Labode ‘because he promised to give her money.’ Labode never paid her 
parents, and they compelled her to leave him (Ake Native Court, CRB 1930). In 1945 a woman 
named Adefunke asked for a divorce because of an unpaid balance of her bridewealth, though she 
had lived with her husband for about ten years. (Ake Native Court, CRB 1945). After two years of 
courtship with no money given to her, Kafilat of Ijeja town brought Labode, a native of Owu, to 
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court for divorce, citing ‘neglect’ (Ake Native Court, CRB 1945). While I do not foreclose the 
possibility of other factors in these breakups, what is important for this section is that money threatened men’s ability to get married and stay married.  
Besides marriage payments, the new consumerist lifestyle, which was firmly established as 
Nigeria became integrated into the capitalist world economy system, also increased the need for 
cash. Access to cash was significant for negotiating new social and political relations: with cash a 
man had the opportunity of competing for and getting important chieftaincy titles and playing 
important roles in his community. Besides being attractive for labour employment opportunities, 
the city offered men as well as women opportunities to explore new social and sexual relations, 
which the community would disapprove. 
For several unmarried men, marriage expenses were a primary reason for early twentieth-
century labour migration, as reported throughout Africa (Beinart 1982; Bravman 1998; Peel 
1983; White 1990). With the expansion of such opportunities, young men were increasingly able to “abbreviate the period of their juniority” (Peel 1983) by earning cash away from home. J.D.Y 
Peel recounted that early osomaalo (itinerant traders) explained that they had undertaken 
itinerant trade because “mo fe gbeyawo’’ (I wanted to get married) (Peel 1978). By the 1930s, 
engaging in migrant trade and wage labour to raise money for marriage payments was well 
established (Peel 1983). N.A Fadipe, a Yoruba sociologist who studied marriage in southwestern 
Nigeria in the early 1930s and wrote very insightfully about his people, linked bride price inflation 
to the railway, wage labour and commercial expansion. As the rail line extended to northern 
Nigeria, he explained that unskilled government labour allowed a man to earn in one year what it 
would take three years of farming to save, and this money was commonly used by young men for 
getting married. He also pointed out that wage employment affected marriage custom for many 
young men. According to him, 
the introduction of wage employment also meant a modification of the custom that a 
son remained directly under his father in whatever occupation he followed from 
about the age of six until his marriage, and that the father should, thereafter, get a wife 
for him (Fadipe 1970). 
However,  
the latter custom, with regards to those in salaried or wage employment, no longer 
holds since a young man is now responsible for finding money for paying the bride 
price of his fiancée (Fadipe 1970). 
Also, with the arrival of the railway and increased economic opportunities through wage earning, 
parents, who could not themselves take advantage of the increased economic opportunities 
through earning wages, attempted to benefit from the enhanced standard of living by demanding 
extravagant rates from suitors (Fadipe 1970). Consequently, the scale of bridewealth maintained 
some pace with the rise in prosperity. The end of World War I witnessed an enormous rise in 
14  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23 
prices of local crops, specifically cocoa. Unfortunately, the prices were not sustained for a long 
time before depression sets in (Berry 1975). These developments further complicated the 
increasing amounts demanded as bridewealth. There was a measure of recovery between 1925 
and 1928, but this was followed by a worse price slump. The scale of bridewealth, which had come 
into effect during the years of economic boom had remained unaltered, much to the anguish of the 
young men who had to pay. Paying for their own marriage expenses allowed many young men to 
choose their own spouses more frequently than they had before. Women, too, began to demand 
more influence in their choice of husbands, often preferring young earners with cash over older 
men or non-migrants (Peel 1983: 2000). By the 1930s, Fadipe clearly links changes in marital 
relations to the railway industry including its construction camps and stations. He argued that the 
railway construction camps, and later the railway stations, attracted women and girls in their 
pursuit of trade and their contacts with clerks and artisans led already-married women and 
betrothed girls to defy both parents and public opinion in their affairs. Women who wanted to 
leave their husbands simply approached the office or the court of the Resident Commissioner to 
sue for divorce. Also, young girls whose parents wished to force them into a marriage also 
obtained the protection of the colonial representatives through the courts (Fadipe 1970). The women’s actions and their connections with the railway workers cannot be separated from the 
larger economic quests. With the opening of the interior for trade and as the depression of the 
First World War began to bite hard, it made sense for women to take up such opportunities to 
improve their standard of living. Under these circumstances, significant changes in marriage 
customs in Yorubaland were initiated. These women pushed the boundaries of marriage by 
renouncing and rejecting the betrothal of girls in infancy without their consent, initiating marriage 
by mutual consent and the popularisation of divorce. 
The unstable character of the colonial economy that manifested during the Great Depression and the World Wars, poor working conditions and unequal worker’s compensation prevented men 
from wholly exploiting the advantages of working away from home. Consequently, between the 
1930s and 1950s workers went on strike to demand improved working conditions (Oyemakinde 
1975). Unemployment was on the increase, as about twenty thousand unemployed people 
registered with the government labour office in Lagos in the early 1920s and the numbers 
increased by the period of depression (Aderinto 2015). These developments worsened the 
financial status of most young men preventing them from fulfilling monetary obligations to their 
fiancées, families and communities. In essence, wage labour did not automatically create wealthy 
young men; in reality, only very few men amassed wealth through it. Instead, it provided access 
to consistent income through which people were able to meet their basic needs but insufficient 
for exorbitant marriage payments. Thus, this situation suggests that while some men were able to 
make exorbitant marriage payments, others were not able to do so. 
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4 Petitions and debates over marriage and bridewealth in the print 
media 
The paper makes use of framing and crisis communication concepts in exploring how Kenyan 
press adopted distinctly different framing strategies in their coverage of the famine as it progressed, and thus impacted the Kenyan public’s response to the crisis. Before delving into 
framing concepts, it is important to first tackle the question: why do media matter? 
When men condemned their communities for imposing high bridewealth on them, they 
sometimes compared European culture with African culture and contended that the payment of 
bridewealth was not a prerequisite for marriage in Europe. Thus, they considered African modes 
of marriage as a form of slavery to penalise women. They attempted to redefine the conditions of marriage by suggesting that “marriage must be only out of pure love which cannot be purchased with money” and that the wish of the prospective bride and groom must overrule that of their 
parents (The Osunmare Egba 1936). This proposal attempted to individualise marriage by 
isolating the extended family from interfering in conjugal matters in breach of the prevailing 
norms that considered marriage as a relation between families rather than two individuals. The 
idea of individualising marriage or attempting to limit parental involvement mirrors the colonial 
influence of modernity - the idea of following the path of European states. Hence a contributor to 
a local newspaper who preferred the termination of the bridewealth system employed the 
language of modernity by associating bride price with “backwardness and oppression”. He wrote: 
The system [bride price] is a kind of oppression, depression and all impression 
equally ruinous to the husband who is unable to recover his heavy amount, and the 
woman who owing to inability to pay or return the exorbitant dowry must remain 
forever with the husband whom she abhors to live with. In those parts of the world 
where civilisation is a matter of thought and action, no such selling erroneously 
termed dowry in connection with marriage exists; only character and financial 
equipment of the would-be-husband that count (The Osunmare Egba 1936). 
The contributor concluded his writing by suggesting that the European form of marriage should 
be embraced and further cautioned parents who demand exorbitant bride price on their 
daughters to be “aware that they are impoverishing, not only husband and wife but the unborn generation” (The Osunmare Egba 1936).  
None of the article I saw which demonstrates more effectively the irritation of most men regarding 
exorbitant marriage payments than the opening paragraph and conclusion of an author identified 
as Toye in Egbaland Echo, which read more like his own experience:  
Please allow me a space to talk to other men about marrying a wife and the grossly 
extravagant money we men spend on women as love money that the court does not 
acknowledge (The Egbaland Echo 1950). 
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Such monies include: money for the alarena (intermediary), owo Iyawo Ile (money for the 
housewives), and owo omo ile (money for the children of the household), among others. He argued 
that if the court would not recognise these payments it was:  
needless paying them, because these payments have made several women without husbands. Several men have vowed not to pay them or request for women’s hand in 
marriage but resort to taking over other women in the courts, by refunding the bridewealth to their estranged husbands” (The Egbaland Echo 1950). 
This in his opinion has led to the increase of divorce and marital cases in the native courts. He 
therefore, called on the native authorities to review existing laws of marriage payments because “if a custom was detrimental to the society and the people, it would not be out of place to review or scrap such custom” (The Egbaland Echo 1950).  
Notwithstanding the complex nature of debates over marriage payments, most men wanted the 
amounts reduced and not completely removed. They understood the significance and value of 
bridewealth as that fundamental part of traditional marriage that sanctioned a man’s status as 
husband. Another writer simply identified as Oke clearly explained the impact of the non-payment 
of bridewealth on gender relations in marriage and on marital relations:  
A woman whose husband has paid no dowry (bride price) for her, will at the slightest 
opportunity disrespect him and remind him of not expending any costs over her (NAI 
Marriage Notes 1918). He also stated that the “failure of husbands to complete bridewealth payments had consequences for the respectability of the wives in the marriage and for the custody of the children” (NAI 
Marriage Notes 1918). Indeed, when these men wrote about the problem of marriage and 
marriage payments, they attempted to enlighten their community about their suffering and 
challenges in their attempts at making a living in the city. Through petitions, they refuted the 
claims that men from the city made a lot of money and as a means to pass home their demand for 
reduction of bride price. The youths’ narratives in the petitions include the difficult conditions 
under which they worked, the kinds of work they did, everyday life and the unfair decisions of the 
courts in cases of refund of bridewealth. 
5 Contestations over marriage and bridewealth in the colonial courts  
From about 1914, the new native courts established across the southwestern region were up and 
running. Though most people in the region were probably sceptical of the courts, preferring to 
wait and see what will happen in them, a number of litigants brought disputes before the new 
courts. Between 1914 and 1957, the Ake Abeokuta native courts heard a total of 3,365 cases on 
bridewealth. Two of the first ten cases brought before the court in January 1914 dealt with a 
husband and a fiancé seeking to recover their bridewealth payments from their father-in-law 
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because the wife moved out of the house and the wife-to-be refused to honour the marriage 
arrangement. Adewunmi of Idiaba town sued his father-in-law, Adeyemi Nurenu, because Adeyemi’s daughter had left him and Adewunmi wanted to recover the £30 expended as 
bridewealth (Ake Native Court, CRB 1914). Adesegun of Ijeja brought a case against his 
prospective father-in-law, Laisi, because his daughter did not want to live with Adesegun as his 
wife. Adesegun wanted to recover the £20 he had given Laisi as bridewealth for his daughter (Ake 
Native Court, CRB 1914). In both cases, the court ruled in favour of the woman’s choice and 
granted a divorce and the refund of bridewealth.  
Whether the native courts were compassionate to women’s claims in favour of divorce or ordered a wife to refund her estranged husband’s bridewealth, the judgements all highlighted the 
contractual nature of marriage. The essential component in Yoruba marriage is the strategic 
investment - “the circulation of goods and personnel in social streams” - that revolves around 
building and maintaining webs of kinship and in organising and controlling labour (White 1991). 
Marriage definitely builds kinship between groups. It also creates conditions for the generation of 
recognised descendants who are children. Marriage also transfers to the husband and his kinship group rights to his wife’s labour, her reproductive power and rights of sexual access (Roberts 
2005). Yoruba marriage is a long-term investment and transaction; the woman’s labour and 
services provide some immediate returns for the substantial bridal costs, while many of the 
benefits will be amassed over the subsequent years. Marriage is a complicated affair and the problems with it are numerous and complex. The court records clearly highlight the ‘‘trouble spots’’ in these relationships and put their conflictual nature in perspective. Marital relations were 
clearly bounded by certain expectations; as long as husbands and wives related to each other 
within these expectations were met, then the marriage would persevere. Cases arrived in court 
when expectations were not fulfilled. In the courts, wives and husbands employed these limits in 
seeking dissolution of their marriages. Bridewealth was clearly one of the trouble spots in Yoruba 
marriage and the consequences of a failed marriage or marriage arrangement and a major source 
of disharmony between the father of the bride and the groom.  
As previously explained, with the arrival of the railway and increased opportunities for wage-
earnings, parents took advantage of the increased economic opportunities to demand high 
bridewealth from prospective sons-in-law. With this, the scale of bridewealth kept pace with the 
rise in prosperity and prevented many young men from marrying or marrying later than 
projected. Young lovers, watching their hopes of marriage disappear, eloped or ignored the 
process of bridewealth by arranging with the young woman to allow herself to be abducted. These ways and means were employed to convince the woman’s father to accept either a reduced 
bridewealth, payment of bridewealth in instalments, or treatment of unpaid bridewealth as a debt 
that the young man may never honour (Fadipe 1970). Women forced into marriage with wealthy 
and influential men who had more money for bridewealth absconded, moving in with lovers of 
their choice. Thus, the native courts became flooded with fathers, daughters and future sons-in-
law in contestations over bridewealth and women. In Abeokuta, bridewealth disputes 
represented 9.3 percent of the 65 percent of all marital disputes. Similarly, the divorce cases 
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presented before the courts which represented 41.6 percent also involved wives or fiancée 
refunding bridewealth. 
The era of many marital troubles was a product of two factors. First was the nature of Yoruba 
bridewealth. Most men and families raised money for social and economic projects or repaid 
existing debts by exploiting bridewealth. For example, in many of the divorce cases presented before the courts, majority of the husbands testified to paying an existing loan for the wife’s family 
or redeemed the bride from pawn as part of bridewealth payment. The second factor was the 
social transformations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, more specifically the colonial 
economy. The new wealth spreading in Yorubaland, unequally dispersed, forced the bridewealth 
rate up to amounts unseen or witnessed for decades. Individuals, as well as families, needed 
money for the payment of taxes, clothing, and other daily merchandise, education, and lawsuits. 
For some time, the sale of agricultural produce satisfied these needs, but at the turn of the century, 
this was not the case. Young men had opportunities to offer their labour for wages as a means of 
building wealth. With these possibilities, a new class of men emerged - chiefs, state employees, 
the educated and literate, and the skilled or semi-skilled. These men with access to new wealth 
ventured into other business enterprises such as trade in crops like coffee, retail shops, grinding 
mills, and transportation. Consequently, a gap emerged between the wealthy and the masses. 
These rich men gave more bridewealth, even well above the pegged price. In 1930, James Ogunjimi 
of Ago-Oko, Abeokuta, an ex-service man, petitioned a certain man identified as Tejuoso. The 
petition reads in part:  
When I was discharged from the army I spent all my money on Miss Rebecca Tejuoso 
who promised to marry me, but after I have spent every necessary dowry on her, her 
father by name Mr. Richard Tejuoso gave her to a railway official by name Mr Bankole, 
but the railway official refused to refund my money (NAI, Egba Council Records ECR 
1930). 
James estimated the total bridewealth he expended as £25, while Mr Bankole claimed to have 
expended £50 as bridewealth. These amounts were far above the proposed amounts for 
bridewealth in this period. With the rates of bridewealth upwards, few men gave more while 
others had nothing to offer. As a result, bridewealth was at a level never witnessed in Yorubaland 
since at least the nineteenth century. 
From the cases on bridewealth presented before the courts we gain insights into what constituted 
marriage, why people got married, their expectations from marriage and the roles of kin in the 
marital process. Bridewealth cost had become so inflated during the period of prosperity that 
young men found it difficult to marry. Several fathers preferred to give their daughters to the man 
who could pay more for bridewealth, pushing their daughters or women into marriage with men 
whose only qualifying factor was their wealth and status. Young men responded by abducting 
their lovers with the aim to make a marriage or ran off with women because they could not afford 
to marry. This situation led to pockets of resistance in the form of petitions, newspaper editorials 
and the flooding of the native courts with marital issues. These circumstances compelled the 
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Yoruba chiefs in 1937, during their first conference, to consider pegging the amount of 
bridewealth. In 1928, a man identified as Folarin appealed to the Alake and council to make some 
strong regulations because women charged all sorts of fees that were not specified by the 
regulations on marriage (NAI, ECR 1948). In neighbouring Ijebu town, the Ijebu Muslim Friendly 
Society, Ijebu Mohammedan Young Men Friendly Society, and Ijebu Anti-High Bride Price League 
all enjoined the District Officer, Ijebu-Ode and the Ijebu Native Authority to come up with stricter 
regulations for bridewealth to prevent several men from “the evil of the exorbitant cost of marriage and immoral women who make our men to incur unpayable debt” (NAI Marriage Rules 1940). These concerns were also echoed in faraway Akure by a group identified as the “Sons of 
the Soil Akure” in several petitions addressed to the Akure Native Authority (NAI Marriage Rules 
Akure 1942). These groups of young men argued that bridewealth as practiced had become 
fraudulent from the original intent and was the cause of many disagreements between a 
prospective father-in-law and son-in-law. They also linked bridewealth to the high rates of divorce 
in their specific communities as well as neighbouring towns. 
These debates encapsulate the issues that were crucial to the history of Yoruba marriage for three 
decades or more before and after 1937. Bridewealth was gradually rising higher, only to remain 
higher despite the attempts of chiefs and British administrators to regulate it. Marital disputes 
originated in great numbers by uncontainable bridewealth forcing colonial officials to insert 
themselves into affairs among Africans. Young and old men and women, sometimes acting 
maliciously and selfishly in marriage, regularly trying to pick from the best available options and 
living out their aspirations to their best. The conference of the Yoruba chiefs came at one of those 
historical moments that, in reappraisal, signalled the end of one era and the dawn of another. The 
decades before 1937 appeared to have been a period of prosperity in which bridewealth was 
quickly accumulated. Marital cases were on the rise and their numbers intensified and deepened 
in the subsequent years. Even with the directives of chiefs and colonial administrators to place 
limits on bridewealth, some men with female dependents continued to request for bridewealth 
which is beyond the pronounced amounts and men who wanted to marry paid these amounts. 
Within a decade, the chiefs and colonial officials soon accepted that no proclamation could ever 
peg bridewealth. Thus, the efforts to reduce bridewealth to more practical payments were not so 
productive. It was clear that citizens across southwestern Nigeria were not following the new 
limits. As fathers and families continued to consider the highest bidder in bridewealth payment, 
the institution of marriage became devalued as an avenue to acquire wealth and as a breeding 
ground for illicit sex. Escalating costs of bridewealth advanced a practice of divorce; prevented 
young men from marrying or marrying a little later than anticipated, strengthened the influence of women’s in-laws over the homes of their sons-in-law, and instigated tensions and instability. 
Consequently, young men suffered a double tragedy: being hindered by the initial expenses of 
marriage and repeatedly, two or three months after a marriage, the wife requesting a divorce. 
The inability of elite men and colonial officials to regulate bridewealth across southwestern 
Nigeria was in keeping with the failure of similar attempts across Africa in the period of colonial 
rule. For example, in Maradi, Niger Barbara Cooper argues that the attempt at regulating 
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bridewealth through the Jacquinot decree had little effect because it failed to take into account 
local variations in the amounts, contents and significance of bridewealth (Cooper 1997). These 
failed attempts were also echoed in Gabon and Kenya where French and British colonial personnel 
together with African chiefs and African political figures also made wartime and post-war efforts 
to limit bridewealth payments (Jean-Baptise 2014; Shadle 2003). As in Maradi, Kenya, and Gabon, 
bridewealth regulation policies in southwestern Nigeria failed due to non-compliance by 
communities and individuals and the failure of African and colonial political leaders to enforce the 
very limits that they had set. In Abeokuta, for instance, no husband at the time of divorce would 
accept being reimbursed only the official amount; husbands continuously argued to prove that 
they had paid a certain amount over several years above the official amount and would demand 
to be reimbursed the entire amount. In addition, only a few individuals registered their marriages 
in colonial registers. Thus, the state had limited capacities to enforce regulations. The increasing 
number of marital cases brought before the courts also demonstrated that the attempts at 
regulation was less effective. It reveals the conflicts of interest and the contestations among 
African men of different generations about access to wealth and the shifting landscape of defining 
marital relations. Consequently, the debates over divorce, bridewealth and marriage opened 
avenues for women to exercise extramarital control over their sexuality and their persons. 
6 Men’s agency in bridewealth debates 
Early colonial and postcolonial ethnographies depict marriage as a set of relationships between 
male household heads in which the groom and bride were passive. The court records and petitions 
shed lights on the anxieties that surrounded marriage and bridewealth payments in the twentieth 
century. Due to social and political changes occurring in Yorubaland, most especially the 
increasing and decreasing opportunities for wage labour, and the establishment of the native 
court, young men and women were rejecting a lifestyle that they considered incompatible with 
their newly-found independence. For matters concerning marriage, this usually meant that the 
young men rejected the matches made on their behalf when they were young thus breaking 
established traditions because of inflated bridewealth. A young man narrated to his friends how 
he dissolved a marriage process which his parents had initiated when he was young because the girl’s parents ‘‘repeatedly inflated bridewealth’’ (NAI, AkDivCo.2, 197/2, Marriage Rules 1942). 
Although we do not know how this matter was finally resolved, the young man gave his example 
as a way of empowering other young men to follow his example. Similarly, Young men returning 
home with their wage labour earnings put elders in a difficult situation. Youth now had cash of 
their own to use as bridewealth, releasing themselves from dependence on their elders. 
Grooms fought for the significance and consequence of inflating bridewealth in marriage 
contracts. They established that fathers and women were active agents in the creation of the 
complex situation. One strategy was to attribute full responsibility to the elders, some of who were 
polygamists in their communities. These elders had regular interaction with British 
administrators and believed British administrators could see beyond the individual cases that 
came before them and understood the larger context in which they made their decisions. Thus, 
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while the elders maintained that he who had not given bridewealth had no claims over a woman, 
they did not always rule this way. In marital cases, the elders tried to balance out the rights of 
women against the men. Consequently, the younger generations demanded for the stabilisation 
of bridewealth in order to bring some semblance of order to marriage in Yorubaland. 
Marriage customs, specifically the amounts involved in bridewealth that elder men had defended 
and attempted to convince the colonial administrators as essential to communal stability now 
appeared outmoded, backward and an obstruction to imperial goals. Colonial officials who had 
previously expended little energy in overseeing the courts, undertook to revamp the courts. New 
rules were created and enforced. New and educated elders who could better follow the more 
complex administrative regulations were appointed. This commitment to creating and enforcing 
court policies was where the new administrative judgements on women, bridewealth and 
marriage would have the deepest impact. The courts would no longer be able to force women back 
to their husbands or fathers as long as bridewealth was to be refunded. At the same time the 
number of women and men creating illicit unions increased, and the state could not grant senior 
men extensive assistance. While the native courts remained vital to the young men’s quest to 
uphold their vision of marriage in Yorubaland, their success could not be guaranteed. 
7 Conclusion 
This article has shown the controversies over bridewealth in colonial southwestern Nigeria. This 
controversy fell within the framework of strained relations between junior and senior men. The 
junior men debated their stance in print media, wrote petitions to the colonial and native 
administrators and presented their cases in the native courts. Young unmarried men became 
newspaper columnists and wrote petitions criticising the impact of exorbitant bridewealth as 
persistently lamented about their inability to achieve the conditions necessary for marriage and 
rite of passage to adulthood. They also expressed strong disapproval of the decisions on 
bridewealth-related issues in the native courts and the continued sympathy of the courts towards 
the women. Thus, one of the main contributions of this article to African research on gender, 
marriage and marriage-related practices is its use of a combination of sources - petitions, 
newspapers and court records - which outline the contest among men and women of different 
generations and backgrounds and its consequence for conjugal relationships. 
Although debates about bridewealth in the form of petitions or in the newspapers are full of 
several contradictions, these contradictions should be anticipated. Within the various Yoruba 
communities, marriage expenses varied. Even with the introduction and spread of Christianity 
and Islam and their two forms of marriages (referred to in Yorubaland as Christian marriage and 
Islamic marriage) most men preferred Yoruba (indigenous) marriage, yet they questioned the 
fairness and legality of social responsibilities that greatly affected their financial strength. The inconsistencies in the men’s concerns cannot be separated from the wider problem of colonial modernisation. The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed Africans’ selective 
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condemnation of African native laws and customs by way and means of supporting their ever-
changing positions on fundamental issues and problems, like marriage, that concerned them. 
Transformations in African marriage are a worthwhile area of scholarly research as evidenced by 
growing body of works that continue to emerge, but there are still some gaps. For instance, it will 
be interesting to take the debates further to the postcolonial period. In other words, how do the 
transformations and debates under colonialism continued to influence people’s understanding of 
their role and members of their communities and a new independent nation? Much of the present 
work focuses on the colonial period, yet we need works that chronicle the reconfiguration of the 
intersection of gendered concerns and debates over marriage since the demise of colonial rule in 
1960. Did new forms of concerns emerge after independence? What kinds of political and social 
conditions or changes ushered in the growth or consolidation of new forms of apprehensions? For 
instance, by October 1, 1960, several statutes were further enacted to regularise certain 
customary laws. Many of them were gazetted as local byelaws and were administered by 
customary courts (previously known as native courts). A typical example is the “Marriage, Divorce 
and Custody Adoptive Bye-laws” Order 1958, administered in all customary courts of 
Southwestern Region of Nigeria. This bye-law introduced new sets of ideologies about marrying 
and obligations in marriage. It is important to know what these new ideologies and dynamics 
teach us about marriage and gender relations in postcolonial southwestern Nigeria. What is more 
noteworthy is that political and economic developments since independence have impacted all 
areas of life in Nigeria especially with the oil boom of the 1970s. There is need for historical 
research on how expanding and decreasing socioeconomic opportunities, changes in government 
administration, and the extension of educational institutions, among other developments have 
transformed marriage, gender and intergenerational relations.  
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1 Introduction 
In many African cities, marriages are usually registered or conducted according to customary 
and/or religious rather than civil law. In Niamey, the capital city of Niger, for example, people 
rarely conduct civil marriages. The few who practice it do so as a supplementary to the more rec-
ognized religious or customary rites. People in Niamey, like many of their counterparts in the 
south of the Sahara region hold the opinion that a marriage is only valid with the payment of what they call “dot” in French. “Dot” in English literature has several names and meanings. Very recur-rent terms are ‘’dowry’’, “bride price” or “bridewealth”. Literature on marriages in Africa high-
lights the importance of bridewealth in African marriages as well as its forms, nature and the roles 
it plays in conjugal alliances. Even though in the family codes of some African countries the pay-
ment of bridewealth is prohibited, it is still popular and a common practice among many ethnic 
groups (see: Akouhaba Anani 2011). 
As in most Sub-Saharan societies, in Niger and particularly in Niamey the payment of bridewealth 
is characteristic of marriage alliances. In Niamey, it is referred to as sadaki1 or sadakin aure, terms 
in Hausa language2 that can be described as ‘’money that a groom gives to his bride through her parents or guardians in order to marry her’’. The sadaki is a fundamental aspect of a conjugal alli-
ances in Niamey. After a brief review of the literature, this article examines how the amount pay-
able to the bride as sadakin aure depends on several parameters. It discusses the position and 
roles of women in determining the amount of their own sadaki, even before their parents get in-
volved in the negotiations. 
This article, further, elaborates on why attempts to regulate or fix sadaki in Niger by some military regimes and some religious reformists like the ‘Yan Izala3 have failed. While literature on marriage 
                                                 
1 Sadaki (Hausa term) in this context means in Arabic mahr. The latter is a wedding gift that a fiancé must offer to his 
fiancée during the contract of an Islamic marriage. Mahr is one of the material rights to a Muslim woman who marries.” 
2 The use of Hausa terms in this article comes from the fact that, most of my respondents – regardless of their ethnicity – speak Hausa. 
3 Izala is one of the largest Islamic movements in Niger. People who follow this movement are called ‘Yan Izala. 
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tends to focus on the role of bridewealth in conjugal alliances, this article delves on the role of 
bridewealth in the breakdown of conjugal alliances, an aspect that is largely unexplored. This con-
tribution will therefore discuss the role of sadaki in marital breakdowns, especially in cases where 
women seek divorce.  
The term divorce is used in the Islamic Association of Niger (A.I.N.) or in the district courts of 
Niamey, mostly when a wife decides to dissolve her marriage. In contrast, repudiation (in Arabic 
talâq) is known as an act by which a husband “unilaterally” decides to break the marriage that 
binds him to his wife. However, the article illustrates that in Niamey, repudiation is not always a 
unilateral decision of men. When marital conflict reaches a certain threshold, women prefer repu-
diation over divorce. It further elaborates how the declaration of President Seyni Kountché 
from1975 on the setting of the expenses of marriages, affects the access to divorce for women in 
Niamey today.  
This article is part of my doctoral thesis in anthropology dealing with marriages and marital 
breakdowns in Niamey. I conducted ten months field research in Niamey, between June 2016 and 
July 2017. This field research focused mainly on three levels of information gathering. The data 
was collected from several families (family level), religious organizations that fall within the 
framework of alliances and divorces (religious level) and in courts (judicial level) all in Niamey. 
The main data collection technique was participant observation, as part of which I conducted 
some internships in the two main institutions that manage marital conflicts in Niamey, the Islamic Association of Niger (A.I.N.) and in the magistrate’s courts of Niamey. Thus, most of my data is 
based on observations as well as conversations with married women and men, their parents and 
other important actors (preachers, alkalai (customary or Islamic judges) and civil judges).  
There are certainly several ethnic groups of different social classes in Niamey. Despite differences 
in ethnic and social classes, inter-ethnic and inter-class marriages are frequent. In most of the 
marriages, Islam plays a crucial role. Furthermore, the Islamic and Judicial institutions that pro-
vided some empirical data for this study, discourage the categorization of people into ethnic or 
social classes in the settlement of marital conflicts. However, some matrimonial practices ob-
served in Niamey do not have an Islamic origin, but customary practices and Islam are inter-
twined. Thus, this article goes beyond focusing on one ethnic group versus another or one social 
class over another. 
2 Context and problem 
Before I describe the case study of sadakin aure in Niamey, it is important to review the literature 
on bridewealth in Africa in general. What distinguishes African societies concerning bridewealth 
is often its nature and use. The bridewealth in Africa usually comes from the groom or his family to the bride’s family during the marriage ceremony to seal the marriage contract and to legitimize 
the future descendants of the marriage (Colleyn 1982; Munzimi 2006). Depending on the different 
societies where it is practiced, it can be either in form of money and/or goods. According to Isiugo-
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Abanihe, for example, in an Ibo society in Nigeria the bridewealth was offered in the form of tan-
gible goods like cows, goats, yams, etc. He further states that the quantity of donated goods was not fixed. It depended on the status of the bride’s family, her physical attractiveness and many 
other aspects of her abilities regarding farming or household (Isiugo-Abanihe 1994). Other au-
thors, like Bernus, mention that the status of the groom or his family influence the amount of 
bridewealth as well (Bernus 1992). The bridewealth has several interpretations or significations.  
2.1 Dowry, bridewealth, marriage compensation or bride price?  
Literature in social sciences offers several interpretations of the bridewealth. It has been called “marriage consideration”, “marriage compensation”, “pledge of alliance” or “bride price”. For So-lus Henri (1950) and Nkouendji Maurice (1975) the “dot” (also: dowry) is considered as a pur-
chase price paid by a man to acquire a woman. Nkouendji Maurice, asserts in his participation in 
the realization of the new family law in Cameroon that  
it is a purchase, it is necessary to proceed (as any sales matter) to the removal espe-
cially as the seller most often desires to release his responsibility for custody at the 
earliest4 (see: Akouhaba Anani 2011; Bitota Muamba 2003). 
However, authors like Bitota Muamba (2003) or Djibo Boukari (1962) do not share this point of 
view. For them the bridewealth is not the purchase price of a woman.  “At Sodoké, the greatest insult a husband can inflict on his wife is to let her know that she has been bought by the payment of the “dot” (bridewealth). This can even cause 
a divorce: some humble families when the “dot” begins to grow to somewhat enor-
mous proportions, refuse to receive it because this amount completely loses its mean-
ing”5 (Djibo, 1962: 547).  Thus, the term “bride price” is highly criticized. For Mair the bridewealth should not be reduced to the “price of the woman” because the woman remains still a member of her clan or her family 
even when she is married (Mair 1974). 
It is in this framework that Evans-Pritchard proposes the term bridewealth (Phillips 1978), in-
stead of bride price. In this case, the bridewealth symbolizes rights to the marriage not purchase 
of a woman, in other words, it represents the rights of the husband over his wife and the rights 
that a father can have over his children (see: Bounang Mfoungué 2012). Furthermore, the term “dot” (dowry) is often used in Francophone literature to refer to the payment of “bride price” or a “matrimonial compensation” that a fiancé gives to his fiancée or her parents before the marriage 
takes place. But the concept "dot" in French or "dowry" in English, comes from the Latin "dotis" 
meaning gift. Dictionary Larousse illustrated (2009) defines dowry as "Goods that a woman brings 
when she gets married." According to Segalen Martine (2004) dowry is a kind of contribution that 
                                                 
4 The authors translation. 
5 The authors translation. 
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the woman makes to the marriage through an economic contribution necessary for the good func-
tioning of her household. 
For Marc Pilon, it is the middle class in parts of French-speaking Africa that translated the term bridewealth as “dowry" (dot). He further asserts that the term "bridewealth" applies to marriages 
arranged by families based on certain payment schedules, which some call ‘price of the fiancée’ 
(Pilon 1994: 135). The same expenditure is also called in the context of many Sub-Saharan socie-
ties "matrimonial compensation”. Matrimonial compensation here refers to the property that the woman’s family enjoys in order to acquire another wife and fill the gap left by the woman who 
leaves the family or the clan. The woman is seen here as a reproductive agent. This is confirmed 
by the fact that a woman who dies or separates from her spouse without having given birth causes 
the return of the bridewealth (Bounang Mfoungué 2012). The bridewealth is therefore perceived 
as a compensation for the women's family who suffered ‘’loss’’ of one of its members. 
In Niger, a country with a Muslim majority, the bridewealth is at the center of the complex process 
of marriage (Koné / Kouamé 2005). In Islamic law, mahr (bridewealth) is one of the material 
rights of a woman who marries in the same way as the obligation to be cared for by her husband 
(Asha 1997). It is the “payment” of the bridewealth which claims the right to sexuality. Marriage 
ceremonies mark the establishment of a sexual as well as a domestic union (Cutrufelli 1983; Phil-
lips 1978). The bridewealth - formerly based on symbolic objects - is nowadays monetarized. The 
monetarization of bridewealth is a phenomenon which emerged between 1920 and 1945. Expla-
nations for this development could be the increase in Western education with a high demand for educated wives, and parents’ desires to recover the cost of a daughter’s education through her 
bridewealth. A second explanation for the (relative) inflation of bridewealth could be an increase 
in commercial activities and major employment opportunities related to the growth of the public 
and private sector and the increase of the availability of money thanks to the system of wage labor. 
Since then, the bridewealth has become a market value with which one calculates and at the same 
time one of the major challenges that the young men meet during their marriages. It is considered 
even as a form of "business" (see: Isiugo-Abanihe 1994). This is also what Masquelier (2009) high-
lights in her book entitled, Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town (Dogondoutchi, Ni-
ger). She argues that:  
In the mid-1970s the kyauta arme (wedding gift) had risen to 2,500 francs ($10) in 
Dogondoutchi and, despite the cap of 20,000 francs6 ($80) instituted by the govement, 
bridewealth usually amounted to a considerable sum (Piault 1978: 422). […] At a time 
a month, earning the cash necessary to pay bridewealth for a budurwa (unmaried girl) 
was quite challenging, especially when Dogondoutchi mothers, mindless of the Izala 
message, decided the marriage would not be “tied” unless their financial expectation 
were met (Masquelier 2009: 182-183). 
Moreover, this monetarization or even the inflation of the bridewealth produces a stabilizing ef-
fect for marriages in case of conflict. For Koné and Kouamé, it is even a guarantee for marriage 
                                                 
6 The F.C.F.A. is the name of two common currencies of several African countries, precisely those that were colonized 
by France. 
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because in the face of the obligation to reimburse the bridewealth when divorce occurs, the par-
ents influence the behavior and decision-making of their daughters to avoid divorce (Isiugo-Aba-
nihe 1994; Koné / Kouamé 2005). Cooper agrees and writes:  
Since the payment must be returned to the husband if the woman initiates a divorce, 
high bridewealth can thwart women's efforts to servere a union, for their kin may be 
unwilling or unable to return it (Cooper 1997: 17). 
However, it should be noted that the amount or value of the bridewealth often depends on the 
type of marriage. For example, in Niger the amount of the bridewealth or its value is often re-
stricted in an intrafamilial marriage. 
3 Place and role of women in "sadakin aure" in Niamey 
A marriage process in Niamey consists of different stages. Before discussing sadaki, the practice 
of kudin shiga gida, literally translated as home access money (from the groom) is also important 
for most of my interviewees. The kudin shiga gida is the money that is used at the beginning of a 
betrothal. This sum varies according to social classes between 20,000 and 50,000 FCFA (between 
30 and 80 Euro). The acceptance of this money by parents of a woman means the acceptance of 
the suitor and marks the beginning of an engagement. 
It is usually followed by discussions on the amount of sadaki that the groom must give to be al-
lowed to get married to his fiancée. According to existing literature, these discussions are held 
between the parents of the couple. However, the findings of this research show that today in Nia-
mey these discussions or negotiations are taking place between young girls and their suitors be-
fore their respective parents even get involved in the process. Girls often make it clear to their 
suitors how much they expect as sadaki and they set this amount according to several parameters. 
They often fix it according to the amounts received by their elders, sisters, and / or friends who 
are already married. There seems to be a competition between women and even their families in 
this context. The following excerpt from an interview with Safiat7, a young educated married 
woman whom I met in Niamey proves this: 
Long before I met Ila, I had several suitors. Among them, were great tradesmen and 
simple students of the university. My relationship with some of them lasted for seeral 
months and others for many years. They kept asking me for the green light so that 
they could send their parents to meet mine and start the marriage process. But at that 
moment, I did not want to get married to any of them. I was still waiting for my angel. 
I stayed with some until the time I met Ila. We got to know each other, and I undestood 
that he was interested in me. Weeks after our meeting I realized that he is a young 
magistrate looking for a wife. Few months into our relationship, I knew that he is the 
man I've been waiting for since. Allah has finally brought him to me. When he asked 
my hand in marriage I did not hesitate for a moment. He asked me how much he will 
                                                 
7 Pseudonym. 
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give for my sadaki (sadaki na, in Hausa). I asked him how much he can give, he told 
me 500.000 FCFA (769 Euro). I told him no, it's very little, and by the way it's the same 
amount my aunts had as sadaki and some friends in the neighborhood. Then, I multi-
plied the proposed sum by two. I told him to bring 1,000,000 FCFA apart from the 
suitcases and other expenses that are part of the wedding ceremony ... On the day of 
the delivery of the sadaki, his parents came with 1,000,000 FCFA in cash and five suit-
cases filled with goods worth more than 500,000 FCFA. Today I am his wife ... (Inter-
view, 01.04.2017). 
At the beginning Safiat had accepted several suitors and stayed with them while giving everyone 
some hope of getting married to her until she met a young magistrate who met some of the essen-tial criteria she had in mind and whom she chose to marry. This practice of having several “candi-dates” is not unusual for young girls of marriageable age in Niamey. Many married girls and 
women I interviewed considered this practice as normal. For example, a mother I interviewed 
mentioned that: "A girl should not rely on a single man because in Niamey men have no guarantee. 
He can leave her for another at any time. So, in this case, how is she going to do it (marriage)?” 
(Interview, 15.05.2017). 
The case of Safiat shows that women discuss with their potential husbands how much they expect 
as sadaki. Describing it as “my sadaki” illustrates not only the power of a woman in determining 
the amount but also her role in the marriage process. Safiat had control over her intimate rela-
tionships with her suitors and she had the decision-making power over what would later be her 
sadakin aure. The differences concerning the amounts of sadaki are linked to several aspects, one 
is the marriage status of the women and the other aspect is their ethnic background. Girls who 
have never married before are called budurwa or yan mata in Hausa and considered virgins. For 
them a sadaki must be higher. 
Concerning the aspect of ethnicity, the sadaki of an Arab or Tuareg girl is usually higher compared 
to women from black-African descendants. I often heard men saying that "buzuwa8 tsada gare ta" 
or "buzuwa is expensive". Very often getting married to a buzuwa, if one is not of the same ethnic-
ity as her, is a way of demonstrating economic success, financial or social prestige. Many large 
traders in some neighborhoods of Niamey were married to their cousins when they were young. 
Their first marriages are usually endogamous. Most of them take ba'abzina (generally women 
with lighter skin and long hair) as second wives to demonstrate their economic successes. To be 
perceived as financially successful, it is often necessary to build a beautiful villa in which one “puts 
a new amarya (bride)" who has light skin. Some men and women go to the extent of comparing a 
woman with a fair complexion to a light (electricity) that illuminates a house. They say in Hausa: 
"farar mace lantarkin gida" or "a woman who has a light skin is the light (electric) of a house". 
In Niamey, the amount of sadaki also depends on the marital status of the bride. The sadaki of a 
young girl is not the same as that of a divorced woman with or without a child. The number of 
                                                 
8 The Tuaregs are often called buzaye in Niamey which is the plural of buzu or buzuwa, referring to male and female, 
respectively. But the term can be pejorative because can mean "liberated slaves". That is why Tuaregs themselves prefer 
to use the term abzinawa, comes from Abzin or Aïr and translated as Tuaregs. 
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children often affects the amount of sadaki of a divorced woman. It usually decreases with the 
number of children. My observations and interviews show that the sadaki of a girl who has never 
been married before could, in most cases, be higher than that of a woman who has three children. 
It should be noted here that not marrying before is not the single determinant of the amount of 
sadaki. The latter may also depend on the attractiveness of a woman. For example, in Niamey, men 
speak of macce mai caisse which literally means, "a woman who has a (good) body" and in contrast 
to this term they speak of gajiyayya, which can be translated as a woman who is ‘’tired’’. Thus, the 
sadaki of a woman who has a “good body” is higher compared to the one who is described as tired, 
irrespective of whether the latter has children or not. Therefore, when a man wants to marry a 
woman who had married before, he enquires about the number of children she bore. However, 
my observation shows that marital status of young girls as yan mata or zawarawa (repudiated, 
divorced or widows) has strong influence on their sadaki. 
In neighboring Nigeria, a digital agency called Ankle even launched an application called Bride 
Price which can be used to calculate in a few clicks the “value” of a bride’s bridewealth based on 
criteria ranging from height to weight as well as cooking skills. Based on this application for ex-
ample, a sadaki of a mixed-race woman with "Beyoncé's legs" or the “teeth of happiness’’ would 
be considerably high. On the other hand, for women who are overweight or have tattoos, the cal-
culated sum would be lower. This application has attracted many people in Africa, with Jeune Af-
rique (Juompan-Yakam / Niakate 2015) reporting that in three months, the application had reg-
istered about 4 million visitors.9 
Based on my observation, this kind of categorizations are related to social changes happening 
across the society in which both parents and suitor commodify a woman on a scale based on her 
physical appearance. It is not only the sadaki that is debated in Niamey, but also other financial 
burdens on men that precede the proper "payment" of the sadaki. These are in forms of material presents/gifts and financial help to fiancées and parents’ in-law. It is in this perspective that 
Ouassa writes:  
The “dot”10 is today overbought and commercial in nature, enormous sums are being 
demanded from young people. From the engagement period until the wedding it is an 
incessant flow that circulates, the gifts and benefits that are added to it are multiplied 
[...] Where before sheep were gifted to tie the engagement, we see now a sequence of 
gestures and gifts that mix, money, work and presents [...]11(Ouassa 2013: 48). 
Each case of marriage followed and observed as part of this research, in Niamey, cost (on the side 
of a fiancé) at least 700.000 FCFA, roughly 1.000 €. To understand this amount as huge, one needs 
to put it in the context of Niger, a country where it is still very difficult to find a paid job and even 
if one works the average salary of an ordinary employee is less than 100,000 FCFA or 154 € per 
month. As a result, men often face financial challenges to get married. These difficulties are often 
                                                 
9 The authors translation. 
10 Like some other authors already cited she uses the term “dot” instead of bridewealth or (richesse de la fiancée) in 
French.  
11 The authors translation.  
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related to 1) integration into the labor market and 2) raising the amount of sadaki. These difficul-
ties often force them to postpone their conjugal alliances. Even when men decide that they are 
willing to get married they are “forced” to ask for financial contributions called gudummawa, in 
Hausa, from their “Parents Amis et Connaissances” known as P.A.C. This implicit demand for this 
contribution is often expressed through the printing and distribution of so-called “carte de reun-ion” or "meeting cards” and/or those called “carte d’invitation’’ whose purpose is mainly to get 
financial support from family and friends. For men in Niamey this collection of money is crucial to 
come up with the sum of sadaki as well as covering other expenses regarding the marriage cere-
monies. Concerned about the struggles men and women encounter on their way to get married 
the government in Niger reacted and tried for the past decades to regulate marriage expenses. 
4 Attempts to regulate marriage fees and the resistance by women in 
Niamey 
Sadaki inflation is not a new phenomenon and attempts to regulate marriage expenses started 
during the colonial period. As Barbara M. Cooper points out:  
[...] the matter of greatest interest to both the colonial and postcolonial governments 
after 1945 was that of the high cost of marriage. The colonial government saw the 
cause of "social disequilibrium" and in 1951 attempted to regulate it through the 
Jacquinot decree (Cooper 1997: 16). 
President Kountché (1975) tried to regulate marriage expenses again after realizing their 
inflation. He made the following remarks to the women of Niamey: 
Faced with this social chaos, the CMS (Conseil Militaire de Sécurité) has decided - I am 
confirming it - that, from now on, we will not tolerate any wedding celebrated with 
ostentation and extravagance. Wedding expenses cannot exceed 50,000 CFA francs; 
noisy bridal processions spilling out of the town hall with fake veils and a nouveau-
riche look are strictly forbidden. Equally forbidden - I am declaring today - are the one 
hundred roasts that have surfaced out of who knows which gluttonous tradition. [For-
bidden] as well are the collections of outfits for the bride conspicuously exhibited throughout the city’s streets and the loud and pretentious baptisms (see Masquelier 
2009: 180). 
As the author explains later in her book, President Kountché did not mention Islam in his speech, 
yet his speech is based on an image of Islam in which the ostentatious practices have no place. But 
this statement could have been influenced by some religious groups. President Kountché, accord-
ing to my findings, had a very important relationship with some founding members of the Islamic Association of Niger (A.I.N.). What is also interesting is that Kountché’s speech was directed at Niamey’s women, often known for their "ostentatious" practices that the president considered as 
a "social chaos". 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   33 
However, these different attempts to regulate the cost of marriage or sadaki were not successful. 
Although the president spoke about wedding expenses in general and certain practices (such as 
the famous roast the day after the harnessing of weddings and wedding uniforms that women 
wear during weddings) he did not specifically mention sadaki. However, one can understand by 
his speech that he tried to fix it by limiting all expenses within 50.000 FCFA. In the same vein, it 
seems that President Salou Djibo, during his military transition in 2010-2011, unsuccessfully tried 
to fix the sadaki. It is obvious that parents and their daughters have resisted attempts to fixing 
marriage fees, especially the amount of sadaki. A woman I met said:  
The government has no reason to forbid parents or young girls from setting the 
amount of sadaki they want to have. Why is he going to fix that? Where was this gov-
ernment when people raised their daughters? (Interview, 19.09.2016). 
During the administration of President Salou Djibo, young girls whose amount of sadaki equaled 
the amount set by the president were referred to as “Salou Djibo promotion”. In addition to 
different military regimes that attempted to control marriages, there are other public reformist 
discourses such as those of 'yan Izala who propagate a frugal ideology concerning marital 
practices or ceremonies. They preach for both men and women to simplify marriages and avoid what they consider “turpitudes” that cause the "degradations" of the traditions (See also 
Masquelier 2009). The question begging for answer is why these different attempts have failed 
and why women and their parents do not want marriage fees to be fixed? 
4.1 Reasons for failure 
The women and their parents oppose any attempt to fix sadaki for several reasons, one of which 
is the religious or Islamic belief among the Niamey population. People in Niger believe that Islam 
sets the sadaki as one of major principles of marriage. However, Islam, according to some ulema, 
has never fixed its amount at least not regarding the upper limit. In this debate there are two 
contrasting Islamic schools of thought. They both agree that a sadaki in Islamic law should not 
have an upper limit, even if they do not encourage its inflation. The debate regarding sadaki 
focuses rather on a minimum amount one would have to pay. 
Thus, according to Maliki school12 of jurisprudence the sadaki has a clear minimum amount which 
is rubu'ud-dinar, literally ¼ of dinars. The rubu'ud-dinar worth, according to some of these 
scholars is about 50,000 FCA, around 77 €. In contrast, scholars adhering to the second school of 
thought, based on their understanding of hadith argue that the amount of a sadaki has neither a 
minimum nor maximum. According to them anything that is useful or anything that has value can 
be accepted by a woman, a girl or her parents, as her sadaki (a ring, a watch, a sheep, for example). 
The main reason for the perception of the hadith scholars is that during the time of Prophet 
Mohammad a ring of no great value was given as sadaki. A girl or a Muslim woman can receive as 
sadaki from 1 FCFA up to one million Euro or US Dollar, or more. But, on the other hand, both 
                                                 
12 The Maliki School (madhāhib) is one of the four great schools of Sunni Muslim law (fiqh). 
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agree that anything that is considered as haram or forbidden in Islam, should not be accepted as 
sadaki.  
The second reason which may explain the failure of these attempts to regulate marriage expenses 
is rather cultural and directly related to the use of the amount of money collected as sadaki. It is 
cultural and not Islamic because the sadaki in Islamic law belongs to the woman. The sadaki does 
not belong to her parents or anyone else. This is also why in the Nigerien context, the sadaki is not 
perceived as a marriage compensation or bride price. It is much more a "wedding payment" or a 
"pledge of relationship" that the suitor gives to his fiancée so that it becomes lawful to him to 
sexually engage with her. However, culturally when the sadaki13 is given by potential husband or his parents to bride’s parents, it is given not to the woman or bride herself but rather through her 
female parents or guardians. If sadaki money is not given to the young girl or woman who is 
getting married, then how is that money going to be used? What do their parents do with it? 
5 The use of sadakin aure in Niamey 
"Macce da sadakin ta ne ake yi mata kayan daki" is a common statement of mothers whose daugh-ters are getting married in Niamey. This expression can be translated as: “woman’s sadaki is used for furnishing her house”. Apart from new sets of clothes, shoes, and cosmetics a bride takes to 
her conjugal household (traditionally known as tsaraba in Hausa, better known nowadays as va-
lise or suitcase), the maternal family furnishes her new home with furniture and kitchen wares. 
That is known in Hausa as kayan daki, literally, "things of a room" which are all things needed in 
a matrimonial home. 
In Niamey, amounts collected as sadaki are used for the purchase of items, such as beds, mat-
tresses, sheets, lounges, wardrobes, dressing table, furniture, curtains, tablecloths, carpets, the 
famous "glasses of champagne", flowerpots, television sets, DVDs players, etc. These products are 
used to equip and decorate the interior of the bedroom of married women. Apart from these prod-
ucts there are many products used generally outside the rooms, for example, pots, large thermos, 
boilers, buckets, brooms, etc. Thus, sadaki is inflated based on the prevailing inflation rate in Nia-
mey. In this regard, inflation and increasing cost of living in Niamey could be understood as the “problem” not the bridewealth “per se”. 
Most of the products mentioned above are not produced in Niger. These are products imported 
from neighboring countries and/or from other continents such as Asia and/or Europe which make them “very” expensive. Moreover, women are generally proud when their furniture is imported 
since local products are perceived as cheap and of poor quality. This is what Barbara M. Cooper 
observed in Maradi in the 1990s when she argues:  
                                                 
13 The sadaki is usually accompanied by suitcases. These suitcases are today almost obligatory in a marriage. The non-
provision of suitcases can even cancel a marriage process. A few decades ago one suitcase was demanded, but nowadays 
three or more suitcases are expected. They can be empty or full of loincloths, bazins, jewels, cosmetics, etc. When they 
are empty, apart from the amount of the sadaki, usually these bags are accompanied by another sum of money provided 
for the purchase of these products. These are the products that brides use during their first months or years of marriage. 
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Women's preference for the more prestigious imported cloth [...] These new items 
must be purchased on the market and cannot be produced by women themselves […]” 
(Cooper 1997: 101-103). 
However, exorbitant sadaki is often commensurate to the skyrocketing cost of living in Niamey 
since it is not enough or sufficient to buy all the aforementioned products. Therefore, parents and 
close relatives of the bride have some moral duty to contribute money or goods (gudummawa) so 
that their daughter or their niece is provided with such items. A woman with a poorly equipped 
household can be a subject of gossip and ridicules in the neighborhood. The brides often feel em-
barrassed, a situation that sometimes triggers conflicts and leads to marital breakdown in Niamey. 
To tackle these challenges, some reformists like the 'yan Izala argue that women have no religious 
obligation to use their sadaki for the purchase of kayan daki and that a husband who wants his 
home nicely equipped should take the burden not his wife or his parents-in-law. Moreover, if in 
Niamey, the sadaki is not given in cash to the girl who is getting married, it is finally returned to 
her in another form. Once in her matrimonial home this property belongs to her. Therefore, in 
cases of marital conflict, women sometimes prevent their husbands from sleeping on their beds 
or lounges. In addition, it should be noted that the purchase of the furniture, bedding and cutlery 
is the responsibility of the parents or guardians in cases of marriages of girls who were never 
married before and considered "inexperienced". This is because these parents think that those 
young girls could mismanage their sadaki. 
It is probably the existence of these realities mentioned above that led to the sadaki being recog-
nized14 in the latest preliminary draft of the Family Code in Niger. In addition, this preliminary 
Family Code did not limit the amount of sadaki but has recommended it to be moderate.15 In Nia-
mey, sadakin aure is not only discussed in the context of marriages, but also in a very lively way 
on marital breakdown or divorce.  
5.1 The sadakin aure in divorce. 
In Niamey, there are three main forms of conjugal breakdowns, Tashi the “simple” and temporary 
separation between spouses, repudiation and divorce. It is in the third form (divorce) that one 
speaks about the sadaki and its refund. Generally, if a man repudiates his wife, he is not entitled 
for a refund of sadaki from his wife or her relatives. However, if a woman is the initiator of a mar-
ital breakdown, reimbursement of the sadakin aure is discussed. This practice of reimbursing sa-
daki by a woman or ramkon sadaki is rooted in Islamic history espoused by a story of woman who 
                                                 
14 Chapter II of the latest preliminary draft of the Personal Status in Niger or Family Code (September 2010) deals with 
sadakin aure extensively. In some African countries the bridewealth is sometimes abolished or recognized. In Burkina 
Faso and Ivory Coast, for example, the bridewealth has been abolished. In Ivory Coast it has been banned since 1964. 
While in some countries such as Benin or Togo it has been recognized and codified. In Togo it has an optional character 
and its amount should not exceed 10,000 FCFA (15 Euro), for example. However, having family Codes that regulate or 
abolish bridewealth is one thing, but applying these Codes in the daily lives of the populations concerned is another 
(See Akouhaba Anani 2011). 
15 See the article 27 of the preliminary draft of the Personal Status in Niger (Avant-Projet du Statut Personnel au Niger 
2010).  
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“liberated” herself from her marriage by the same practice as explained to me by one of the Sunni 
scholars in Niamey: 
At the time of prophet Muhamad, there was a woman who lived with her husband. 
One day, he (her husband) had male guests at his home. While her husband was dis-
cussing with his guests in the court, the woman who was in her room observed the 
guests through her window. She realized that the visitors were taller and more hand-
some than her husband. Later, she went to the Prophet and told him that she no longer 
loves her husband. The Prophet asked her what she received as sadaki from her hus-
band. She answered him “a garden”. The Prophet asked her to return the garden to 
her husband. She returned the garden and he released her. This is called Khul'i in Ar-
abic (Interview, 26.O7.2016). 
Since then any woman who wants to divorce from her husband must reimburse the sadaki, if her 
husband asks her to, regardless of the duration of her marriage and/or the number of children 
she has with him. The sadaki belongs to the woman, but with the condition that she remains in 
her household and does not seek divorce. It is thus the sadaki that binds the spouses. One of the 
first conditions accepted by all actors and institutions engaged in the divorce process is the reim-
bursement of the sadaki by the married woman to her husband. Many of the men I interviewed 
made reimbursement of sadaki a necessary condition, not only for a divorce but also for a repudi-
ation desired by their wives. That is, without going through an intermediary institution or a judge. 
However, during conflicts and/or conjugal breaks, the economic situation of women, the system 
and/or the inflation of the sadaki plays in favor of men. Owing to these aspects some men manage 
to "keep" their wives despite certain marital conflicts. Because when the amount of sadaki is im-
portant, it becomes more complex and complicated for a woman to free herself or get divorced. It 
is from this perspective that some authors (Cooper 1997; Komé / Kouamé 2005) cited above at-
tribute to the brideweath a certain stabilizing effect of conjugal alliances. 
In Niamey this statement is partly true. The results of my observations and interviews show that 
sadaki inflation can make a marriage stable especially when the negotiations of conflicts are at 
family level. Often, parents faced with the obligation to repay the husband, lobby or ask their 
daughters to be patient and return to their husbands. Even so, it must be noted, faced with the 
inflation of the sadaki and the economic context in which most of women do not have a paid job 
allowing them to pay their "liberation" through the reimbursement of their sadaki, they have de-
veloped and continue to develop strategies to push or even "force the hand" of their husbands to 
liberate them through repudiation. Contrary to what one might think, repudiation is not always a 
unilateral decision of men. Women, too, have real powers in this context. 
This means that often, women who want to breakdown their marriages, even before their conflicts 
go out of their respective homes, do not generally sit idly by. This is what emerges from most 
interviews with my respondents and a dozen cases of couples followed for monographic studies. 
When they want to leave their husbands, they largely prefer repudiation over divorce. It is when 
their husbands refuse to repudiate them and from the moment the negotiations go beyond the 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   37 
family level that the deal changes, even when the sadaki was the subject of a sum of money con-
sidered as high or important. In Niamey, there are two main institutions that are known in divorce 
settlement. One is a religious organization, the Islamic Association of Niger (A.I.N), the other is a 
judicial one, namely the courts. It is to these to employ the regulatory procedures to that I turn 
next. 
6 Reimbursement of Sadaki by women in case of divorce. 
Generally, at the family level the amount to be reimbursed, when a woman wants to break her 
marriage "without valid reason", is the amount of her sadaki received during her marriage, as 
mentioned above. It is also one of the reasons that push some women to "force the hand" of their 
spouses to repudiate them. It is one of the reasons why some women in tashi (separation) are 
neither protected nor supported by their parents. Further, that is why some parents even require 
their daughters to leave their husbands' homes only when they have their takarda saki, literally 
"release paper" or repudiation paper, at hand. 
However, the amount of sadaki to be refunded changes when the case is taken before the Alkali 
(customary and/or Islamic judge) of the A.I.N. or before one of the judges of the five district courts 
of the capital. At the level of these institutions, the amount is nowadays almost fixed. It is usually 50,000 FCFA (77 Euro), except in cases where the marriage has not been “consummated”. For 
example, in A.I.N., if the marriage has not been consummated, the Islamic association finds it to be 
a sort of fraud on the part of the woman. The woman is then asked to reimburse the sadaki re-
ceived by her or her parents, or all the expenses incurred by the husband during the marriage. 
But if the marriage was consummated, in clear terms, if there was sexual intercourse between 
spouses, it is thought, even if it is not clearly stated, that the husband has consummated or spent 
a good part of his money. The wife is then asked to reimburse not what the husband gave her, but 
rather 50,000 FCFA (a sum often announced during the sealing of marriages), even when the hus-
band has paid 500,000 or 1,000,000 FCFA, announced as sadaki in the neighborhood, and some-
times broadcasted on some social networks like Facebook and/or WhatsApp. But in case it has 
been said, for example, that the sadaki is 500,000 FCFA during rituals for marriage sealing, the 
Alkali divides the sum into two. He asks the woman to reimburse half of the amount. At this mo-
ment the husband "loses" half. 
This is one of the reasons for the presence of spousal representatives during - Islamic or judicial - 
hearings or trials. Some husbands, to whom taking this money is considered a shame, drop the 
refund, while others protest. Generally, these are those who have relatively young marriages and 
wives who are often childless, or those with one or two or sometimes three children. Moreover, a 
woman divorced without child is designated in Niamey by the Hausa term sakin wawa or "liber-
ated by a fool". It is to avoid being considered as "double fool" that some men interviewed, require 
reimbursement of sadaki. 
At the level of the district courts of Niamey, the principle is almost the same, except that women 
applying for divorce for a consummated marriage are always asked to refund 50,000 FCFA to their 
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husbands. This fixation of an amount in case of divorce surprises most of the men in conflict with 
their wives who I met at the A.I.N. and/or at court. How can this principle be explained? What is 
its origin?  
This practice is connected with attempted sadaki regulation in the 1970s (during the regime of 
president Kountché). As I mentioned earlier, after noting the magnitude and inflation of the wed-
ding expenses, the Kountché regime tried to set them at 50,000 FCFA. He led one of the most 
feared military regimes in Niger. Thus, for fear or being prosecuted by the regime of the day, ac-
cording to a lawyer interviewed who knew this regime, people stopped public announcement of 
the exact amount of sadaki they gave or received during the process of their conjugal alliances. At 
the Fatiha (Islamic public rituals for marriage sealing) for example, they announced only 50,000 FCFA, even when the ‘’true’’ amount was ten times more than that. The Islamic Association of Ni-
ger often considered a "state instrument", could not oppose this statement although this decision 
is somehow contrary to the Islamic law itself. 
The members of the A.I.N., who were sometimes assessors in courts (see also Hassane et al. 2006) 
and certain Courts such as the Court of Cassation, could not give so-called customary opinions 
contrary to this declaration during the hearings related to divorce. Thus, at the level of A.I.N. the 
declaration has since become a rule considered as customary. Even today, most of the civil status 
officers and most of the Niamey court judges, some preachers and those who consider themselves 
to be intellectuals, regard this as law. But it is not, it is neither a custom16 nor a law. In Niger there is still no law that fixes the amount of the bridewealth. It is through this “political” statement that 
president Kountché verbally fixed the marriage expenses. 
It should also be noted that there are some associations and religious or Islamic actors that oppose 
any fixation of sadaki. Most women interviewed, whether married or not, do not accept the idea 
of setting the amount of sadaki or wedding expenses: “50,000 francs my ‘dot’? No, never, I'm not 
a goat anyway”. This is the first reaction of most girls of marriageable age asked about sadaki during talks and/or interviews. Thus, implying that they perceive their own “worth” much higher 
to this sum, which in their eyes is only suitable for a goat.  
It can, therefore, be safely said that the measure taken by the president Kountché, to ease marriage 
contract in favor of men has today turned out to play an important role in favor of women when 
they want divorce at the two institutions mentioned above. It is also clear that these institutions 
are knowingly or unconsciously trying to change some of the practices related to divorce. In the 
face of the recurring failures of Family Codes in Niger (Alidou 2005) or Personal Status projects, 
which would give women some protection and some power,17 these institutions often protect 
women and facilitate women's access to divorce. Nowadays, many women in Niamey do not need 
to sell their kayan daki to reimburse their husbands when they want divorce. 
                                                 
16 It may be qualified as an administrative or legal custom. But it is far from the custom of the parties. For according to 
Robert (1994: 5201), custom is an "oral legal usage, consecrated by time and accepted by the population of a given 
territory" (translated by the author). 
17 See articles 17, 33, 39 of the preliminary draft of the Personal Status in Niger (Avant-Projet du Statut Personnel au 
Niger 2010), for example.  
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7 Conclusion 
As in many African societies, bridewealth still plays an important role in conjugal alliances in Nia-
mey. As already shown by other studies, the bridewealth can vary in its forms and can have dif-
ferent meanings as well. Often regarded as a "bride price" or "marital compensation", the sadaki 
in Niamey or in Niger in general, is not considered as such. It is rather seen in Islamic law as a 
pledge that a suitor gives to his fiancée for a lawful sexual engagement. On the other hand, sadaki 
is a financial support mechanism allowing parents of a bride to provide her with furniture and 
other materials necessary or useful for her new life in her matrimonial home.  
In Niamey there have been several attempts to limit or regulate marriage expenses, but these at-
tempts did not produce the expected results. With the help of empirical data, this article illustrates 
why these attempts were not well received by the population of Niamey. It also showed how and 
why Niamey women resisted and are still resisting these attempts. Furthermore, the article elab-orated that the stabilization of marriages by the ‘inflation’ of the bridewealth in Niamey today 
depends on the level of negotiation, actors or institutions that are involved in the settlement of 
marital conflicts. The article concluded that women who want to break their conjugal alliances 
prefer repudiation over divorce. Since repudiation allows them to break their marriages without 
1) going through one of the two institutions that manage marital conflicts in Niamey and 2) the 
reimbursement of their sadakin aure. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the issue of participation of women in democratic governance process in Nigeria 
has become a recurrent topic in many Nigerian newspapers. One may hardly read Nigerian news-
papers without coming across an article about political participation of women and other gender 
issues. Since 1999 when democratic governance returned to Nigeria after nearly two decades of 
military dictatorship, the country has witnessed an unprecedented surge in the wave of gendered discourses in the nation’s print news media. The country’s return to democracy has expanded the 
activities of many gender activists and conservative individuals and groups, who tend to use lan-
guage1 to oppose or support systems of gender relations in the country. One major forum in which 
such positions are expressed is opinion articles2. As a sub-genre in newspapers, opinion articles 
(in Nigerian context) present an influential way of constructing and legitimizing particular rela-
tions between men and women in the society. 
However, much as discourses on gender in Nigerian newspapers exist, little scholarly attention 
has been paid to how female authors of opinion articles linguistically justify and legitimize partic-
ular relations between men and women in the newspapers. This paper therefore seeks to add 
another voice to the few studies that examine how language is used to perpetuate, maintain and 
challenge social inequality between men and women in the Nigerian society3. It does this by em-
ploying methods of and insights from critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze how some fe-
male authors use language to legitimize participation of women in Nigerian politics and social 
                                                 
1 I am using the term ‘language’ in a sociolinguistic sense, which sees it as “a primary means through which the social 
world is constructed” (Muntigl 2002: 49). In this regard, language is seen as a tool used by individuals not only to 
exchange information, but also convey to one another what kind of people they are – constructing and negotiating their 
social identities. 
2 An opinion article is a piece published in newspapers that mainly reflect the author's view on a particular subject or 
topic. 
3 This paper is part of my PhD research project, which was funded by the Bayreuth International Graduate School of 
African Studies. 
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equality between men and women in fifty female-authored opinion articles in five national news-
papers in Nigeria, namely: Daily Trust, The Guardian, The Punch, New Nigerian, and Vanguard pub-
lished from 199 to 2014. CDA is an approach to discourse studies that investigates the use of lan-
guage as an instrument of social control. CDA is a relatively new research paradigm that seeks to 
demonstrate how language serves as an active agent in the construction of social reality through 
the illustration of how it is used to enact, legitimize and sustain social and political inequalities in 
discourse (Fairclough 1989; van Dijk 2001; Wodak 2001). Wodak et al. (1999: 8) indicate that: 
The aim of critical discourse analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often 
obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies 
of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use. 
The focus of much CDA work is, therefore, on the linguistic resources used by certain individuals 
and groups to stabilize or even intensify social and political inequalities in society. This orienta-
tion of CDA is based on the assumption that language is not a neutral tool of communication. This 
makes the framework of CDA very suitable for the current research, which seeks to show how 
language is used to construct gender identities and ideologies that can perpetuate, maintain and 
challenge systems of gender relations in society.  
Investigating how particular gender power relations between men and women are constructed 
through language use in the media, especially newspapers, is particularly important. As Mills 
(2003: 185) notes, gender ideology in society, or shared beliefs about who men and women are 
and the relations between them, “are often authorized in some sense through being mediated by 
the media”, which tend to influence the way individuals may perceive and construct sense of 
selves in relation to others. Bearing this in mind, the article analyzes how gender equality is legit-
imized through the use of certain discursive (argumentation) strategies in the newspapers.  
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the concept of discursive (argumentation) 
strategies. The data and methods of data collection are discussed in section 3. In section 4, I ana-
lyze data and present research findings. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2 Discursive (argumentation) strategies  
In discourse-historical approach (the approach to CDA adopted in this study), discursive (argu-
mentation) strategies represent a category of analysis which examines how arguments are artic-
ulated against or in support of particular positions (see Reisigl / Wodak 2016; Wodak et al 1999). 
A key tool of analysis of argumentation strategies employed in this study is topoi, or argumenta-
tion strategies. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44) talk of these strategies as ‘systematic ways of using language’ to achieve a particular communicative goal (Reisigl / Wodak 2001: 44). van Dijk (2000: 
97) defines topoi as parts of argumentation that “represent the common-sense reasoning typical 
for specific issues”. In the same vein, Wodak (2009: 42) describes topoi as:  
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parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They 
are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument or arguments 
with the conclusion, the claim. 
Topoi have also been viewed as “conclusions or thematic propositions used to refer to a particular 
group or event”, or a line of argument (de Luna 2013: 80). In this study, topoi have been identified 
as a significant means by which particular positions on gender attributions of identity are legiti-
mized. Topoi are considered important in this research because, as Zampetti (2006: 26) observes, “they [can] help us uncover deeper meanings in arguments.” In that, as he further observes, ex-
amining topoi can “offer us a systematic, organized process whereby we can acquire, interpret, 
manage and use information (in the form of arguments) critically” (ibid: 23). In section 4 I will 
discuss the six topoi that featured in the legitimation of gender equality in the data. These include 
topoi of religion, usefulness, justice and human rights, democracy, abuse and gender partnership.  
3 The data and methods of collection 
The data for this study is made up of fifty authored opinion articles on gender in five Nigerian 
newspapers. All the texts used are believed to be written by female authors. It should be noted 
that the name an author used to identify herself, was the only criterion used in identifying them 
as females. Unfortunately, I do not have any other practical means of verifying the identity of the 
authors apart from the names they identified themselves with. The selected newspapers are, 
namely: Daily Trust, The Guardian, The Punch, New Nigerian, and Vanguard. These newspapers are 
chosen purposively because they have national coverage and distribution. Although they are pub-
lished in English, they enjoy wide readership in the country. They are considered to be national 
newspapers because most of their reports tend to focus on national issues, and they have corre-
spondents in many major Nigerian towns and cities. Moreover, the newspapers do not seem to 
have specific audience or target readers. I wish to point out that with the exception of New Nige-
rian4 (which is a state-owned newspapers) all the newspapers are privately owned and managed 
by Nigerian nationals.  
Another criterion for selecting the newspapers is that they cover the time period beginning from 
1999 to 2014. This period was selected because it witnessed an unprecedented surge in the wave 
of discourses on gender in the print news media in Nigeria, especially the newspapers. In other 
words, since 1999 when democracy returns to the country after nearly two decades of military 
dictatorship, gender issues such as participation of women in democratic governance has become 
a recurrent topic in many of the national newspapers in Nigeria, as evident by the huge number 
of articles on subject. This long period is also chosen in order to give a wider coverage to allow for 
uncovering the general trends in the discursive legitimation of gender equality and equity in the 
newspapers. The data used for analysis was obtained mainly from the archives of the newspapers 
located in three major Nigerian cities: Lagos, Abuja and Kaduna. The Guardian, The Punch and 
Vanguard have their archives in Lagos, while those of Daily Trust and New Nigerian are situated 
                                                 
4 New Nigerian is the only state-owned national newspaper in Nigeria. 
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at Abuja and Kaduna, respectively. I visited the head office of each newspaper, explained the pur-
pose of the research and sought permission to access the data stored in their libraries. The study 
could have obtained all its data from online sources, but a search for data online yielded only a 
few relevant articles. Perhaps, this is because in the process of updating their websites, these 
newspapers tend to replace old reports or articles with new ones. Since the study covers a fifteen-
year (1999 - 2014) period, it was thought that restricting its data to a few articles available online 
might not be “representative enough”. Nevertheless, the few available data searched and obtained 
online were also used in the study. However, a large percentage of the data was obtained from the 
archives of the newspapers. With the help of the librarians in charge of the archives, many editions 
of the newspapers from 1999 to 2014 were searched and relevant articles photocopied. I will re-
turn to this issue later. 
Although the online version of the reports in the newspapers might have some differences from 
the print edition such as hyperlinks to related articles, graphic illustrations and other possible 
peculiar resources, these differences cannot however affect the study. The perceived difference 
between the online and print editions of the newspapers is therefore insignificant as far as this 
work is concerned. This is because this paper is concerned with only the linguistic aspect of the 
reports, that is, the actual wording and not the type and size of the fonts used in the different 
versions and the graphic illustrations that may accompany them. It is not expected that the online 
version will display certain linguistic features different from those displayed in the print edition 
since normally, they originate from the same manuscript and published by the same media house 
(or newspapers). The texts used in the analysis consist of opinion articles authored by female au-
thors.  
With regard to the huge amount of opinion articles on gender by the female authors in the news-
papers and the practical constraints imposed mainly by the availability of time and other limita-
tions, a decision was taken to select articles based on their saliency to the research topic and pub-
lication within the period covered by the study. Even at that a “Quota sampling” method (Saunders 
et al. 2009: 235) has to be employed, in order to produce a corpus that can serve as both a repre-
sentative of the huge data collected and at the same time analyzable within the time frame allowed 
for the conduct of the research. This sampling technique involves gathering representative data 
from a group based on certain desired features (or, saliency of the articles for the study). The 
overall corpus consists of 200 female-authored opinion articles on gender with an approximately 
187,000 words size. This method of sampling is chosen, because it is very useful in selecting sali-
ent articles for analysis and does not involve probability calculations. Saunders et al. (2009: 235-
236) explain that using this sampling method ensures that sample selected represents certain 
characteristics of the total study population chosen by the researcher. For ease of identification of 
the source of particular data, the newspapers are coded as follows: DT for Daily Trust, NN for New 
Nigerian, TG for The Guardian, TP for The Punch and V for Vanguard.  
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4 Analysis of discursive strategies used to legitimize gender equality 
The gender legitimization discourses observed in the data can be classified into the following 
topoi, although these are in no way exhaustive: 
◼ The topos of religion (paragraph 4.1) 
◼ The topos of usefulness (paragraph 4.2) 
◼ The topos of justice and human rights (paragraph 4.3) 
◼ The topos of abuse (paragraph 4.4) 
◼ The topos of democracy, and (paragraph 4.5) 
◼ The topos of gender partnership (paragraph 4.6) 
In the sections and sub-sections that follow, I will analyze and discuss each of these topoi in some 
detail. Note that in the course of analyzing each topos particular attention will be paid to the lin-
guistic means of its realization. The analysis will also examine how the discourses in the topoi 
contribute to the justification and legitimization of social equality between men and women in 
society. 
4.1 The topos of religion  
This topos is an appeal to religious authority, often through reverence for divine authority. It is, 
in the words of Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 79), a form of argumentum ad verecundiam, by which a 
particular position is constructed as true because, an authority, or in this case God or certain reli-
gious scriptures, agree with it. For example, in Excerpt 1, the author quotes a verse from the Bible 
to legitimize equality of the genders.  
Excerpt 1: It doesn’t matter if you are a Jew or a Gentile, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbaric, uncivilised, slave or free. Christ is all that matters and he lives in all of us” (Colossians 
3: 11). This biblical quote shows that men and women are equals and therefore should 
be treated equally. The Bible is therefore against all forms of discrimination, sexism, 
classism, racism, ageism; the basis of peacelessness in society (TP, 27.06.2010: 39). 
The excerpt opening with a quote from the Bible is noteworthy. It allows the author to invoke 
authorization by making an appeal to divine authority to call for equality of all persons regardless 
of their race, gender, and social status. The purpose of this intertextual reference is to construct 
all forms of discrimination against persons as ungodly and therefore evil. This is intensified by the author’s identification of sexism and other forms of discrimination as source of “peacelessness” in 
society. By constructing this link between these two concepts (i.e. sexism and peacelessness), the 
author legitimizes her support for social equality. Note also the declarative clause “he [Christ] lives 
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in all of us” (Excerpt 1, lines 2-3), by which the author constructs a homogenous religious identity 
for all the readers. The assumption here is that all the readers believe in Christ who has authorized 
equality between men and women. Excerpt 2 illustrates another salient example of religious ar-
gument in support of gender equality.  
Excerpt 2: 
According to the renowned Evangelical Christian Evangelist and ordained Pentecostal 
minister, Dr. Myles Munroe, men and women are created equal. On page 23 of his best-
selling book: "Understanding the Purpose and Power of Women", he writes, "If the nations of the world had understood God’s purposes for women and men, they would 
have realized that the spirit of equal rights that demands equality was never tended 
by God, because he has already made men and women equal. Men and women were created equal. Men and women are equal.” Therefore, regarding or treating one gen-
der as inferior and inconsequential is wrong (TG, 23.09.2003: 43). 
This example further shows how the topos of religion can be used to further justify and legitimize 
gender equality. In the excerpt, the view of a renowned Christian religious leader, Dr. Myles Mon-
roe, serves as a primary reference point for the discursive authorization of gender equality. What 
is however interesting in this example, is that it highlights Dr. Monroe’s institutionalized religious 
position as an ordained Pentecostal Priest, who declared that God created men and women as 
equals. His authorship of a best-selling book and position as a highly respected religious leader, 
as reported in the excerpt, implies that he had unique knowledge of the spiritual purpose of crea-
tion of human beings. This paves the way for the author to delegitimize discrimination on the basis 
of gender, labelling it as an ungodly social practice. Of more significance is the way the author 
repeatedly declares men and women as equals in three consecutive sentences in the excerpt. The 
aim of this, it would seem, is to enable the author to reinforce the argument she articulated and ensure that the point she made stays in the reader’s mind. 
4.2 The topos of usefulness 
Here, the authors frequently made use of topos of usefulness to express their support for social 
equality between men and women in society. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 75) note that, this topos 
is based on the premise that “if an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, 
then one should perform it”. To this topos (of usefulness), Reisigl and Wodak further identify three 
sub-types. These include the topos of pro bono publico (to the advantage of all), the topos of pro 
bono nobis (to the advantage of “us”) and the topos of pro bono eorum (to the advantage of “them”) 
(ibid). In the corpus, it was observed that the first of these sub-types (i.e. the topos of pro bono 
publico) featured prominently than others, as the following example illustrates. 
Excerpt 3: 
Experts have calculated that for each additional year of schooling, a woman’s income 
increases by 20%, agricultural productivity increases by 10%, infant mortality drops 
by 10%, and the return on investment in deferred health expenses is 25% [...] It was 
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also stated that in Nigeria, if young Nigerian women had the same employment rates 
as young Nigerian men, they would add 13.9 billion Naira in annual GDP. Gender 
equality and women empowerment are therefore not favours done to women but, the 
smart ways to go as they benefit the entire society (TG, 23.09.2012: 33). 
This excerpt shows how economic argument and statistics can be used to advocate women em-
powerment and gender equality. The repeated use of numbers in the example can be seen as a 
discursive strategy, in that it allows the author (of the excerpt) to represent women’s empower-
ment as a means to an end. Although the bases for the statistics was not explained in the example, 
credibility of the calculations behind it comes from the opening clause (“Experts have calculated”), which also serves to authorize the author’s opinion. Note also, the use of the noun phrase “smart 
ways” (Excerpt 3, line 7) to construct women’s empowerment as a smart way of promoting devel-
opment in society is explicitly stated in the excerpt. Thus, the example shows how the topos of 
usefulness can be used to advocate gender equality and equity. In another example, the author 
uses a causal argumentation scheme to highlight the usefulness of gender equality. Her choice of 
the adverbial clause of condition: “Until equal numbers of girls and boys are in school” (Excerpt 4, 
line 1), to introduce her argument is noteworthy. It allows her to argue that without giving equal 
educational opportunities for both men and women, boys and girls, the society will continue to 
suffer from poverty, hunger, and diseases. The use of the adjective “impossible” (Excerpt 4, line 1) 
enables the author to express commitment to the truth value of the proposition she makes. This 
adjective can be taken as an example of “stance value” (Adendorff 2004). Stance values, as Aden-
dorff (ibid: 206) describes them, are linguistic resources, which a speaker or writer can use to 
indicate certainty, commitment or otherwise of her proposition. By using this adjective, which 
functions as a stance value in this context, the author indicates her commitment to the truth-value 
of what she says, as the example below illustrates. 
Excerpt 4: 
Until equal numbers of girls and boys are in school, it will be impossible to build the 
knowledge necessary to eradicate poverty and hunger, combat diseases and ensure 
environmental sustainability. Therefore, there is no basis for competition or subjuga-
tion of one gender by the other as we march towards 2015. It is time to put an end to 
gender inequality and all its concomitant effects on our country's future (DT, 
12.03.2014: 21). 
It is also interesting how the author, through the use of this topos (of usefulness), attempts to 
articulate an argument that can persuade the reader, and by extension men and women in society 
to work together to put an end to all forms of discrimination against persons based on their gender 
or sex category. Drawing upon gender partnership discourse, the author delegitimizes suppres-
sion of one gender group by another through the declarative clause “there is no basis” (Excerpt 4, 
line 3), which portrays the practice as unnecessary and inappropriate. Of significance also, is the 
way she represents gender inequality as having concomitant effects, suggesting that it has at-
tendant consequences for the future of the country. Thus, the excerpt shows how the topos of 
usefulness can be used to instrumentally rationalize a position, or in this case, express support for 
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equality of the genders through highlighting the benefits that can be derived from promoting so-
cial equality between men and women in society.  
4.3 The topos of justice and human rights 
This topos was used to legitimize equality of the genders by showing that it conforms to the pro-
visions of the Nigerian Constitution and some international human rights conventions that de-
clared equality for all persons regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity and place of origin or 
creed. The topos is thus based on the principle of equal rights for all human beings. The following 
example serves to exemplify the topos. 
Excerpt 5: 
The 1999 Constitution [of the Federal Republic of Nigeria] (as amended) provides in 
section 42(1) that no person shall be discriminated against on the basis of community, 
ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion. As regards sex, the pro-
vision is also in compliance with international conventions especially the Convention 
on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Section 
42(1) specifically protects the right of women against discrimination based on sex. So 
is also Section 15 (2) of the same Constitution. The combined effect of the provisions 
of the two sections is that discrimination against women is illegal, as far as the law is 
concerned (V, 11.03.2013: 25). 
As this example shows, discrimination against persons based on their gender was depicted as a 
breach of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of gender, ethnic group, and religion. By using this topos (of justice), the author argues against discrimination against women. The writer’s appeal to the authority of the constitution, as encoded 
in the topos, is noteworthy. It paves the way for the author to delegitimize gender inequality by 
declaring it unconstitutional, and therefore illegal and unacceptable. One can also note how the 
author repeatedly makes reference to some relevant sections of the constitution. This intertextual 
reference, it would seem, was used by the author to give credibility to the argument, transforming 
what would otherwise be taken as a subjective view into an objective one. This enables the author to present the position as authoritative because, it was derived from the country’s supreme law. 
It would also seem that the reference to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW) made in the excerpt was meant to show that, discrimination 
against women is something that has been prohibited also by international law or treaty. This 
comes out even more overtly in Excerpt 6, where the author appeals to the authority of the con-
stitution and some international conventions on human rights to de-legitimize discrimination 
against women. 
Excerpt 6: 
Discrimination against the woman is inconsistent with the AU Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which promote right to live and personal integrity; Sections 33 and 
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35 of 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria also promotes rights to life and 
personal liberty respectively (TP, 18.09.2014: 30). 
4.4 The topos of abuse 
Related to the topos of justice and human rights, is the topos of abuse. This topos focuses on the 
protection of women from exploitation and victimization. Through this topos, women are repre-
sented as victims of physical abuse and some cultural practices in society. In excerpt 7 for instance, 
the author employs juxtaposition to de-legitimize cultural practices that discriminate against 
women. This strategy involves putting some lexical items, phrases, and clauses in contrastive (and 
often adjacent positions) in order to achieve an effect. By placing side by side, practices that can 
improve the lots of women with those that limit their opportunities and rights, the author is, in a 
way, asking the reader to make a choice between what can be loosely polarized as “beneficial” 
practices on women and “harmful” ones. Thus, through the use of this discursive strategy encoded in this topos (of abuse), she appeals to the reader’s sense of justice to legitimize social practices 
that empower women and de-legitimize those that limit their opportunities and rights. 
Excerpt 7: 
Instead of moral support, proper up-bringing, good education and respect for child 
rights, thousands of girl-children and women are enslaved by parents or guardians to 
engage as domestic workers or forced into early marriage across the country (TP, 
18.09.2012: 35). 
In a further bid to de-legitimize practices that are abusive to women, in Excerpt 8, the author em-
ploys the topos of abuse to argue that since women play a key role in sustaining the family insti-
tution, which is the basic unit of society, they deserve to be protected from physical abuse and 
exploitation. Here again, juxtaposition was used to legitimize some practices on women and de-
legitimize others. This could be seen in the way the author uses the metaphor “the pillars” (Ex-
cerpt 8, line 1), to refer to women and the vital role they play in the family. She contrasts this with 
the following declarative clauses in which women are portrayed as “the victims of the most telling 
abuses” and “socio-economic, political exploitation [of the woman]” (Excerpt 8, lines 1-2). To fur-
ther depict women as victims of abuse, the author uses an emotive declarative clause in which she 
reports that “women have fallen victims of the most vicious forms of gang-rape” (Excerpt 8, lines 
5-6). This discursive strategy allowed the author to draw attention to what women receive in re-
turn from the same society in which they play an indispensable role. By this juxtapositioning, the author is, in a way, appealing to the reader’s sense of justice to legitimize better treatment of 
women and de-legitimize physical abuse and other forms of maltreatment of women in society. 
Excerpt 8: 
Women are the pillars of the family institution, yet they are the victims of the most 
telling abuses and socio-economic, cultural and political exploitation in our society. 
Trafficking in women and children has become so commonplace nowadays that we 
wonder if any nobody is seriously tackling it. Consistently across the world in the last 
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few years, many girls and women have fallen victims of the most vicious forms of 
gang-rape (TP, 11.01.2013: 18). 
4.5 The topos of democracy 
The topos of democracy is based on the premise that since political equality between men and 
women conforms to universal values and principles of democracy; one should be in favour of it. 
In Excerpts 9 and 10, the authors employed this topos to point out to the reader that discrimina-
tion against women poses a serious threat to the growth and development of democratic systems 
of governance in the country. They also argued that a democracy that discriminates against 
women contradicts its principles. The proposition in the excerpts can be interpreted as suggesting 
that democracy was designed to give equal political opportunities to all citizens regardless of their 
gender, social class, ethnic group, and religious beliefs. 
Excerpt 9: 
A democracy without active participation of more than half of the population is sus-
ceptible to failure. In short, a democracy that discriminates against women is a con-
tradiction in [sic] terms (DT, 27.04.2013: 28). 
Excerpt 10: 
A democracy in which more than half of the population still suffers from some in-
grained limitations and prejudices is one that is seriously incapacitated by a huge def-
icit (TP, 09.03.2011: 23). 
These excerpts sought to collectively highlight how the topos of democracy can be used to legiti-
mize social equality between men and women in society. Using this topos, the authors attempted 
to establish a cause and effect relationship between women’s active participation in political and 
governance processes and sustainable democratic systems in the country, suggesting that the lat-
ter depends largely on the former. Of more interest here, is the use of the adverbial phrase “seri-
ously incapacitated” (Excerpt 10, line 2), and the noun phrase “susceptible to failure” (Excerpt 9, 
line 2) to portray discrimination against women as constituting a serious threat to the growth and 
development of democracy in the country. Here, the authors’ strategy was to appeal to the reader’s 
presumptive desire to promote and protect democratic systems of governance in the country. The 
authors know that since many Nigerians fought hard for the return of democracy after nearly two 
decades of military dictatorship, they would not want the system to fail. This is because the failure 
of the systems may result in chaos in the political system, or even the return of military dictator-
ship. Thus, what the authors were doing here was to point out to the reader, the dangers of not 
giving all citizens, and women in particular, equal political opportunities in democratic systems 
of governance. Note also the metaphor “deficit” (Excerpt 9, line 3) used to describe the effect that 
may result when democratic systems do not give equal opportunities to all citizens. It is also sig-
nificant to note how the author of Excerpt 9 for instance, used the adjunct (“In short”) to summa-
rize her view point and also, reinforce the proposition she made.  
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4.6 The topos of gender partnership 
This topos, which is closely related to the topos of usefulness (see sub-section 4.2), emphasizes 
the need for men and women to work together towards developing a better society. Using this 
topos, the authors draw on economic arguments and the notion of teamwork to justify and legiti-
mize gender partnership, which by implication elevates the status of women to equal partners 
with men in developing the society, as the following example suggests. 
Excerpt 11: 
We should expect growth and development when men and women listen and learn from each other’s skills and talents. According to a recent study, heterogeneous 
groups comprising persons of different genders get better results than homogeneous 
ones (DT, 12.12.2012: 39). 
This example illustrates the use of the topos of gender partnership to legitimize gender equality. 
Of interest here, are the discursive features used to achieve the legitimation. First, the excerpt 
opening with the declarative clause “we should expect growth and development” is noteworthy. 
It allows the author to establish a cause and effect relationship between growth and development 
and gender equality; constructing the latter as a viable means of achieving the former. The author 
positions herself as confident of the proposition she has made through the modal verb (“should”) 
in the clause: “we should expect” (Excerpt 11, line 1). By using this linguistic resource which func-
tions as a stance value (Adendorff 2004) in this context, the author indicates commitment to the 
truth-value of what she says, depicting it as certain. The author draws on research findings to not 
only justify the call for gender partnership, but also present what might otherwise be seen as her 
own subjective position as authoritative. 
Similarly, this topos (of gender partnership) encodes arguments that focus on potential benefits 
of teamwork, and which also provides grounds for legitimizing gender equality. Some of these 
arguments emphasize the need for men and women to work together for the betterment of the 
society, as illustrated in the following example. 
Excerpt 12: 
Since one hand alone cannot build a house, men and women should work together to build a better and prosperous nation, which we all dream for […] The task of nation 
building may be difficult but as the Ghanaians would say “The load is lighter when two people carry it” (NN, 17.10.2007: 30). 
Here, the adage “one hand cannot build a house” (Excerpt 12, line 1) was used by the author to 
argue for gender partnership (and ultimately, make the case for gender equality). The use of this 
saying, it would seem, is meant to show that nation building is a task that requires active partici-
pation of all citizens and not just a section of the population (or, in this case one gender group). Of 
more interest, is the way the author referred to the Ghanaian (Akan) proverb: “The load is lighter 
when two people carry it”, further reinforcing the argument that the task of nation building should 
be a collective responsibility of all citizens (regardless of gender and other social differences). 
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Moreover, given that Ghana is one of the countries that (presently) appears to have positive con-
notation in Nigeria, the reference the author made to the Ghanaian proverb in the excerpt can be 
seen as a strategy of persuasion. It would seem also, that the reference to this foreign proverb was 
meant to show that the wisdom behind the notion of teamwork (or, in this case gender partner-
ship) is something that is also recognized in other African cultures. It therefore constructs gender 
partnership as part of the wider African culture. Thus, the example shows how the notion of team-
work as encoded in the topos (of gender partnership) is used to legitimize gender partnership, 
and which by implication, elevates the status of women to equal partners with men in developing 
the society.  
5 Conclusion  
In this paper, I have examined how some female authors articulated arguments in support of so-
cial equality between men and women in Nigerian newspapers. Starting off with a discussion on 
how the return of democratic system of governance has expanded the activities of gender activists 
in Nigeria, the paper showed how some female authors of opinion articles in Nigerian newspapers 
used language to advocate gender equality. It then provided an analysis and a discussion of the 
different patterns of argumentation strategies identified in the data. The analysis revealed that 
that through the use of the topoi of religion, usefulness, justice and human rights, democracy, and 
gender partnership, the authors advocated equal treatment of all genders. It also showed that the 
topoi were realized through linguistic features such as pronouns, adverbial clauses, declarative 
clauses, noun phrases, intensifiers, intertextual devices, metaphors, idioms, and proverbs fea-
tured prominently in the discursive legitimation of social equality between men and women in 
society. More importantly, the paper has argued that legitimisation does not always serve as an 
instrument of achieving domination and hegemony through discourse, as other studies suggest. It 
can also function as a powerful tool of resisting domination. Moreover, it has shown that cam-
paigns for gender equality in Nigeria involve women using language in the print news media to 
advocate equality of the genders, as a way of engendering social change in society. Apart from contributing to the few existing literature on modes of women’s struggle in Sub-sa-
haran Africa, the present study has demonstrated how a discourse approach to the study of gender 
representation in Nigerian print news media can reveal the complex and often subtle ways in 
which gender equality is constructed and legitimized through the use of language in the newspa-
pers. Thus, the findings of this research are expected to contribute in creating awareness on gen-
der issues in Nigeria as reflected in the discourses examined in the dissertation. This (creation of 
awareness), is considered as an important step towards eradicating all forms of gender discrimi-
nation that serve as impediments to achieving gender equality and equity in society. As Talbot 
(2010: 117) argues: 
Before change can even be wanted, what appear to be natural aspects of the everyday 
lives of women and men have to be exposed as culturally produced and as disadvan-tageous to women […]. This means beginning with an understanding of how gender 
is socially constructed. 
54  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23 
References Adendorff, Ralph (2004). The Principal’s Book: Discursively Reconstructing a Culture of Teaching 
and Learning in an Umhazi High School. In: Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Studies in Social Change. L. Young & C. Harrison (Ed.). London, 
Anthony Rowe: 202-216. 
de Luna, Rodríguez M. (2013). ‘The Other’ Crossing: Discursive representations of the 
management and dynamics of the southern boarder of Spain (M.A. Dissertation). 
University of Oldenburg, Oldenburg. Retrieved from 
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/185864. (Accessed on 29.01.2019). 
Fairclough, Norman (1989). Language and Power. London, Longman. 
Reisigl, Martin / Wodak, Ruth (2009). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In: Methods for 
Critical Discourse Analysis (2nd ed). R. Wodak, & M. Meyer (Ed.). London, Sage: 87-121. 
Reisigl, Martin / Wodak, Ruth. (Ed.) (2000). The Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical 
Discourse. Vienna, Passagen Verlag. 
Saunders, Mark / Lewis, Philip / Thornhill, Adrian (2009). Research Methods for Business 
Students (5th ed). New York, Pearson. 
Talbot, Mary (1998). Language and Gender. Cambridge, Polity. 
Mills, Sarah (2003). Gender and politeness (Vol. 17). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
van Dijk, Teu. A. (2001). Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity. In: Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Martin, Reisigl & Ruth, Wodak (Ed.). London, Sage: 95-119. 
van Dijk, Teu. A. (2000). On the analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration. In: The 
Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical Discourse (pp. 85–104). Vienna, Passagen 
Verlag: 85-104. 
Wodak, Ruth (2000). Does sociolinguistics need social theory? New perspectives on critical 
discourse analysis. In: Discourse & Society 2: 123-147. 
Wodak, Ruth. (2001). The Discourse Historical Approach. In: Methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Martin, Reisigl & Ruth, Wodak (Ed.). London, Sage: 63-94. 
Wodak, Ruth (2009). The Discourse of Politics in Action. Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Wodak, Ruth / de Cellia, Rudolf/ Reisigl, Martin / Karen, Liebhart (1999). The Construction of 
National Identities. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. 
  
1 Introduction  
For public participation to be effective, there should be a discussion on how the communities that 
stand to be affected would like to engage in the process (Gaventa 2002). Public participation is to 
be approached in a manner that respects local realities without losing objectivity and creating an 
effective platform for pro-citizen policy-making. In his exploration of citizenship, participation 
and accountability, John Gaventa notes that little has been done to understand  
how poor people themselves perceive their rights, how these meanings are acted 
upon through political or social mobilization, and how they are bounded by issues of 
knowledge and representation, as well as by differences in identity (Gaventa 2002: 
6).  
This process of perception to action transcends poverty to encompass all matters requiring the 
socio-political mobilization of all citizens. 
This article explores the findings of a study focused on Maasai women and their engagement in political processes within Kenya’s devolution structure that decentralises power to 47 county gov-
ernments with the aim of encouraging citizen participation and supporting participatory govern-
ance. Within the Maasai community, influential patriarchal considerations inform agency and 
power relations (Hodgson 1999; Hodgson 2001; Parsimei 2013; Spencer 2003; Taeko 2014). 
These considerations have continued to exclude women from political spaces and limit their ac-
cess to economic resources, relegating them to being dependants on men and under-represented 
in decision making platforms. This disparity has created what Fraser (1990: 66) terms as a strat-ified society, defined as one ‘‘whose basic institutional framework generates unequal social 
groups in structural relations of dominance and subordination.’’ 
This stratification calls for amendments if increased engagement of women is to be realised in the 
community. Approaching this initiative from the lowest administrative hierarchies is important, 
as these are closest to the people and therefore better positioned to understand local norms and 
how best to formulate engagement mechanisms. This knowledge is crucial in promoting active 
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citizenship which ultimately contributes to increased participation by women in the Kenyan po-
litical arena. Gender equality at the national level cannot be realised in the absence of the very 
required subjects at the local ward level. Should this be the case, it would signify the presence of 
a certain class of women, one with not only the exposure and knowledge on political processes, 
but most importantly, from backgrounds that support them in the endeavour. Most Maasai 
women are not privy to such privilege. The affirmative action debate in Kenya is also clouded with 
accusations of being driven and dominated by a section of elite women – lawyers and those in 
academia (Kanyi 2016). The prevailing effect of this is poor participation by women at the local 
level due to a lack of information. 
Against this background, this article adopts a case study approach, informed by the added value 
of a case study in addressing causal complexities. This approach gives room for the elaboration of causal mechanisms that can further explore Maasai women’s agency, as well as contextualise the 
challenges facing Kenyan women in general as they seek political engagement. The choice of the Maasai women is informed by Parsimei’s (2013) observation that they have become dormant, and 
increasingly unaware of social and political injustices, knowledge of which is obtained from the 
continuous process of critical thinking and acting upon solving community problems. This posi-
tion is a reported consequence of colonialism which, as Hodgson (1999) reports, distorted the 
pre-existing complimentary roles of Maasai men and women, replacing it with a system where 
men were property owners and decision makers, and women were relegated to domestic chores. 
Being subject to this gendered separation of rights and responsibilities, makes the women a fitting 
target group for inclusion under citizen engagement, which is an integral part of devolved govern-
ment as envisioned in Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya (Constitution of Kenya 2010).  
Data presented here was collected between March and May 2016, from several locations in Kaji-
ado and Narok Counties where the Maasai community is dominant. The focus was on identifying factors that have contributed to the marginalization of Maasai women in Kenya’s public/political 
spaces and examining current strategies for engaging Maasai women in decision making within 
the new devolution structure. Recruited through a mix of convenience and judgement sampling, focus group discussions explored barriers to Maasai women’s public engagement, and how the 
same can be overcome. This was informed by analysing the composition and engagement pro-
cesses in ward and sub county citizen forums. From the study locations, data was collected by 
following two main methods: participant observation in an organized county government citizen 
forum and three focus group discussions in each county. Divided into groups of eight, I discussed 
engagement mechanisms in women-only groups, men-only groups and mixed groups. The objec-
tive of this approach was to check on how men and women evaluate gender inclusivity in public 
engagement, and whether their responses vary in men/women-only forums. Additional infor-
mation was collected from women in politics and officers from both counties. 
2 Women and political participation in context 
In many Sub Saharan countries, the debate on whether the position of women was better in pre-
colonial times than in the post-colonial era remains contested. What cannot however be denied, 
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and for which evidence abounds, is the effect colonialism had on the position of women in the 
formation of post-colonial states. In Kenya for example, even though women participated in the 
liberation movement, they were secluded in the independent state (Wambui 2016). Recommen-
dations by the only woman in the legislative council set up by the colonial government to discuss 
constitutional arrangements for independent Kenya, were ignored. It is reported that she was not 
even allowed to speak, and was only allowed to submit a written memorandum on behalf of Ken-
yan African women (Owuor 2016). This happened in 1962, ten years into the operations of an umbrella organization for the advancement of women’s affairs, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake. 
The male dominated government continued to side-line women in political affairs, focusing in-
stead on constructing the image of an African woman as a submissive care provider. This is argued 
to be the propagation of the Victorian understanding of gender roles, as applied by the British 
colonial government, of women being private and domestic beings (Hodgson 1999). In her study 
on Maasai women in Tanganyika, Dorothy Hodgson traces the emergence of patriarchy to ‘‘two 
inter-related processes central to colonial state formation. The first is the division of the comple-
mentary, interconnected responsibilities of men and women into spatially separated, hierarchi-
cally gendered domains of 'domestic' and 'public '/' political', and the second is the consolidation 
of male control over cattle through the commodification of livestock, monetization of the Maasai 
economy and targeting of men for development interventions’’ (Hodgson 1999: 43). These she 
argues, distorted the pre-existing complementarity of roles and power relations thereof. Men gained more power in the shaping of roles and norms while women’s influence diminished. The history of Kenyan women’s struggle is therefore characterised by men’s efforts to define women’s positions, arguing that affirmative action was not necessary as men represented all con-
stituents. In addition to rejecting affirmative motions in parliament, men had the support of the 
repealed constitution1 whose Bill of Rights in section 82 (3), defined discriminatory as affording 
different treatment based on race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection, 
political opinions, colour or creed. Under the law, discrimination based on gender was therefore 
permissible. 
All these injustices thrived into the early 1990s, a period that saw increased commitment from 
women, with the support of various civil society groups, for the institutionalisation of gender 
equality legislation (Kanyi 2016). Beyond political representation, women continue to face dis-
crimination from their menfolk, as this discussion on the experiences of Maasai women will 
demonstrate. There is still widespread belief that the public space belongs to men, and that 
women should submit to their husbands and not question their authority (with respect to Bible 
passages - Ephesians 5:22; 1 Timothy 2:11).  
This belief has shaped negative attitudes towards the political agency of women, perpetuating a 
powerlessness among women that spans the private and intimate space of home and family, into 
the civil public space. This motivated the demand for the inclusion of women and youth who have 
historically been underrepresented in governance. It is therefore a clear mandate under the 2010 
                                                 
1 The 2008 revised edition is available at: http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution%20 
of%20Kenya%20(Repealed).pdf (Accessed on 29.01.2019).  
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Constitution of Kenya. Article 27(3) of the Bill of Rights states that: 
Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal op-
portunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. Article 56 of the Consti-
tution goes a step further in stating that; The State shall put in place affirmative action 
programmes designed to ensure that minorities and marginalised groups - (a) partic-
ipate and are represented in governance and other spheres of life. 
Descriptive representation, characterised by the acting of an individual as a representative or ad-
vocate of a homogenous group that they belong to (Kurebwa 2015), is guaranteed by ensuring 
that women are adequately represented in public office. Article 81 (b) of the constitution states 
that the “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same 
gender”. This is supplemented by Article 97 (1) (b) which spells out that 
The National Assembly consists of forty-seven women, each elected by the registered 
voters of the counties, each county constituting a single member constituency.  
This intersection of laws and provisions provides an equal platform for citizens to engage in deci-
sion making processes. These processes define participatory governance as envisioned in chapter 
eleven of the constitution, which focuses on devolution.  
With a new constitution in place, it can be assumed that all women have benefitted from the strug-
gle that bore fruit in the 2010 constitution which reflects the success of the affirmative action 
struggle. But this is sadly not so. The current (12th) national parliament has 76 women legislators, 
against 273 men, a clear contravention of the constitution. Efforts to redress the underrepresen-
tation of women in the parliament have been frustrated by the inability to reach an agreeable 
formula to achieve the constitutional one third minimum. Unlike the ambiguity concerning the 
bicameral parliament however, the constitution expressly provides that county legislatures must 
nominate extra women to meet the gender requirement. Article 177(1b) of the constitution states 
that “A county assembly consists of the number of special seat members necessary to ensure that 
no more than two thirds of the membership of the assembly is of the same gender”. This provision has necessitated the creation of gender ‘top-up’ lists, to meet the constitutional quota.  
At the county level, only 96 women were elected to represent 1,450 administrative units across 
the 47 counties in the August 2017 elections, necessitating the nomination of an extra 559 female 
legislators to ensure that the county assemblies attained the legal gender ratio. None of the 19 
women who contested were elected to the county assembly from the eleven constituencies in Kaji-
ado and Narok counties. According to data from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Com-
mission, Kajiado had to nominate 11 women legislators, while Narok nominated 15, to ensure 
gender balance in their assemblies. But running for political office is a difficult task, as women face 
harsh criticism from the patriarchal community. This was the experience of the first Maasai 
elected woman member of parliament, Ms. Peris Tobiko. It is reported that she had to overcome 
threats, alienation and curses from Maasai elders for “trying to be a man” (Ndonga 2013). To 
many, the quest for political activity has had them branded as prostitutes, as no home and family 
focused woman has the time to run around discussing politics.  
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   59 
The existence of such attitudes in Kenya today may be difficult to grasp, especially considering the 
effort that went into publicising the women’s struggle over the years. What it points to however, 
is the non-inclusivity of the movement. As Kanyi (2016) notes, ordinary women remained igno-
rant of the ongoing changes as these occurred predominantly at the policy level. The debate was 
driven by women in law, academia and the civil society, with little effort being put into engaging with those in the grassroots. Maasai women’s current situation and struggles for equality are a 
clear embodiment of this weakness. Maasai women thus face the socio-political struggles that 
Kenyan women were supposed to have tackled in the 1990s. They are not only struggling to catch 
up with Maasai men, but also the rest of Kenyan women.  
Aware of this reality, the case depicts a community whose female members opt for co-option in-
stead of confrontation as a desired pathway to achieving gender equality. This option places men 
and women centrally in this quest, only minimally referring to formal laws for guidance. Respond-
ents demonstrated an awareness of the rules governing power relations within the community, 
and optimistically, reported openness to alternative engagement processes. The case thus reiter-
ates the argument for the need to balance desire for legitimacy and support for decisions in par-
ticipatory policy planning (Rowe / Frewer 2000). For communities such as the Maasai, socio-cul-
tural norms outweigh formal laws and it is within them that change can be actualised. Disregard 
for these will do nothing to help in giving a voice to the marginalised women and improving their 
agency in the Kenyan public space. 
3 Barriers to Maasai women’s public participation Studies on women’s low levels of participation in political processes tend to focus on three inter-
related explanatory variables when exploring the lack of gender parity in politics in general: cul-
tural practices and norms, socioeconomics, and institutional factors. This study adopts this ap-
proach in exploring the Maasai situation. 
3.1 Socio-cultural barriers 
Gendered separation among the Maasai has resulted in women’s absence from the public space, severely limiting their input in the community’s decision-making processes. Since they oversee 
domestic affairs however, they have little time to spare for political or other public engagements. 
They are also relatively poor (Erakit 2013), which combines with cultural norms of the duties of 
women to create the “double-burden” barrier to participation (McNulty 2015). This argument was 
prevalent in the discussions with the respondents, with both men and women agreeing that 
women have limited time to engage in public affairs. Domestic duties take up most of their time: 
They [the men] are now off to their jobs so if there is a political meeting they can go 
at night and will come back home whenever they wish. But as a woman, you cannot 
do this; you have to take care of the children, cows and other domestic affairs, but the 
men have free time (Interview, Female Respondent, Kimuka - Kajiado West, 
23.03.2016). 
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With the increased awareness and legislative calls for change in engagement mechanisms, women 
are gradually becoming more visible in the public space. But while their presence is noteworthy, 
the substantial element of it remains questionable. Women are involved, arguably for the sake of 
numbers, without there being evident commitment to understanding and incorporating their 
views and opinions. For example, respondents reported that women in education and develop-
ment committees were largely unaware of decisions made on these platforms, since men side-
lined them. This attitude is prevalent in public forums, where men give speeches, but women are 
only given a chance to give a closing or a “women representation” remark. This was observed at a 
public meeting in Rombo Ward, Loitokitok Sub-County: at a meeting with the Member of Parlia-
ment as guest of honour, there were over 20 speakers, but only three of these were women. Of the 
three, one was from the Ministry of Education, another from a Non-Governmental Organization 
that supports pupils at the local school, and only one woman from the community. This lady spoke 
on behalf of the women in the community, a chance that had been given to more than 10 men from 
the same community.  
It is scenarios such as this that continue to discourage women from participating as they are in-
creasingly aware of the lip service paid to the inclusion of women. They are largely ignored by the 
system which is embedded in patriarchy, forcing them to focus on their domestic duties instead. 
As one respondent narrated: 
When we hear of such meetings, we do not see the importance of attending because 
we would only be taking our eyes as we have no opportunity. So we choose to remain 
at home and do other things. Men tell us whenever they go for meetings and we let 
them go and choose to focus on our chores as we have no chances in such meetings 
(Interview, Female respondent, Nairagie Enkare - Narok East, 19.04.2016). 
Unsurprisingly, this disregard for the political role of women shapes the sphere of political lead-
ership. The first elected Maasai woman Member of Parliament, Ms. Tobiko narrated the harsh crit-
icism she faced from the community during her contestation in the 2012 elections. She is reported 
to have overcome threats, alienation and curses from Maasai elders for “trying to be a man” 
(Ndonga 2013). These sentiments were echoed by Ms. Merin, an aspirant for the position of Ward 
Representative, Rombo Ward in the 2017 elections. Being a single young mother, she was often 
criticised for neglecting her role as a mother, choosing instead to fight with men. She has been 
called Elkirikoi,2 and has been sexually harassed by men who promise to listen to her only after 
she has granted them sexual favours or agreed to be a second or even third wife. 
It is therefore evident that regardless of the legislative commitment to the inclusivity of women 
in politics and public affairs by the Kenyan government, the community continues to be governed 
by norms that are in opposition to this vision. A reluctance to change or shift attitudes on deep 
rooted traditional cultural beliefs remains the biggest obstacle to institutional transformation 
(Norris / Inglehart 2000): gendered norms and rules are very powerful and evidently undermine 
formal changes to political participation parity within the community.  
                                                 
2 Mainly refers to wanderer in Maa, but could in cases like this loosely translate to prostitute. 
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While traditions and customs were often cited as reasons for continued male dominance in au-
thority and decision making, one male respondent made it clear that the same is used as an excuse 
to perpetuate male dominance and maintain the status quo. He pointed out that the community 
has over time adopted many changes that contradicted what was termed traditional but are re-
luctant to get rid of male dictatorship to promote gender equality. 
3.2 Economic barriers 
Maasai women’s freedoms of expression and socio-economic development have been affected by 
a lack of direct access to resources, limiting their capacity for development. They generally have 
limited control over property and resources as these are controlled by men as heads of house-
holds. Consequently, women are relatively poor and can therefore not always afford to meet mon-
etary demands beyond basic needs. This lack of access to the ‘‘material means of public participa-tion’’ (Fraser 1990: 64) enforces the socio-cultural disadvantages discussed above. 
Public participation exercises tend to take place at administrative centres, necessitating travel for 
those from the villages. Participating in public fora therefore ranks lower for them as they choose 
to save the little resources they have to meet their domestic needs. The spare time they have for 
themselves is spent in women groups where they do beadwork, the proceeds of which contribute 
to meeting additional household and personal needs. As respondents narrated, calls for attend-
ance to public meetings exclude inhabitants of areas further from administrative offices. Accord-
ing to one respondent: 
They make announcements for development meetings to be held in the administra-
tive central. Further, they do not provide transport for the people coming from remote 
areas […] This process leaves out the common mwananchi because they need to go to 
the people at the grassroots and ask them what their needs are, and the people give 
their proposals (Interview, Female respondent, Loitokitok - Kajiado South, 
03.03.2016). 
This was also confirmed by the Narok County Budget Officer who reported that his office only 
reaches out to 12 locations that are easier to access. This excludes citizens who live in the out-
skirts, and especially women who cannot afford to take time off their domestic duties for such 
meetings, or even afford it. 
Participants and county governments alike depend on the availability of resources to be able to 
fulfil the participation mandate. The Kenyan Public Finance Management Act of 2012 in conjunc-
tion with the County Public Participation Act of 2014 give the public the right to participate 
throughout the entire budget process, which runs from the formulation of the budget, throughout 
its implementation, to the evaluation stage. The effectiveness of public participation thus depends 
on the availability of resources to implement it.  
The issue of inadequate resources was prevalent in the discussions with both citizens and econo-
mists in the planning departments of Kajiado and Narok county governments, magnifying the role 
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of financial constraints in limiting the implementation of the participation exercises as constitu-
tionally envisioned. Financial resources do provide a constraint to the successful realization of 
public participation. Jütting et al. (2004) point to the reality that local governments may some-
times lack the human and financial resources to effectively implement decentralization. As the 
excerpt narration from the Loitokitok respondent shows, the lack of resources in both the domes-tic and public fronts continue to limit Maasai women’s capacity to actively engage in public par-
ticipation exercises. The women pointed out the need for such to take place within reasonable, 
preferably walking, distance so they could manage to attend at no cost. 
Even though the funds are limited, this has not deterred its unfair distribution against women. 
The Women Representative for example, administers the Uwezo Fund, a programme aimed at en-
abling women, youth and persons with disability to access finances to promote businesses and 
enterprises at the constituency level.3 The citizens have questioned the equitable distribution of 
the fund, with respondents reporting that it has been overtaken by an elite who have become 
guaranteed beneficiaries in every allocation cycle, leaving out many other deserving citizens. This is in addition to the fund’s demanding and tedious application process that leaves very little room 
for the illiterate to participate. As a result, stratification in the community deepens, while at the 
same time widening socio-economic divisions. 
3.3 Institutional barriers 
Although the existing legal framework supports equal inclusion of women, respondents argued 
that there have been very few efforts to take the gender equality agenda seriously. The dissemi-
nation of information on citizen rights and public participation procedures were reported to be 
absent. Many community members remain unaware of the provisions of the very transformative 
constitution that guarantees them a position and a voice in governance procedures. While most 
voted for the constitution in 2010 based on hearsay, the men are more knowledgeable on its pro-
visions, a benefit derived from their wide socio-political circles. Presently, the majority are be-
coming more knowledgeable based on the administrative failures that play out in public, such as 
suing parties and county governments for non-compliance with gender parity in nomination ex-
ercises.4 
Both men and women admitted that the lack of knowledge is the biggest challenge to gender main-
streaming within the community. Civic education on the 2010 Constitution of Kenya was poor 
prior to the vote, and the situation still prevails, as one respondent explained: 
We are asking the government to come to the grassroots, we sit together and discuss, and for them to explain the Constitution to the community because we don’t know. 
                                                 
3 A programme aimed at enabling women, youth and persons with disability access finances to promote businesses and 
enterprises at the constituency level: http://www.uwezo.go.ke/ (Accessed on 29.01.2019).  
4 “Court revokes nomination of 12 Migori MCAs”: http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/migori/Court-revokes-
nomination12-Migori-MCAs/1183306-4251058-i70lotz/index.html (Accessed on 29.01.2019). 
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They only come during the campaign period (Interview, Female respondent, Loi-
tokitok - Kajiado South, 07.03.2016). 
The limited civic education carried out was also skewed and marred with political interest. Very 
little, if anything at all, on rights and responsibilities was openly discussed, as another respondent 
summarised: 
What there was, is that they told us Christians to refuse Islamic law and legalization 
of abortion. As Christians, we chose the Orange (No) and the others were Bananas 
(Yes). […] But we did not understand what it all meant […] As Christians we fought 
against the legalization of abortion (Interview, Female respondent, Kimuka - Kajiado 
West, 23.03.2016). 
This created a loophole that promotes the apparent lack of political will and commitment to gen-
der equality. Combined with the fact that neither Kajiado nor Narok counties have adopted a po-
litical empowerment agenda, women continue to lack an equal voice in the participatory decision-
making processes which would improve their agency and legitimise public participation within 
the community. 
While women are appointed to development committees at the Ward levels, it is mainly done to 
fulfil the two thirds gender rule and not really to give a voice or any decision-making authority to 
them. This transcends to other positions in the administration, such as the chiefs, where it is rec-
ommended that the Chief and the assistant Chief be representative of both genders, to make it 
easier for women to have one of their own to whom they can address their concerns. However, 
this does not work out as envisioned because the women in these positions always have men as 
colleagues and fellow decision makers. As it is therefore, both men and the structure in place do little to legitimise these women’s positions, and this clearly outlines the paradox of policy com-
mitments. Of a female Chief in the Ewuaso Kedong Ward, it was reported: 
In her position, the men just let her be for the sake of it. So it can be seen that she is 
there […] She is there because the government has said she should be […] She is there but most decisions are made for her…She is given the opportunity to speak but it is 
not so that she can say everything. The power is there just because the government created the position…They still say a woman cannot do much […] When a woman 
stands to speak on something they do not like, they use very bad language, asking 
'What can a woman say or do?'[…] They ask in what capacity that woman gets up to 
speak to them (Interview, Female respondents, Kimuka - Kajiado West, 23.03.2016). 
This scenario depicts the infiltration of gender bias into the administration, the consequence of 
which is a lack of commitment to fulfilling the agenda tasked to the institution. Having women in 
power without power is a failure of participation, not from operation or technique, but as a sys-
temic consequence (Cooke /Kothari 2001). In supporting this, Connell (2005) theorises that prin-
ciple and practice differ in the acceptance of change by men. It is more problematic in the Maasai 
community since it is the men who, due to their political dominance, select women who will join 
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committees and even endorse candidates for the Women Representative position, a special posi-
tion that ensures that every county has a woman representative in the national assembly. On how 
they voted for this position in 2013, a respondent narrated: 
For example, when Mary Seneta [the Women Representative] expressed political in-
terest, we had not known her previously but we voted for her because the men said 
they already knew her (Interview, Female respondent, Kimuka - Kajiado West, 
23.03.2016). 
In the Maasai patriarchal set-up, it matters that the male political class endorses a candidate, oth-
erwise they stand little chance of winning. While it is true that women could do a lot more in nom-
inating and voting for one of their own, the financial requirements in the Kenyan patron - client 
political set-up excludes many of them from being actively engaged in the political scene. Kimani (2014) highlights the fact that Kenya’s politics are heavily reliant on social capital, but the process 
of accumulating political capital is more favourable to men. Women interested in politics therefore 
search for male colleagues to act as patrons, in a bid to attain legitimacy and improve their chances 
of winning. The endorsement of women candidates by men makes it difficult for the women to 
contradict men, due to the prevailing logic of appropriateness (Chappell 2006) that forbids women from openly opposing or criticising men. For the longest time, men kept their wives’ iden-tity and voter’s cards, to ensure that they did not vote independently - this with the assistance of 
political party agents at voting stations. Incidences of violence were common whenever women 
acted independently. This is a proliferation and collusion of informal gendered norms in the for-
mal public space, which in the end supports and upholds an elitist political structure that is dom-
inated by men and slowing the gains of equality legislation. 
4 Negotiating alternative pathways to inclusion 
While the findings above illustrate more challenges than successes, the citizens are themselves 
aware of possible measures to rectify this. These measures were observed in the focus group dis-
cussions and are analysed in the following sections. 
4.1 Citizen-led civic education  
Civic education can make up for the disadvantages of a lack of higher education attainments. Many 
countries have therefore adopted this approach, to spread awareness on civic duties, rights and 
responsibilities. Persson (2013) reports that there is empirical evidence that civic education has 
had a positive impact on outcomes such as civic knowledge. As a precaution however, Finkel 
(2002) warns that the effects of civic education rely on frequency, style, and the political resources 
of individuals, because civic education exposes individuals to both curriculum and group mobili-
sation processes, which can have short term effects. 
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The focus group participants included men who expressed readiness to volunteer as ambassadors 
within their communities for civic education, but they noted the importance of government sup-
port. This support is necessary to facilitate movement and resources, such as expertise and texts, 
to promote training of trainers in a system that would speed up the process and increase depth of 
outreach. One of them explained: 
In order to deal with these problems and help women feel like part of society is that 
we the knowledgeable men […] need to volunteer to teach whenever public meetings 
take place or during the women's merry-go-rounds [rotational savings and credit as-
sociations] since the government seems to have abandoned the grassroots. If the 
county government can facilitate this because facilitation might be problematic espe-
cially in reaching out to women in this vast area, it would go a long way in uplifting 
our women and our community in general (Interview, Male respondent, Nairagie 
Enkare - Narok East, 21.04.2016). 
Partnerships such as this would have a positive influence on the relationship between citizens and 
government administration, as communication and support channels would be readily available 
to both parties. Most importantly, in volunteering to teach women, men help to bridge the gap in 
the constitution of political spaces. Through teaching, men extend the invitation to participation, 
breaking down socio-cultural barriers that have perpetuated male dominance in public affairs 
among the Maasai.  
4.2 Maximising on men’s role as gate keepers of cultural norms  Men are gatekeepers for gender equality, and their willingness to ‘‘open the gates for major re-
forms is an important strategic question’’ (Connell 2005: 1802). This has worked in combating 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) whereby the involvement of men has led to increased success in 
the campaign. The engagement of Maasai Morans in Kajiado has been reported to be very effective, 
as they are the decision makers on whether or not to marry uncircumcised women.5 Regarding 
participation, it is the men who made suggestions to have male ambassadors at the community 
level, who could volunteer for civic education whenever there is an opportunity for public engage-
ment. 
Involving men at the community level could make the process inclusive, as everyone plays an im-
portant role in transforming the political space. It also compliments sentiments by the women, 
that knowledge transmission on the importance of including women in governance processes 
should not be restricted to women alone but should also include men so they can provide an op-
portunity for change starting at the home front. According to one respondent: 
Even men need the training. They are saying that 'women do not speak' so they also 
need the training so that when both are educated, he can give me the freedom. I am 
                                                 
5 “Legalise Female Genital Mutilation, says doctor in court”: https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Legalise-female-
circumcision--says-doctor-in-court/1056-4267584-11ajval/index.html (Accessed on 29.01.2019).  
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not saying it is all of them, but without the training, he will not understand me when 
I bring an agenda to the home. For us to understand each other, we both need the 
training (Interview, Female respondent, Nairagie Enkare - Narok East, 21.04.2016). 
With the provision of training for all members of a community in place, men and women can ap-proach roles as equals, recognising and respecting each other’s rights to engage in political affairs. 
The ensuing support structure would therefore minimise confrontations, while opening the space for equity and equality. Having men as champions of women’s empowerment also increases the chances of the agenda’s success since as custodians of Maasai customs, they have the power to 
influence the language and attitude that could ultimately restructure the equality landscape.  
4.3 Formalising women groups  The formalisation of women’s groups would provide an alternative avenue for the incorporation 
of women’s voices in governance. This would involve giving them the power to act as political 
representatives, an approach that has been successfully adopted in Peru (McNulty 2015). As an informal platform of participation, women’s groups as legally recognisable representative bodies 
could become channels for agendas that could not, for whatever reason, be discussed in public 
forums, and those that were discussed but not incorporated, but are of strong standing among the 
women.  
Giving a legal political position to women’s groups would provide a remedy to the shortcoming of 
general public meetings. Registered and unregistered women’s groups are part of the community 
landscape across Kenya. Anunobi (2002) traces the roots of these groups to the precolonial era, 
where women supported each other in their extended families and within their age sets. Their 
activities, though not fitting into the mainstream political classification, play a very significant 
role. They provide excellent opportunities for mobilisation of women in organising women-fo-
cused events. Even though, in their operations, they do little to challenge gender norms that sub-ordinate women, they do provide a platform for the improvement of members’ self-confidence 
and welfare through peer learning, income-generating activities and peer lending. Women’s groups are of great significance in the lives of women, and in ways that benefit the com-
munity at large (Taeko 2014). The social and economic projects undertaken within these groups 
tend to introduce significant changes in not just the lives of the women and their immediate fam-
ilies, but in the rest of the community as well. Discussions with the respondents confirmed this, 
explaining that they have transformed their lives through the knowledge and assistance they get from their women’s groups. These spaces are not only used as meeting points to support group 
lending and organise the sale of their beadwork, but also for peer counselling and information 
sharing on public affairs. The women have therefore been able to learn more about community 
affairs and development needs, in addition to their culturally pre-determined mandate of care. 
They can take charge of domestic duties, alongside running micro and small businesses. Most im-
portantly, these groups have become an important space for networking. 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   67 
Things have totally changed today. There are village elders and among them are 
women. The women are now involved in community development and pass on all the 
necessary information to the women in the merry-go-round groups (Interview, Fe-
male Respondent, Nairagie Enkare - Narok East, 19.04.2016). Formalising women’s groups would increase their legitimacy and provide a platform for training 
on political agency, and a channel for women to communicate their needs without fear of preju-
dice or disregard from their male counterparts. This navigation system will then present itself 
directly to planning boards, communicating matters that would otherwise remain unaired in the 
mainstream participation process. Fraser (1990) terms these platforms subaltern counter-pub-
lics. She argues that in stratified societies, subaltern counter publics provide subordinated groups 
parallel discursive arenas where they can invent and circulate counter-discourses, allowing them 
to formulate their own interests and needs. Women groups as a subaltern counter-publics will 
therefore expand the discursive space while at the same time countering the issues presented by logic of appropriateness that limit women’s contributions in deliberative processes. While this 
may be argued as exclusionary and therefore contrary to the goal of inclusion in a deliberative 
democracy, it bears the potential to offset the unfair cultural public participatory privilege of men 
among the Maasai. 
5 Conclusion 
Participation and participatory governance are hailed for bringing the government closer to the 
people and promoting responsive policy making by the government. Its bottom-up approach aides 
in the definition of local priorities and more home-grown solutions (Cornwall / Jewkes 1995). 
Public participation allows for a governance structure guided by the creation and implementation 
of activities among citizens in conjunction with those in government. Together, the two entities 
formulate policies to meet a common goal, mainly home-grown and inclusive development. As a 
means or an end in itself, the process of citizen deliberation has been argued to improve democ-
racy (Bingham et al. 2005). However, the concept of ‘bottom’ needs to be reconsidered. For Maasai women, their bottom po-
sition differs from that of their male counterparts. A call for participation can only be honoured if 
the ground is levelled, to afford citizens equal footing. The public sphere cannot be conceptualised 
as neutral, and free from any cultural ethos (Fraser 1999). Rather, as the discussion here shows, 
the public sphere available to women has become a platform for the continued marginalization of 
the very individuals for whose benefit the process is set up. Participation threatens to be a plat-
form for continued male dominance, and one where women rights are violated or out rightly de-
nied. The lack of freedom of speech provides a good example of this among the Maasai, where it remains subjugated to the community’s gendered logic of appropriateness.  
Contextualised policy making and openness to support for alternative processes pave the way for 
inclusive and transformative public governance systems. In the case of the Maasai, the awareness 
68  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23 
and readiness for dialogue on engagement frameworks that promote inclusivity provide an excel-
lent platform for the exploration of alternative approaches to gender equality, and within them, 
ensuring inclusive and effective participatory democracy. 
References 
Anunobi, Fredoline (2002) Women and Development in Africa: From Marginalization to Gender 
Inequality. African Social Science Review. Vol. 2, No. 2: 41-63. 
Bingham, Lisa Blomgren / Nabatchi, Tina / O’Leary, Rosemary (2005). The New Governance: 
Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of 
Government. In: Public Administration Review 65 (5): 547-558. Chappell, Loiuse (2006). Comparing Political Institutions: Revealing the Gendered “Logic of Appropriateness”. In: Politics & Gender 2(2): 223-235. 
Connell, Raewyn (2005). Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities, and Gender Equality 
in the Global Arena. In: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30 (3): 1801-1825. 
Constitution of Kenya 2010. Available at: 
https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf. 
(Accessed on 12.05.2015).  
Cornwall, Andrea / Jewkes, Rachel (1995). What is participatory research? In: Social Science and 
Medicine 41 (12): 1667-1676. 
Erakit, Joan (2013). The Challenge of Being a Maasai Woman. Available at: 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/the-challenge-of-being-a-maasai-woman/. (Accessed 
on 29.01.2019). 
Fraser, Nancy (1990) Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy. In: Social Text 25/26: 56–80. 
Gaventa, John (2002). Exploring Citizenship, Participation and Accountability. In: IDS Bulletin 33 
(2): 1-14. 
Hodgson, Dorothy (2001). Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of 
Maasai Development, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hodgson, Dorothy (1999). Pastoralism, Patriarchy and History: Changing gender relations among 
Maasai in Tanganyika, 1890-1940. In: Journal of African history 40 (1): 41-65. 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   69 
Jütting, Johannes / Corsi, Elena / Kauffmann, Céline / Mcdonnell, Ida / Osterrieder, Holger / 
Pinaud, Nicolas / Wegner, Lucia (2004). What Makes Decentralisation in Developing 
Countries Pro-poor? In: OECD Development Centre Working Paper 236: 1-59. Kanyi, Wambui (2016). Kenyan Women’s Journey In Their Quest For Affirmative Action. In: The 
Walls We Can't See: Public Policy Lethargy on Women’s Political Participation in Kenya. 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Policy Brief. Available at: 
https://ke.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2016/06/gender_briefs_-
_wambui_kanyi.pdf. (Accessed on 23.04.2017). 
Kimani, Kennedy (2014) The gender rule quagmire: Implementing the two-thirds gender 
principle in Kenya. Available at: http://iedafrica.org/index.php/policy-legal-
reforms/143-the-gender-rule-quagmire-implementing-the-two-thirds-gender-principle-
in-kenya. (Accessed on 23.11.2014). 
Kurebwa, Jeffrey (2015). A Review of Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) Conception of Women’s Political 
Representation. In: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 5 (11): 
50-60. 
McNulty, Stephanie (2015). Barriers to Participation: Exploring Gender in Peru’s Participatory 
Budget Process. In: The Journal of Development Studies 51 (11): 1429-1443. 
Ndonga, Wambui (2013) Women who broke barriers to get elected. Available at: 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/03/women-who-broke-barriers-to-get-elected. 
(Accessed on 16.12.2015). 
Norris, Pippa / Inglehart, Ronald (2000) Cultural Barriers to Women's Leadership: A Worldwide 
Comparison. IPSA 2000 paper. Available at: 
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/IPSA2000culture.pdf. (Accessed on 
11.12.2017). 
Owuor, Effie (2016). Women and political inclusion in Kenya: A historical overview, 1963 – 2016. 
In: Gender Equality and Political Processes in Kenya. Japhet Biegon (ed), Nairobi, 
Strathmore University Press, 7-38. 
Parsimei, Emmanuel (2013). The Maasai Women: Childhood to Womanhood. Available at: 
http://web.education.unimelb.edu.au/UNESCO/pdfs/maasai.pdf. (Accessed on 
20.01.2014). 
Persson, Mikael (2013). Education and Political Participation. In: British Journal of Political 
Science 45(3): 689-703. 
70  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23 
Rowe, Gene / Frewer, Lynn (2000). Public participation methods: A framework for evaluation. In: 
Science, Technology and Human values 25(1): 3-29. 
Spencer, Paul (2003). Time, Space, and the Unknown: Maasai Configurations of Power and 
Providence. Routledge, London. 
Taeko, Takayanagi (2014). The complexity of literacy in Kenya: narrative analysis of Maasai women’s experiences. In: Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education 
44 (5): 826-844. 
Wambui, Jane (2016) Neo-Patrimonialism, Patriarchy and Politics of Women’s Representation in Kenya. The walls we can't see: Public Policy Lethargy on Women’s Political Participation 
in Kenya. Available at: 
https://ke.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2016/06/gender_briefs_-
_jane_wambui.pdf. (Accessed on 12.03.2017).
  
1 Introduction  
Queer life in Kenya is of necessity clandestine, secretive and furtive. Nevertheless, where there is a will there’s a way and members of the Queer community have man-
aged for 50 years and more to live, love and drink beer side by side with the rest of 
society without creating too much of a fuss (Githahu 2014).1 
As the quote shows, a queer community has always existed in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi. In 
the past two decades trans issues in the African context have become more visible with more at-
tention being drawn to the political and social topic of accepting LGBTIQ2 people. More and more 
people refuse to live this clandestine and secretive life Githahu is referring to, but in many parts 
of Africa queer people, especially the trans community, however, still face a multitude of hardships 
within their societies. Trans issues is a highly misunderstood subject in Kenya and due to the 
stigma and shame linked to it, many trans Kenyans are confronted with conflicts within their per-sonal as well as their work environments. Some even “suffer in silence”, as Maureen3, one of my 
informants framed it (Interview, Maureen, 30.09.2016).4 Nighttime, as this article will demon-
strate, is perceived by parts of the LGBT community as a safe space and a crucial part of their lives, 
because it offers trans people opportunities to be themselves, to be free and express parts of their 
lives they oppress during the day due to the aforementioned conflicts with family or colleagues.  
Accordingly, it is the night that offers a contrasting experience compared to the daily life where 
many trans people in Kenya fear to live in the open because they have experienced violence and 
the loss or rejection of family and friends who did not understand or accept their gender identity. 
This is one of the reasons why some of the trans people in Nairobi, who will be introduced in this 
article, choose nighttime to express their gender identity socially (such as wearing clothes of their 
desired gender), at home or in nocturnal safe spaces, such as queer-friendly bars and clubs in the 
                                                 
1 “We're queer, we're here and we're drinking our beer”: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2014/02/05/were-queer-
were-here-and-were-drinking-our-beer_c891077 (Accessed on 29.01.2019). 
2 LGBTIQ is the abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersexual and Queer/Questioning and is widely 
used in the activist and political sphere. There are other common abbreviations such as LGBT, but for the sake of 
consistency I am using LGBTIQ in this article.  
3 All names of the mentioned informants have been changed or modified for the source’s protection. 
4 There are no statistics about the trans population in Kenya. During my research I had close contact with six trans 
people and through them I met around 15 (Kenyan) trans people during my fieldwork. 
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city. Nairobi, a fast-growing, globally connected city, offers more opportunities for the queer com-
munity to live freely and engage with others as it is impossible in rural areas of Kenya. A percep-
tion of an open-minded and cosmopolitan city is one of the reasons why people from neighboring 
countries decide to move to Nairobi and enjoy the anonymity urban life offers. The phenomena of 
a nocturnal city where LGBTQ Nairobians have carved out their own space of freedom and secu-
rity is the focus of this contribution. 
There is little to no literature on queer people in Kenya, especially trans persons. Public discourse 
has only started recently and is limited to urban areas where activists, LGBT movements and non-
governmental organizations engage in projects to support trans people personally as well as ed-
ucate the broader public about the topic.5 By sharing ethnographic data about trans persons in 
Nairobi and describing a fraction of their complex life stories, this contribution draws academic 
attention to trans stories in the Kenyan context and leads to new areas of research on trans per-
sons in Nairobi and on the role gender plays in power relations and social struggles in Kenya.  
In this article,6 I address how the significant differences of night and day, reflects in the lives and 
struggles of trans persons in Nairobi. The article shows how important the night is for trans peo-
ple as well as how the safe nocturnal spaces in the city are created and experienced. To do this, I 
will first discuss the methodological approach (2) and terminology used in this article (3). After 
reviewing the current regulations and laws affecting the trans community in Kenya in section 4, I 
will share the empirical material I collected in Nairobi and introduce different trans informants (5). In part 6 I illustrate how “a night out” is experienced by them and by referring to the quote in 
the title of the article I show how my informants link their nocturnal experiences with the idea of 
freedom. Using the concept of safe spaces, I will explain how trans people in Nairobi perceive the 
night as such (7). With concluding remarks, I will demonstrate how the night challenges social 
categories such as gender or class and offers marginalized groups visibility they lack in their daily 
lives.  
2 Gaining access to and trust within Nairobi’s trans community  
The research that this article is based on was conducted in Nairobi between October 2015 and 
November 2017.7 During two long and two short research stays totaling 19 months, I collected 
different kind of data, including participant and structured observation, questionnaires, night-
                                                 
5 Being trans is not an urban phenomenon, but especially in the African context the LGBT community is more visible 
and active in urban areas.  
6 I would like to thank the reviewers of this article, Prof. Dr. Katharina Schramm (Chair of the Anthropology Department, 
University of Bayreuth) and Dr. Jan Hutta (Chair of Cultural Geography, University of Bayreuth) for their critical 
comments and helpful discussions which improved this contribution tremendously. I am furthermore grateful to my 
colleague and friend Carsten Mildner who commented helpfully on the ideas in this article and to Bernard Podolski who 
took the time to support me with language corrections. 
7 The fieldwork I conducted was part of the PhD Project “Perceptions of the night in Nairobi, Kenya” which is associated 
at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS).  
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walks and interviews, which include in-depth and expert interviews as well as informal conversa-
tions.  
The ethnographic material I am sharing in this article are personal experiences of my interlocu-
tors, and I find it crucial to provide an insight into trans lives in Nairobi and give them a voice, at 
least to a certain extent. In this article they will speak through me, which means that I made the 
decision which material will be shared and of course I am taking into account how my own role as 
an ethnographer shaped the research process, the relationship to the people I speak about in this 
article as well as the interpretation of the collected material. This reflexive approach might reduce 
a bias, but it must be acknowledged that an ethnographer can never describe something objec-
tively as it is, no matter how much we try to engage in a reflexive process. The lens I use to view 
my research process, whether regarding personal or theoretical beliefs, the relationships I built 
with my informants, how they viewed me and how I viewed them all influenced the outcome of 
this contribution. I think that the lens of these personal experiences I am going to describe, from 
family backgrounds up to illustrating a night out with the four trans people mentioned in this 
article, are a useful approach to understand the way they use and make sense of the night since I 
argue that these lived experiences shape the process of what I call night-making later in this arti-
cle.  Collecting detailed descriptions and illustrations of my nocturnal trans informants’ personal di-
lemmas was only possible because I gained their trust, I invested time as well as emotional energy 
into spending time with them and building close relationships. I argue that the process of devel-
oping rapport is inevitably linked to the idea of Participant Observation in the field of Anthropol-
ogy and this article demonstrates the importance of such methodological approach once again to get a glimpse of people’s lives, mainly speaking about issues regarding people’s personal spaces. 
Nevertheless, my own biased position needs to be examined. 
I am a cisgender white woman in her late twenties from Germany. I am educated, a PhD student, 
who is financially independent. I have an interest in nightlife culture and all kinds of nocturnal 
experiences. I see myself as an insider because I spent a significant amount of time in Nairobi’s 
nocturnal scene but simultaneously as an outsider to the Nairobi trans community since I am nei-
ther Kenyan nor am I trans or any part of the LGBTIQ community. In the ethnographic descriptions 
later on I will show that the trans people I engaged with had an understanding of Europe as more 
tolerant than Africa, more open-minded towards people’s sexual orientation and in general they imagined it as a place where people do not interfere as much in other people’s personal lives as 
they experienced it in their lives before. My European background and being the same age as them, led to my informant’s perception of me being tolerant and open-minded. Another contributing 
factor has been that I met the four trans people through a third party and that person linking us 
at is a gay friend of mine who I have known since my first visit to Kenya in 2010. In many conver-
sations I had with my trans informants this was mentioned as a key factor for them to trust me 
and allow me to spend time with them since this friend has vouched for my discretion. By sharing 
narratives of trans people the aim of this article is to create a sensibility for the social power rela-
tions in my research context and the marginalization people experience as well as the opportuni-
ties nocturnal atmospheres offer to overcome these.  
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3 Trans in the Kenyan context- Terminology and legal framework 
In this article, the primary emphasis lies on my empirical data which allows me to illustrate the 
personal experiences of my informants. Nevertheless, it is essential to discuss the terminology 
and language used in this article. My aim is not to reflect on ongoing debates in Gender and Queer 
Studies, but rather explain where my informants position themselves, which terms they use and 
why.  
Transgender, Transsexual, Trans*, Trans men/women? - How to write about trans persons 
One can find a multitude of creative terms, concepts and definitions when it comes to discussions 
about (trans) gender identities. I would like to explain why I chose to use the term ‘trans’ in refer-
ring to the informants I am speaking about in the following sections. To use the terms correctly 
and to understand their manifestations it is necessary to discuss them here.8 Green et al. ad-
dressed the issue of using proper terms in an article published in Transgender Quarterly formu-lating the question “What do you want us to call you?”, using the subtitle “Respectful language” 
indicates that working about trans people is always linked to a discussion and maybe even justi-
fication why one chose to use a specific term since “terminology goes hand in hand with particular viewpoints” (Green et al. 2018: 105). Therefore, it is necessary to speak about the term 
transgender on the one hand, and to discuss on the other hand why I chose to use the term trans 
or trans persons in my work.  
The term transgender is not indicative of gender expression, sexual orientation, hormonal 
makeup, physical anatomy, or how one is perceived in daily life (Valentine 2007: 33). It has its 
origins in the United States and focuses on the social gender dimension instead of the physical 
dimension indicated in the term transsexual (Baumgartinger 2017: 46). It is very much linked to 
debates in the Global North and has been criticized as US-centric. Nowadays transgender is mostly 
used as an umbrella term grouping individuals who are transsexual, genderqueer, agender, an-
drogyne, demigender, genderfluid, individuals who cross-dress or dress androgynously as well as 
other individuals who cross or go beyond traditional gender categories. The following statement 
about transgender people in the Kenyan context has been published in an article which Audrey 
Mbugua wrote for the Queer African Reader. 
When I talk of transgender or transsexual people, I will be referring to people who 
experience a long-lasting and persistent discomfort with their assigned sex and seek 
medical and legal assistance to transition from one sex to another. Note that I will not 
be talking about drag queens and kings, male sex workers who go around dressing in 
certain clothes to get attention from clients and I will definitely not be talking about 
shemale porn actors, cross dressers and effeminate gay boys and butch lesbians 
(Mbugua 2013: 123). 
                                                 
8 It is not possible and not my intention to give a full description of the historical and political developments which lead 
to the use of a variety of terms. For an overview Baumgartinger (2017), Stryker / Whittle (2006), Stryker / Aizura 
(2013).  
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Mbugua is a Kenyan transgender activist who has been involved in legal actions in the High Court 
of Kenya to fight actively for the rights of transgender people in the country. When discussing her 
prominent case in the Kenyan Media as well as in academic publications, she uses the terms 
transgender or transsexual (Mbugua 2011, 2013). Since she is the only person writing academi-
cally as well as in her position as an activist about the trans community in Kenya she is the person 
dominating the discourse in my research context. I would like to point out that Mbugua refers in 
the quote and in most of her work to a specific trans identity which is linked to the idea of transi-
tioning, she mentions the point of seeking legal and medical advice, and therefore could rather be 
described as transsexuality. It will become clear that not all trans people, also not all of my inform-
ants, want to undergo surgery or even locate themselves in binary categories. Transsexual, 
transgender and trans are relatively new concepts in the African context (Theron / Kgotisau: 580) 
and are not yet popular terms used in Kenya outside of the LGBTIQ community. My interlocutors 
though, used the term trans when they introduced themselves. This aspect will be discussed later 
in this article.  
Recognizing the importance of the emic perspective, I am using the term trans in this article since 
my informants used it themselves and it is imperative for me to represent their voices correctly. 
As mentioned in section 2, my own role as an ethnographer might have even influenced the lan-
guage and terminology used by my informants. Being educated and from a European country my 
informants likely assumed that I am familiar with the term trans and the discourse linked to it. 
There is no Swahili or Sheng translation of the term trans and in Kenya, as the statement of 
Mbugua and her published papers shows, the discussion about trans issues in public is held in 
English. Even though many Kenyans speak English it is rather a language used in work and edu-
cational contexts. Within families, other languages are spoken. By dictating English as the lan-
guage dominating the discourse about trans issues a choice has been made to exclude a rather 
large amount of people and might be one of the reasons why the larger public is still not educated 
about trans issues in particular as well as LGBTIQ issues in general. The fact that my informants 
spoke about themselves as trans shows, that they are aware of ongoing debates from LGBTIQ 
movements and adopting commonly used internationally terminology as their own. I will not dis-
cuss this phenomenon in detail, but it emphasizes on the importance of understanding the life 
stories of trans people in Kenya (and other African countries) since they cannot be seen only in 
the local context, but they are a part of a more significant global discourse. I will show in the de-
scriptions of my informants they all experienced moments in their lives where they were exposed 
to knowledge about the issue of gender identity struggles. Following global debates, the terms 
discussed in these discourses offered my trans informants’ opportunities to frame, name and 
more importantly understand their personal experiences. The interlocutors in this article all refer 
to themselves as trans.  
The second reason why I use the term is trans because even though the term originated in Western 
discourses such as transgender did, in which binary gender/sex concepts are assumed as the 
norm, it is less US-centric and commonly used in academic as well as activist publications. Regard-
ing the term, reports published by the “Transrespect versus Transphobia Worldwide” (TvT), an 
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ongoing, comparative qualitative-quantitative research project initiated by Transgender Europe, 
state the following definition:  
Trans people and gender-diverse people include those with a gender identity that is 
different from the gender they were assigned at birth, and those who wish to portray 
their gender in a way that differs from the gender they were assigned at birth. Among 
them are those people who feel they have to – or who prefer or choose to – present 
themselves in a way that conflicts with the social expectations of the gender role as-
signed to them at birth, whether they express this difference through language, cloth-
ing, accessories, cosmetics or body modification. These include, among many others, 
transsexual and transgender people, trans men and trans women, transvestites, 
cross-dressers, no-gender, liminal gender, multigender and genderqueer people, as 
well as intersex people who relate to or identify as any of the above. Also included are 
those who identify with local, indigenous or subcultural terms – such as Leitis in 
Tonga – and relate to the terms ‘trans people’ or ‘gender-diverse people’, for instance 
in international activist contexts. Further included are those people in non-binary 
gender systems who were raised in a different gender than male or female and who 
self-identify as trans people or gender-diverse people in international contexts 
(Balzer et al., TvT-Report Vol.9, 2015: 6). 
Reviewing my empirical material for this article, I read the following passage of my fieldwork di-
ary. In this passage I am referring to Rose as Robert since I did not know about her trans identity 
and in the interview with Rose he introduced himself as Robert. 
It is Friday evening, 11 pm, in an apartment somewhere in Nairobi. I am sitting on the 
floor next to Robert, who invited me here, and some of his friends. We are having 
drinks, smoking and some people pass a joint around. I interviewed Robert yesterday. 
He is a student and a part-time model. A friend of mine, a photographer, gave me his 
contacts and he agreed to meet me for an interview in a café. He was dressed in a suit. 
Right now, he (or she?) is wearing a short black dress and walking barefoot showing 
her perfectly painted red toenails. Her wig has long thick straight hair. The subtle 
Make-Up, just a little mascara and rouge, suits him (her) (Research Diary, 
27.11.2015). 
When we first introduced ourselves, Rose used her male birth name, Robert, “because we were in public”. Focusing on his perceptions of the night in Nairobi, discussions about gender identity or 
sexual orientation did not come up. When I came to the apartment under the impression of meet-
ing Robert and some of his friends, I did not have a clue I was given the opportunity to explore the 
nocturnal life of parts of the trans community. In preparation for this article, I recently texted Rose 
on WhatsApp, and we made jokes about my reaction when I came to her apartment that night. “Robert was the one who invited you and then Rose opened the door” (WhatsApp Conversation, 
25.03.2018), she commented on that incident. Looking back, I remember I did not ask anything 
about who they were, how they refer to themselves or anything. Seeing how I wrote “he” but in-cluding “she” in brackets demonstrates my confusion Rose might have sensed when she observed 
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me that night. It was Rose who brought up the topic the same night. She refers to herself as trans, 
a term her trans friends use as well. That night, Rose made it easy for me: “I am trans, so is Maureen. Joshua is just gay. David is crossdressing sometimes. There are two more coming”, she 
told me while giggling (Research Diary, 27.11.2015). Surprisingly, even though Rose is not very 
open about her trans identity to strangers, she was not afraid to confide in me. When discussing 
this with her after we had gotten to know each other for some time, she explained to me that she 
opened up to me, because we had a friend in common who was gay (Rose concluded that I was 
likely not homophobic), because I was a woman and a foreigner who she always referred to as “more tolerant” than Africans.  
The four interlocutors I introduce in this article, Rose, Maureen, Pauline and Mary, were assigned 
the male gender by birth.9 All have struggled with their gender identity for many years. One had 
undergone Gender Reassignment Surgery. Some are dating men, some are dating both men and 
women, Rose currently has a girlfriend.  
It is important to clearly state what my informants, interlocutors and many of you already under-
stand and take for granted. Trans people are not all the same, not anywhere in the world and not 
in Kenya. They are all individuals with unique family backgrounds, living in different economic 
and religious settings and therefore perceiving their gender identity struggles in very different 
ways. Some live and speak about it openly and engage in activism for their rights, and some only 
confide in their close friends, and many face these issues alone. The individuality of each person, 
and the variety of different trans cultures and identities around the world is the reason for such diversity among trans people. There is no such thing as a typical “Kenyan trans person”. What they 
all share is enduring discrimination in the Kenyan labor market, difficult access to medical ser-
vices as well as experiences of exclusion and sometimes even violence (Mbugua 2011: 244). 
Unfortunately, there is scarce literature on trans people in Kenya10 and the challenges they face. 
Most is material from NGO’s, activists or articles in the newspapers. These sources report about 
the high levels of transphobia in Kenyan society. There is a lack of knowledge in Kenya about gen-
der identity struggles. In recent years, homophobic and transphobic discourses have become 
prevalent in Africa. Often, religious and political leaders perceive the issue as something un-Afri-
can, immoral and imposed on Africa by foreign people (Aarmo 1999: 255). They promote the idea 
in public and even pass new laws which lead to their on-going harassment by police and broader 
society.11 What is striking is that this image of Africa as homophobic, and in the case of this article 
transphobic, is promoted by both traditionalists in the respective countries who insist that homo-
sexuality is a Western intrusion and by the Western media as well that lays an ongoing focus on 
homophobic statements from African political and religious leaders (Awondo et al. 2013: 145). 
                                                 
9 Since Rose connected me to other trans people in Nairobi I did not influence the group of informants. There are trans 
people in Kenya who were assigned the female gender at birth and who struggle with their gender identity, but I did 
not establish close relationships with them and therefore they are not included in this article.  
10 There are several articles on Trans People in Southern Africa: Currier (2012), Lubbe-De Beer (2013), Morgan (2009), 
Swarr (2012). The literature regarding Kenya is limited to papers published by Audrey Mbugua or NGO publications. 
11 A very prominent case was the so-called Anti-Homosexuality-Bill in Uganda. Further literature on similar cases from 
various African countries: Awondo (2010), Cheney (2012), Msibi (2011). 
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The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, which was celebrated as progressive compared to other African 
countries (Glinz 2011) forbids discrimination on some grounds but does not include sexual ori-
entation or gender identity unlike the South African Constitution. It explicitly states that a mar-
riage must be between a man and a woman. Sexual activities between persons of the same sex are criminalized in the Kenyan Penal Code as “against the order of nature” with the penalty of 5-14 years’ imprisonment. This includes homosexual activities which affects the lives of trans people 
in Kenya because many of them are categorized as homosexuals. There is a perception in Kenyan 
society that trans people are homosexuals or sex workers which leads to further criminalization. 
This perception has been discussed regarding other parts of the world. Valentine states, that “transgender people have, for a long time, been misrecognized – or misclaimed – as homosexual” 
(Valentine 2007: 29). GALCK12 reports that trans people in Kenya are often arrested, although 
charges may not actually be pressed (Deutsche Welle 2018, GALCK). 
In 2014, two critical cases regarding trans persons were won in the Kenyan High Court (Migiro 
2014): one where the High Court ordered the National NGO Council to register the trans organi-
zation Transgender Education and Advocacy and another where Audrey Mbugua got the right to 
change her name and gender on her academic certificates. Given that there are existing legal 
measures to change names on certificates, but not the sex of a person, and there is no adequate 
protection for transgender and intersex people against discrimination or hate crimes, the two 
were essential landmark cases that could change the situation for trans persons. Nevertheless, for 
my informants being as outspoken about their gender identity as Mbugua would take more time 
and courage. Before I share the observations of the nocturnal experiences, I will describe the back-
ground of my informants regarding their gender identity struggles and private situation. This is 
crucial to understand their ideas of being unsafe as well as being free and safe.  
4 Living as trans in Nairobi  
In this section I introduce Rose, Pauline, Maureen and Mary and their life stories. I summarized 
information I received from them but included many direct quotations as well. I met all four alone 
for audio-taped interviews, but we also spoke during group activities and when we all hung out 
where the conversations were rather informal. 
Rose 
Rose is in her twenties. She was born and raised as a boy named Robert in a village close to Kericho 
in western Kenya. In the past ten years, she has not been back home and has not been in touch 
with any of her family members. Rose knew from early childhood that she wanted to be a girl. The feeling started when she wanted to play with her sisters’ dolls and always felt more comfortable 
being surrounded by girls to play and talk with. She told me that it was not an issue while at home 
                                                 
12 The Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK) was established in May 2006 following the convening of local and 
regional lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) activists and is the Kenyan umbrella organization for 
the LGBTI community. 
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with four sisters and only one brother, but that things began to become difficult in the school en-
vironment:  
For me, the problems started in boarding school. Being in boys’ dorms and after school hours I had to engage in the boys’ activities like sports. I was not feeling com-
fortable. This was just not who I was (Interview, Rose, 14.12.2015).  
Being in boarding school, a typical experience for many Kenyans, there was not much privacy, and 
when Rose was 16, she got caught by a classmate trying on lipstick and eyeshadow in one of the school’s bathrooms. He insulted her, calling her “shoga” and “msenge”, disrespectful Swahili 
words used for gay people. Afterwards, the boy outed Rose to the boys in their dormitory, and 
later the word spread, and the whole school knew about the incident in the bathroom.  
It was humiliating. I was not gay, but nobody understood that. My classmates, even 
close friends, were avoiding me. A few times I got beaten up severely. It was horrible. […] When I tried to reach out to teachers, they were not helpful at all. One even told me that I was not normal and that I am a shame to the school. […] I pretended to be 
really sick so that the school would send me home to my family for medical treatment. 
When I was sent home, the headmaster gave me a letter for my father. I did not know 
that he reported about the incident and informed my father that they suspected I was 
gay (Interview, Rose, 14.12.2015). 
Rose never returned to school. Her father did not react in a supporting way, and neither did the 
rest of her family: 
Only my little sister was understanding me, but she feared my father, too. My parents 
asked the pastor in our church for help; they thought if I pray enough I will recover from this issue. […] I stayed at home for seven months. My neighbors were gossiping 
why I was not in school. My father could not even look at me. I was depressed. I could 
not eat. I thought about taking my life many times. […] The only thing my father would 
ask me if I was still gay. I did not want to live at home anymore. I proposed to visit my 
auntie in Nairobi (Interview, Rose, 14.12.2015). Rose left to visit her “auntie", who is a rather a family friend, in Nairobi in August 2011. Since then 
she has not returned home. This friend, a successful businesswoman, who lived by herself in 
Kileleshwa, helped Rose to understand what happened to her. It was the first time in her life that 
Rose encountered the word trans. Even though Rose found a support system while living with her 
aunt, she is not yet ready to live publicly as a woman. Only at night when she is out clubbing, she “fully lives as a woman” (Interview, Rose, 14.12.2015). 
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Pauline Pauline is Rose’s best friend. She is 24 years old and a Ugandan refugee seeking asylum in Kenya. 
Uganda is one of the 36 African countries where homosexuality is illegal.13 It is widely known as 
an intolerant place for the LGBTIQ community, many face discriminations, violence, eviction from 
their homes and even police arrests. Even though the legal situation in Kenya is similar, many 
transgender and homosexual people from Uganda flee to the neighboring country, especially to 
urban areas like Nairobi, since the enforcement of the law is not as strict as what obtains back 
home. Pauline arrived in Nairobi with her friend who is gay. They live in a house with 11 LGBTIQ 
refugees from Uganda. There are a few arrangements, safe houses, like this in Nairobi, and it has 
been a topic in local and international media (Wesangula 2017): Pauline’s case is similar to Rose’s. 
She faced discrimination and violence within her own family once she was outed. Neighbors were 
avoiding her, and she was unable to find a support system. Suffering from depression and fear, 
she decided to leave her home. Through Facebook, she got contacts of NGO workers in Kenya who 
helped her settle in a house with other refugees. Pauline wishes to leave Africa and move to a place 
where she could get a gender reassignment surgery one day and start a new life: It is easier to get the surgery done overseas. Maybe Europe or the United States. […] I 
would like to start fresh. At a place where I can just go and say, ‘I am Pauline, I am a woman and I am happy’. I will never be able to do this here. […] I miss my home and 
my family every day. Here I spend time with people like me, but we are always at 
home hiding. When I met Rose, I started feeling better, because she helped me to make 
more friends and even to start enjoying my life a little (Interview, Pauline, 
01.10.2016). 
Pauline says that for trans people, it is sometimes even more difficult than for homosexuals.  
I think I get attention because my physique is still masculine, but sometimes I wear 
purses and jewelry like rings and necklaces. I get stopped by police officers, and they 
want to see my documents. Once I did not carry my refugee papers, and then the po-lice guy wanted money. He threatened if I don’t pay, he can send me to jail (Interview, 
Pauline, 01.10.2016). 
She stopped using purses, wearing feminine clothes, or using nail polish and make-up during the day to hide her “true gender”. Pauline and my other trans informants always spoke about “keeping a low profile” during the day to ensure their safety. Since Pauline does not have a regular job, she 
mostly stays at home during the day. She goes out with friends at night to bars and clubs. This is her “real life” (Research Diary, 23.11.2016) as she stated in a conversation I had with her one 
night.  
 
                                                 
13 “Mapping anti-gay laws in Africa”: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/lgbti-lgbt-gay-human-rights-law-africa-uganda-
kenya-nigeria-cameroon. 
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Maureen  
Maureen is a very outspoken person, and unlike the previous informants, she has actually under-
gone gender reassignment surgery in the United States. Maureen was born in Mtwapa, a small 
town close to Mombasa at the Kenyan Coast. When we met and first discussed my research topic, she told me that Mtwapa was always called “the village that never sleeps” and that she “knows everything about nightlife” (Research Diary, 27.11.2015). Maureen is in her early thirties, and she 
works as an accountant in the Kenyan branch of an American company in Nairobi. She said that she always knew that she was a woman: “I knew I was female since I was a little child. There was just something different about me. Of course, by then I could not name it” (Interview, Maureen, 
05.12.2016). Maureen went to school and achieved a high school degree while still living with her 
family in Mtwapa. She was able to hide her problems regarding accepting and understanding her 
gender identity from her parents during this time. When she was 19, she started going to many of 
the local bars and clubs in Mtwapa which are frequently visited by a massive crowd of interna-
tional tourists at the coast as well as foreigners who settled there. I started sleeping with tourists. Men. They were gay. I was not. […] Some of these men 
paid me for sex or bought me stuff. They just assumed I was also gay. I did not mind 
them thinking this. For a while, I felt it too since I was a bit happy with my situation. […] It was not just sex. I found friends. They would understand why Kenya was such 
a hard place for me to be (Interview, Maureen, 05.12.2016). 
Maureen studied accounting at the University of Mombasa and with the financial help of friends abroad she was able to get her own apartment and enjoy some personal freedom: “This is when I 
started buying nice dresses and skirts in the boutiques and wear them at home. I would dress up, wear heels and try on makeup. It felt so nice” (Interview, Maureen, 05.12.2016). Maureen told me 
that her landlord found out about her cross-dressing and threatened to kick her out of the apart-ment if she continued “living like this.” Although she didn’t add much more detail to this story, but 
Maureen mentioned numerous experiences of violence in her housing context. She moved out and 
started taking care of a house for an Italian who was living in Mombasa a few months per year. Later she earned a degree as an accountant and started looking for jobs “rather unsuccessfully”, 
as she explained to me. For four years Maureen was in a relationship with an American man 
named Marc. They met at a local bar in Diani Beach. Even though they broke up many years ago, 
Maureen kept mentioning him in many conversations, always stating how grateful she was for this experience and that she “still deeply loved him”. In conversations we had on the phone after 
I returned from my fieldwork, I learned that it was Marc who helped her in getting the surgery 
done.  
He (Marc) helped me. He knew what was going on with me and told me that I could 
get help in the US. I knew that there was surgery to become a woman, but I never thought that one day I could get it, so I did not bother so much. […] By that time for 
me it would have been ok just to be a woman as in dressing, changing my name and so on. […] Marc helped me. He took care of everything. I was with him in Chicago for 
almost three years (Conversation on the phone, 15.02.2017). 
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Eventually Maureen and Marc broke up, and she returned to Kenya. Even though she had under-gone surgery, something she claimed “many trans people wish for”, Maureen never felt unhappier 
and lonelier than in this period of her life: 
I was all alone. Marc and I were still friends, but we could not stay together. I got back to Kenya. […] I had no friends here, and my family was not speaking to me. I was a 
woman, and it made me happy, but it was still new, and I had no access to psycholog-
ical help like I had in the States and no support system at all. I was depressed (Con-
versation on the phone, 15.02.2017). 
Maureen reached out to one of her sisters to explain her situation. She told her sister about the surgery and asked for “forgiveness”. This notion of forgiveness appears constantly in my dialogues 
with Maureen. She told me that day to day life has been difficult for her family either and that she 
feels guilty for causing problems: “I don’t blame my family. And now they really try. We are not close, but we talk on the phone sometimes. That is progress for all of us.” (Interview, Maureen, 
05.12.2016) 
Mary  
Mary is in her mid-twenties and a rather quiet person. When she is with Rose, Pauline and Maureen, she is the one who talks least and commonly refers to herself as “not a party person at all” (Research Diary, September 2016). Nevertheless, Mary frequently visits various nightclubs in 
Nairobi, and I accompanied her several times. Mary was born and raised in Nairobi. Her family 
resides in Embakasi while Mary shares an apartment with her cousin in South C. She was enrolled 
at the University of Nairobi, but because Mary does not have a regular job, unpaid fees forced her 
to drop out. She relies on her cousin who pays rent and most of their other housing expenses. 
Mary is on good terms with her family, but currently they are not aware that Mary identifies her-
self as a different gender from the one she was assigned at birth. 
I think I knew I was living in the wrong body since I was a child, but I realized it later 
on, maybe as a teenager. I could never really explain my situation to anyone. I was not 
so much afraid of the reaction of my family, but even me I did not know what was 
happening with me. […] Always feeling sad and not wanting to be with people. My 
parents thought I was an introvert and not very social, more into reading, painting and writing. Creative things. […] I learned about the whole issue (being trans) when I 
read about it in Blogs and Social Media. I joined some discussion forums and cha-
trooms where I spoke to people anonymously about my situation (Interview, Mary, 
01.05.2016). 
Mary does not want her family to know. The reason why she is confiding with her cousin and 
roommate Joshua is because he is gay. He had come out to his family two years previous, and even 
though no-one supported his decision, there appeared to be no consequences thus far.  
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My parents know about Joshua being gay. My father made some jokes about it and 
called it a phase, but they are still close to him, and they visit us often, and my mum 
brings food (Interview, Mary, 01.05.2016). When they visit and see women’s clothes in the apartment such as high heels and purses, Mary’s 
parents assume that they belong to Joshua. Even though her parents seem very open-minded for 
their generation, Mary is not planning on telling them about her wish to live as a woman.  I don’t think I am there yet. My country is not yet there, however. Even if my parents 
would support me, there is still work, neighbors, friends and relatives. […] I just wish 
that everybody could understand that we are only humans. Yeah, Joshua is gay, and I am trans, but does that make us less of a human? We are just like everyone else. […] I 
did not ask for this. God created me this way, and I believe that he will guide me on my path. […] I want to study abroad. Maybe in the UK or Belgium. My aunties live 
there, and they want to help me. Perhaps there it will be easier for me to build a future 
because Europe is much more tolerant than Africa (Interview Mary 01.05.2016). 
Mary thinks that for her it is not a possibility to out herself in front of family or friends. For now, she has only told Joshua and her trans friends that she feels like she is “living in the wrong body” 
(Interview, Mary, 01.05.2016).  
Even though the four trans persons who were introduced in this section come from different back-
grounds, two from urban and two from rural areas, and their life stories are all unique in their 
ways, one can find some similarities when looking at them. All of them have experienced discrim-
ination, whether verbally or physical violence, in various contexts, such as school and within their 
families. Apart from Mary they all have no or only loose contact to one family member and have 
not been to their family homes in years. None of them is very engaged in activism, but they all 
follow debates from the LGBTIQ community through Facebook or Instagram. Maureen is the only 
one who had a surgery and therefore does not have to go through the visible transformation from man to woman, unlike the others who go to university or to work and “play the role of a man” as 
Rose sometimes framed it. The four are all active at night and go out many times a week a crucial 
experience, as Maureen describes it: “We have the night at least to be ourselves” (Conversation 
with Maureen, September 2016). 
5 “At night I am free like a bird”– A night out as a Nairobian trans person 
This quote which is part the title of this article is from my second interview with Rose which took 
place two weeks after I knew she was a trans person. We discussed the differences between the 
day and nighttime environments in Nairobi in as well as in her private life. When I asked what is 
specifically different for her regarding inhabiting these two environments, she told me: “Every-
thing! Everything is different. It is a whole different world at night. I can’t describe it. I can’t find the right words” (Interview, Rose, 08.12.2015). Many of my informants struggled to describe the 
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specifics of the night with words, I responded by asking for more details regarding her dual expe-
riences: 
The most significant difference is noticeable: I am a man, but at night I am a woman. 
No, let me rephrase this. I am a woman, but at night I can be one in public. I dress 
differently, I do different things of course. But it is not about that. I could study at night too, and still, it wouldn’t be the same as studying during the day. […] I don’t know how 
to describe it; how do you even describe being free? It is a feeling. At night I am free, 
free like a bird. I can be who I am, do what I want. Trust me, and you will get it once 
you see it (Interview, Rose, 08.12.2015). 
When I asked her if I could join her and her friends to see and observe the places they go to and 
the activities they participate in, she told me: “You have to! If you want to truly understand what the night means for me, how it changes me, it’s a must” (Interview, Rose, 08. 12. 2015). Not only 
once, but many times that I accompanied Rose and her friends during their nights out in the city. 
Although each unique in its own way, a typical night with the “girls” would follow similar activities, 
some spontaneous, others repeated and interestingly ritualistic. Our nights generally took on a consistent form with observable elements including dressing up, “Pre-gaming” enlarging the 
group with the addition of more friends, bar hopping and eventually the denouement, what Mary poignantly refers to as “wiping off the traces of the night”.14  
Dressing up for the night It is Friday night, and I’m with Rose at her apartment.15 We met at the Central Business District 
where the company she works for has an office. We took an Uber together since it would have 
been a hassle to get a seat in one of the Matatus, the Kenyan minibuses serving as shared taxis. 
Rose is wearing a suit. It is required at her workplace to dress up like this. Since she is not outed16 
at work, she has no choice but to dress as a man. As soon as we get home, Rose immediately puts her briefcase in the closet and takes off her suit. “Let me get rid of this shit and feel comfortable”, 
she tells me while she changes into white leggings and a white blouse with pastel-colored flower 
print. Rose sprays herself with a vanilla scent perfume before she sits down next to me on the 
couch. Dinner is takeout chicken from a restaurant next door. The discussion about tonight’s plans 
unfolds: Rose is on her iPhone checking the WhatsApp Groups she is active in where she and other 
members of the LGBTIQ community discuss where to party.17 “Apparently tonight most of them 
                                                 
14 These stages were part of a night out for most of my informants (the night roamers), but in this article I will specifically 
focus on the stages which were more crucial for my trans informants compared to other interlocutors. 
15 The following descriptions are based on the notes in my research diary from November and December 2016. This 
includes the quotes. 
16 Outed means here that Rose’s colleagues do not know about her trans identity since she has not confided to them. At 
work she is still Andrew.  
17 WhatsApp and Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) are popular platforms to discuss Nairobi nightlife and 
share ongoing events.  
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want to go to Alchemist, later Brew or Gypsies.18” Rose says that she does not have a preference and that we can still decide later “where to start”.  
After dinner we both shower and start to get ready. Since I had packed my outfit before, I dressed up quickly while Rose shows me all kinds of outfits asking for my opinion. “I can’t decide. I like the 
red dress, but Mary asked me to borrow my golden heels, so I have no shoes to go with it. Maybe the new silver top with a black skirt then?”, she asks. After we settle for her outfit, the red dress 
with black heels, Rose tries on a wig with long, brown straight hair and picks golden jewelry, a 
fine long necklace, hoops and a bangle. I notice that every time Rose puts on an element of her 
outfit, she looks in the mirror, and smiles. She appears to be celebrating the whole process of dressing up. “I enjoy this so much. Sometimes I even do this at home during the week, just to, you 
know, see how I look. It makes me feel good”, Rose adds when I compliment her outfit for the 
night. Beauty and the perceptions linked to it play a great role in Nairobi, especially at night. A major part of this is the intensive “dressing up” before anyone leaves the house, which is cele-
brated by my informants, sometimes alone, but very often with friends who can advise on the 
proper outfit. 
“Pre-gaming” at a friend’s house 
After getting ready, Rose and I use an Uber to get to Mary and Joshua’s place for “pregaming”. 
Pregaming is the process typically done by students and young adults of getting drunk and/or 
high before going out to socialize at events or places. (Glasser 2011: 31). When we enter their 
place, Maureen is already there as well as Joshua’s boyfriend Michael. They want to party, drink, feel good and let go. “That is what pre-gaming is for. Getting in a mood to enjoy the night,’’ as an 
informant of mine described it (Research Diary, December 2015).  
This activity is another ritual which takes place immediately after the process of dressing up, and 
it is necessary to put oneself in the position to think, act and feel like a night roamer. Rose and her friends usually meet at someone’s house to listen to music, dance, drink and discuss the plan for 
the night. Everyone brings a bottle of alcohol, typically hard liquor like Whiskey or Vodka. Tonight, 
Rose and I brought a bottle of Jack Daniels and some leftover Tequila from the week before. Joshua 
is lighting up a joint and handing it around. The conversations tonight and in general in the context 
of pregaming deal almost exclusively with former nocturnal experiences, funny or exciting mo-
ments which took place at night, as well as the plans for the upcoming night regarding where to 
go. 
While getting in the mood for a night out, expectations are verbalized. Rose is hugging me, raising her glass and shouting, “Tonight we have to get wasted.’’ Maureen agrees and adds: “I had such a 
fucked-up day. I need some fun tonight”. She smirks and adds “If you know what I mean”. In this case, Maureen means “hooking up with someone”. The expectations towards the night differ: on 
                                                 
18 The Alchemist, Brew Bistro and Gipsys are clubs located in the Westlands area of Nairobi. They are popular for 
Kenyans and expatriates living in Kenya. 
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the one hand, the goal is to find a sex partner for the night. On the other hand, it is merely getting 
drunk and enjoying time with friends.  
Even though the conversations between the group of friends tonight is light-hearted and funny as 
usual, I am sensing a bit of competition between them, something I have observed on other occa-
sions like this before. They appear to want to outdo one another: who can tell the wildest stories, 
who can drink more alcohol and still be at work on time the next day, who has the most outstand-
ing outfits, who flirts better, who is sexier or who is the most outgoing. In the conversations taking 
place while pregaming, my trans informants are also trying to prove that they are each the most 
experienced night person. This person acquires, through successful performances in the frame-
work of dressing up and pregaming, some authority which allows him/her to influence the deci-
sions which need to be made regarding the planning for the upcoming night. This is important 
insofar as every bar or club in Nairobi has their own agenda on which crowd to attract. This in-
cludes regulations such as age limits, dress codes or entrance fees. For trans people, like anyone 
else, these things are important, but it is also crucial to find locations which are considered toler-
ant towards the LGBTIQ community. My informants’ decisions for a specific style of clothing, hairstyle or the choice of make-up appear 
to resonate with certain scenes/milieus which reveal ideas of belonging. For the LGBTIQ commu-
nity, which is very marginalized within the Kenyan society, this is their opportunity to “not look misplaced”, as Rose frames it. Since Rose is the one with “the hottest outfit” tonight, she suggests 
starting with some drinks at Havanna, then head to Brew Bistro and end the night at Gypsies. She 
calls an Uber. When the driver calls to verify the location, Rose says “Good evening, this is Rose….”, 
using her female name for the first time tonight in public. Our group of eight people left the house 
and reach Havanna some minutes after midnight.  
Club-Hopping 
We started the night at Havanna, a bar owned by a German, which is quite popular among the 
Expatriates in Nairobi. Then we headed to Brew Bistro, a famous rooftop lounge and club. It is 
common for my informants to hop from one club to another. Usually three to five locations are 
visited per night. They rely on information shared via Social Media and WhatsApp Groups where 
people inform each other for example which locations are full and where the mood is good that 
night. Some of the clubs Rose and her friends visit are walking distance. Even though I have been 
warned many times by friends that it is unsafe to walk in the darkness in Nairobi, most of my 
informants would walk around in Westlands, the major nightlife district of the city, from one club 
to another. My trans informants even made fun of me when I told them that people had warned 
me to not even walk 200 meters alone at night. Rose responded to this as follows: “I always walk 
around in Westie, not scary at all. I mean look how many party people are here and all the taxi guys. It is not unsafe when there are people around. I would be more scared if there is nobody” 
(Research Diary, December 2016). Tonight, we walked from Brew Bistro to Gypsies, around 650 
meters. When we passed the little shops, Maureen suggested to have a shot of something there 
before we pay nearly four times as much for it in the club. She and the others do this most of the 
time in between switching locations to stay on a budget but keeping a certain level of drunkenness 
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throughout the night. After we passed the shops, we entered Gypsies where Rose and I had a cou-
ple of chitchats with the security personnel since we both know them quite well.  
It is around 4 am, and we are on the dancefloor at Gypsies which is packed. Lighting machine and mirror balls are projecting the rainbow colors on people’s faces displaying sweat drops. It is hot 
and sticky even though we are not in a closed building. A song by the Kenyan band Sauti Sol is 
played and I observe the girls19 dancing. Responding to the lyrics of the song named “Shake Yo Bam Bam” they are all twerking. I hear Maureen shouting “Shake your asses bitches” while she 
insinuates spanking Mary. The lyrics are taken literally regarding the dancing style:  “I wanna see the ladies lose control”  “So turn around give it to me” “Give it to me, baby, passionately”  “Shake your bam bam kwenda Sukuma20  “Shake your bam bam kwenda Sukuma” 
Pauline is flirting with an older guy, dancing in front of him closely and wrapping his hands around 
her body while moving her hips to the rhythm of the song. Rose is standing on the wall in front of 
one of the bar sections, a familiar spot for people at Gypsies who like to show off their dancing 
skills. It is a typical Saturday night at Gypsies, a club in Westlands, Nairobi. Though there might 
not be something like an official gay club in the Nairobian context, Gypsies could be called the 
best-known unofficial gay club. It is a bar where a significant number of queer people, Kenyans as well as “expatriates” meet and feel comfortable enough to socialize, dance, enjoy themselves with-
out worrying too much about what other customers, the management or the staff will think about 
them. The Gipsy crowd was and still is what one might describe as cosmopolitan with a racially 
mixed crowd which seemed in the eyes of the queer community to be sophisticated enough to not 
make a big deal of them. It is not in all clubs in Nairobi that queer people feel this safe. It depends 
on the management of locations as well. Since the straight crowd is still the majority and owners 
and managers think about business first, I observed a few times that gay men were kicked out of 
place because they hit on a straight man who then complained to the management. Gypsies is a 
club many people frequent later at night as the last location, to have one for the road and, in case 
of Rose and her friends, to probably meet someone to hook up with later. During my research I 
observed that in Gypsies, for example compared to Brew Bistro where we were before, there are 
more people actually making out while they can be seen, and this includes gay men, lesbians as 
well as trans persons.  
 J. Blessol Jr., a Kenyan gay activist, wrote in an article for Pambazuka News:  
                                                 
19 The four informants introduced before. I refer to them as “the girls” since this is how they would speak about 
themselves when we were out at night. 
20 Translation= Shake your booty, go and push it. 
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We create our own safe spaces, we have queer parties, and we establish queer-
friendly joints where we get to relieve our stress, be rowdy, free our minds, and be 
treated as normal beings. We get to dress as drag-queens and kings, dancing in our own sensual way while we happily watch ‘straight’ people dance to Lady Gaga’s songs, and hum Rihanna’s ‘Te Amo’ without reasoning the meaning behind it.21  
The ritual of visiting a club begins not on the dance floor, but in the line to get in. If the bouncers 
let you through, you cross a threshold dividing inside from outside, marking the border of an ex-
clusive space. Once inside, there is a community feeling, irrespective of age, origin or sexual ori-
entation. Gypsies has been considered one of the rare, but nowadays growing number of places 
where the LGBTIQ community feels some sense of freedom to be themselves. When I came to Nai-
robi for the first time in 2010, it was the spot for my gay and transgender friends to go out every 
weekend. During the period of my research between 2015 and 2017, I realized that there are more 
queer-friendly bars and clubs in Nairobi than many people, even members of the queer commu-
nity might think. There has been a significant change over the past years, and new bars and clubs 
pop up where the LGBTIQ community can meet. Blessol speaks about the creation of safe spaces, 
a term I will also take on in the next section of this article.  
Going back to the dance floor at Gypsies, I am taking a break and sitting down on a bar stool close 
to the entrance, an excellent position to observe most parts of the club. Joshua and Michael and 
another gay couple are standing two meters away from me, both couples kissing. Seeing physical affection in Nairobi’s clubs is normal, at Gypsies, it is commonly accepted among Trans people and homosexuals as well. “Kissing and a little touching at least. Sometimes you might do it in one of 
the parked cars around. Somewhere where its dark and people won’t see you,” Rose tells me (Re-
search Diary, December 2016). Club-Hopping is the phase where my trans informants “really let go.” They drink, dance and flirt and they are open about who they are. They always introduce 
themselves with their female names and speak about their gender identity if the topic comes up if 
someone asks or if they feel comfortable enough in a conversation to discuss it.  It’s not like I say Hi I am Rose, and I am Trans, but I am not hiding it. If I flirt with 
someone and I feel like there is really a vibe, I will just say it. Also, many trans and gay 
people come here, and we know each other (Research Diary, December 2016).  
The way home 
At around 4.30, the dancefloor is almost empty; many people have left or gone to another joint. 
Rose suggests walking to Oil Libya, a petrol station, and getting a snack at one of the fast food 
places, call an Uber from there and chill at her residence. For the way home, I share an Uber with 
Joshua, Maureen and Rose. They are discussing how the night went and whether it fulfilled their 
expectations.  
                                                 
21 “The queer community in Nairobi”: https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/queer-community-nairobi (Accessed 
on 29.01.2019). 
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Maureen: “It was nice. Nothing special, but I liked the music at Brew and that Indian guy I danced 
with at Gypsies asked for my number. Not bad”  Rose: “I got to wear this dress so hell yeah it was a great night.” 
A discussion develops on how they experienced the different joints we visited. They speak about 
the music, the drinks, the quality and friendliness of the staff (bouncers, waiters and the DJ’s), but 
the most critical point is speaking about the different crowds. Maureen prefers Brew Bistro, “be-cause the crowd is so mature. Decent people. Pretty people. Tolerant people”. For my trans in-
formants, the most crucial aspect concerning the crowds in the different bars and clubs they visit 
is the acceptance level of the other people. It is so crucial because they want to feel safe and they 
want to feel comfortable enough to let go and be who they really are. On the car ride home, they 
speak about these kinds of experiences, maybe they heard other people making comments about 
them or if people gave them some evil looks. These feelings are discussed in the Uber or taxi home, 
but not anymore when they reach home. The car ride is the sign for them to “call it a night”. It is 
often mentioned that now it is “time to get serious again”. Even though all of them were still in the 
mood to stay in the clubs, they decided to go home. Rose explained to me that they always pay attention to the time since they “want to be home before the sun is up so that neighbors won’t see us dressed like that” (Research Diary, December 2016).  
Wiping off the traces of the night We reach Rose’s place around 5.30. The night security guard opens the gate for us. I ask Rose 
whether they are not afraid of him seeing her and the others dressed the way they are. She says “no, not at all. He is only working here at night, so I guess he doesn’t even know the truth” (Re-
search Diary, December 2016). At her apartment, suddenly we all feel tired. Since the others will all sleep at Rose’s place, they are discussing the sleeping arrangements as in who takes the 
couches, who shares a bed and so on. I will leave the moment everyone is in bed and head back 
towards my own place. Rose is taking off her wig and puts it on one of the mannequin heads on the shelf, something she bought “to keep them in order, but also to look at them” (Research Diary, 
December 2016). Afterwards, she stands in front of the mirror and starts removing her make-up: 
first the false lashes, then she uses cotton pads and toner to remove the lipstick and eyeshadow. Once in a conversation we had about skin products, Mary called this procedure “wiping off the traces of the night” (Research Diary, December 2016). Knowing myself in such a state, I would 
simply go to bed and take care of my face the next morning; Rose thoroughly cleans her face, 
changes afterwards into pajamas, folds the dress she wore and puts it on the chair next to her bed 
with the jewelry on top. This way “she can look at it in the morning first thing when she wakes up” 
(Research Diary, December 2016). She does not wash away the stamp on her hand which shows 
she went inside a club. Tomorrow morning it will be this sign of yesterday, a trophy of the night, 
which signals that Rose is a member of the scene and preserve that feeling of belonging. Looking 
one last time at the carefully folded red dress on the chair and remembering how she put away the suit and her other “male clothes” in her wardrobe so that she does not have to look at it, I hug 
Rose goodbye, wishing her and the others a good night and leave the apartment.  
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A night out as a ritual process The night out reflects the transition from a kind of “day-personality” into a “night-personality,” a 
process I have observed not only with trans people, but with other night revelers as well, and it 
can be grasped as a ritual process. Even though Victor Turner speaks of different transitions such 
as puberty, marriage or death, I find the concept very suitable regarding my research, especially 
looking at the transition my informants undergo each night while going out. Turner explores the 
threefold structure of a ritual process, namely separation, liminality, and incorporation (Turner 
2005: 94), but only the first two are relevant in my case. "The first phase (of separation) comprises symbolic behavior signifying the detachment of the individual or group’’ (Turner 2005: 94). In the 
separation phase, we find rituals which end the current status. In the case of my informants, it is 
the changing of clothes: taking off the rather formal work clothes like shirts, blouses and suits, and 
putting them in the wardrobe, and taking out more flashy clothes like sequin dresses, ripped jeans, 
colorful blouses, mini-skirts, the newest sneakers or high heels. For Rose and other trans people, 
this separation phase is even more significant compared to other night revelers, because they not 
only change from work wear to party outfits, but this change of clothes is directly linked to a 
switch of gender expression. My informants celebrate this separation phase and often commented 
on it with statements such as “Finally I can let this day go” or “Thank god this day is over”. Rose, as mentioned before, speaks about “getting rid of this shit “. Bastian Bretthauer speaks about 
dressing up as performing a transition ritual between day and night in his book about night roam-
ers in Berlin: "The aestheticized transition into the night includes the visible wiping off the day” 
(Bretthauer 1999: 8). Women and men meet in Nairobi with friends at home and do this aestheti-
cized transition into the night. They try on clothes, put on make-up, style each other’s hair. My 
informants emphasized very often that they CAN look different at night and WANT to look differ-ent at night. In an interview with Kulundu, he called “Putting on my night style and coming off the right way” (Interview, Kulundu, 01.11.2015) as the primary goal in the nightly preparations. The 
somehow beautiful expectations towards the night should be reflected in a beautiful self. As men-
tioned before, for the trans people introduced in this article, this night style includes the expres-
sion of the female gender, the starting point for a night out.  
The individual phases of the transition rituals can be rated and shaped differently regarding the 
occasion. Turner states that liminality is the most striking phase of transition rituals. This is where 
the transformation of the Initiands takes place. Turner stated that in liminality, the transitional 
state between the other two phases, individuals were "betwixt and between" - they do not belong 
anymore to the society that they previously were a part of, but they are not yet incorporated into 
the new group. Relating to my research context, the liminality phase begins when my informants 
are fully dressed up and are ready to leave the house and immerse into the night, which starts 
mostly with pre-gaming at a friend’s house or in a cheap bar. Turner describes liminality as an intermediate world where people live in a community of equals, which he refers to as “communi-
tas” (Turner 2005: 95).  
Communitas is characterized by an intense community spirit and the feeling of togetherness. This 
idea of community is crucial for my trans informants. It is this community of equals which makes 
the night in Nairobi something special for many of them. In this phase, existing social norms are 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23   91 
suspended and alternative rules of nocturnal life, are given space to flourish. For the night roam-
ers in Nairobi, their pastime is important as an outlet for them to relieve themselves of their re-
sponsibilities and obligations, question existing social norms (for example gender roles or the sex-
ual orientation of people) and rebel against the strict segregation within their community. They 
do this by overlooking where people come from, ignore differentiation markers such as age, gen-
der, race or economic background. Schnepel describes this phenomenon as hyper nights,  
nights which offer spaces for rebellious and even revolutionary forms of behavior, 
spaces in which the normal, diurnal form of life, with all its behavioral patterns, norms 
and moral values, is questioned, mocked and even transgressed (Schnepel 2006: 9ff.). 
Regarding my trans informants, the idea of hyper nights begins with the ritual of dressing up and 
ends with the way home and includes other phases which are discussed below. However, they 
create their own nocturnal rules for this phase such as dress codes or a specific kind of language. 
This feeling of communitas is lived throughout the whole night, but mostly when my informants 
meet for pre-gaming and while they are partying in the clubs. As described, during the activity of 
pre-gaming, an activity which is performed by my non-trans informants as well, Rose and her 
friends speak about their expectations towards the night. Even though the expectations them-
selves, drinking, having fun and finding a potential one-night stand, do not differ as much, I think 
that for the trans people it is more crucial since they all mentioned that they would not flirt in 
daily situations such as work, while commuting or shopping, something straight informants would 
probably be more open to. Clubbing I would say is the most crucial part of the liminal phase when 
we perceive the night out as a rite de passage. The communitas feeling is now changing in the 
sense that during pre-gaming the trans people are mostly amongst themselves, but during club-
bing this community of friends interacts with other people.  
While Turner focused on a permanent change of status within the societies they looked at, in my 
case I am speaking about a temporary change of state, from a day person to a night person, which 
is repetitive. Turner himself stated that liminality refers to any “betwixt and between” situation 
or object. This understanding of liminality unfolds opportunities to use the concept far beyond 
that which Turner himself had suggested. Therefore, liminality is applicable to both space and 
time. In this sense, liminality can be applied to single moments or certain time frames, in my case 
the night-time, specific places or areas, in my case clubs and other nocturnal spots that my inform-
ants frequent. Also, liminality can be applied not only to whole societies, but also single individuals 
as well as specific groups, in this contribution trans people, specifically trans-night-roamers. Using 
ritual theory might be exaggerated here, but in observing how my informants perform certain 
rituals at night to prepare themselves and to set their mood to experience the night, I think the 
ethnographic example of trans-night-roamers can be explained with Turner’s concept quite well. 
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6 The night as a safe space 
The somewhat detailed descriptions of my informants as well as my observations of a night out 
with them show on the one side the importance of nightlife for their trans life as well as the various 
practices linked to it.  
People in Nairobi experience the diverse atmospheres, in different ways at night. What is liberat-ing for one person might generate specific fears for others. One’s personal background, religion, 
economic position and age all shape experience, but the most reliable difference regarding noc-
turnal experiences in Nairobi is the aspect of gender and the social expectations and regulations 
connected to it. While many of my straight female informants complained that nightlife is just 
another part of life where the somewhat conservative gender roles within Kenyan society are re-
produced22, the night implies possibilities to challenge these conceptions, question them and in 
the case of my trans informants, offer a space where they feel much safer to out themselves than 
in daylight. Many times, Rose mentioned to me that the night is her safe space. But what does she 
mean when she speaks about space in this context? Is it the specific bars and clubs which are 
considered open towards the queer community or the night itself and its atmospheres which de-
liver the idea to trans people that they can feel free, be themselves and let out a part of their iden-
tity which they suppress during the day out of fear to experience negative consequences?  The concept of safe space emerged in the women’s movement in the late twentieth century (Ken-
ney 2001: 24) and has a lively history, primarily but not exclusively in activist and pedagogical 
communities. To use the term safe space, one must ask what makes a space unsafe. The idea of 
safety generally relies on an underlying threat of violence, particularly physical violence. The per-
sonal backgrounds of my trans informants which were only discussed briefly made clear that 
many trans people experienced violence, stigmatization and discrimination regarding their gen-
der identity struggles. They feel this threat of abuse regarding the police and strangers, but also 
at their workplaces or from family members and relatives. In feminist, queer, and black move-
ments an understanding of safe space has developed that is associated with keeping marginalized 
groups free from violence and harassment. This type of safe space also encourages “a certain li-
cense to speak and act freely, form collective strength, and generate strategies for resistance” 
(Kenney 2001: 24). Perceptions of safety, therefore, vary greatly, partly based on identity produc-
tion and performance (Bondi /d Rose 2003: 234) and on how a space is used and controlled. These 
differ spatially and temporally - a specific public space may be deemed safe during daylight hours, 
but unsafe after dark when walking home alone. Additionally, a single physical space can be con-
sidered safe by and/or for some people, but hazardous for others of a different gender, race, sex-
uality, class, age or other identities - a concern stressed by poststructuralist feminists (Day 1999: 
307; Koskela / Pain 2000: 270). This is the crucial point regarding the experiences of trans people 
in Nairobi.  
I argue that it is not only the specific places that my trans informants frequent at night such as 
queer-friendly clubs, which give them the confidence to negotiate their gender identity differently, 
                                                 
22 There are popular nightclubs in Nairobi where women are not able to gain access without male company. 
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but that it is preferably the night itself with its peculiarities, its specific liberating atmospheres 
which needs to be understood as a safe space for them.  The discourse about “unsafety” in the Nairobian context is mainly linked to the night, but for parts 
of the trans community it is the opposite. Earlier I mentioned that I received many warnings from 
Nairobians about walking at night or being out at night in general when I explained to people that 
I was conducting nocturnal fieldwork for my PhD project. Why is it then that Rose and her friends 
speak about the night as a space for desirable experiences? Why do they call it a safe space and 
why does Rose refer to these experiences that she feels free like a bird even though other people 
I spoke to found it rather suffocating? 
The daily life in contrast to the night, holds higher chances for people to discover my informant’s 
identity due to increased visibility, but first and foremost it is the specific atmosphere of the night, 
a higher tolerance, a strong feeling of a community and overcoming social and racial boundaries, 
which allows trans people to perceive the night as their safe space. First, the term safe space has 
mostly been in operation to reference a physical location which people frequent to be safe from 
threats of bodily harm. Lately, it has become commonly associated with queer people seeking 
space dedicated to freedom from homophobia, transphobia and other forms of discrimination 
(Mountz 2017: 1). Regarding this, it might seem evident that queer friendly clubs are considered 
safe spaces for trans people, but I argue here once more that it is the night itself which creates an 
atmosphere where trans people develop a sense of safety. Yes, these clubs are physical locations 
which are created as safe spaces through certain social practices, for example bouncers denying 
access at the door to people they would categorize as not open-minded. But as illustrated before 
it is also the whole transformation process of people’s day to people’s night personalities which 
allows trans people to feel safe at night. Using different kind of transport, walking around from 
one club to another, dancing with people, interacting with the non-LGBTIQ-community while ex-
pressing their desired gender, are all experiences they are not able to have during daylight.  
The trans people I introduced in this article use the night in the sense of Schnepel’s hyper night. 
They are trying to escape the daily life and create spaces where they can dress, speak and act 
differently, as well as engage with a specific kind of crowd. Regarding these spaces, safety plays a 
crucial role since all of them have faced negative experiences such as stigmatization, discrimina-
tion, psychological and physical violence. They live in constant fear of “getting caught”, and there 
are various things they are not able to do, for example carrying a handbag or wearing high heels 
and make-up, at work or other situations. Knowing that the night will come allows them to feel a 
sense of freedom and liberation. It is linked to the rituals of getting ready where the “male traces” 
of their lives can be diminished and their true gender, in these cases, their feminine identity, can 
be revealed.  
It is the night in Nairobi which makes many people feel like they are in the same situations, facing 
similar exclusion for example in their daily lives. Marginalized groups in the Kenyan society, 
whether they are trans, homosexual or refugees from neighboring countries, when in contact with 
other people can dissolve the boundaries which are visible and felt in a highly segregated city like 
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Nairobi. “The night brings a tolerance which is inexplicable”, as Maureen described it (Conversa-tion with Maureen, 05.12.2016). “I might meet my colleague from work at night who would judge me and avoid me if he knew who I was, but if I run into him in a nightclub it is not an issue”, she 
elaborates. The unwritten law of “what happens at night stays at night”23 is the lived experience 
for many of my informants. At night, they are less frightened, they enjoy themselves, meet new 
people and interact freely. Part of this experience is their gender expression. As described before 
in the phase of getting ready for a night out, my trans informants work on the physical manifesta-
tion of their gender identity through clothing, hairstyle, voice, body shape, movement and most 
importantly the name. It is their opportunity to make their gender expression (how they look) 
match their gender identity (who they are), rather than their sex assigned at birth. They not only 
do this in queer-friendly clubs, but also in other bars, clubs, restaurants, in the taxis they use as 
well as on the street when they walk from one joint to another. The women I introduced in this 
article usually go out together in a group. This could be a contributing factor in perceiving these 
night outs as something safe since they spend them with people they trust. But since I spent time 
with non-trans-people as well during their night outs and observed similar moments, I argue that 
the nocturnal experience itself is the contributing factor to this feeling of safety for trans people, 
particularly in interactions with other parts of the community. It is a collective.  
7 Conclusion “At night I am free like a bird”, the expression Rose used to describe the way she feels at night 
sums up the experiences I had while observing her and her friends out at night in Nairobi. They 
create a world at night, a parallel universe, which contrasts enormously with their daily lives. The 
night is a microcosmos where everything seems to be allowed, where different norms apply. It is 
the particularly liberating atmosphere of the Nairobian night which enables them to express their 
gender identity through appearances such as clothing and hairstyle, but it is also an internal trans-
formation which takes place. The way Rose feels changes. She is free, free as a bird. Night and 
nightlife as this microcosmos where anything goes, like a bubble which is for a moment delineated from people’s daily lives, obligations and restraints, is a projection space for desires and ideals 
and the trans people use it to live their desired gender openly.  
As shown in the article, the night is a gendered experience like every other part of life. Gender, 
especially expressing individual identities such as feminine or masculine and how these identities 
shape interpersonal relationships, has been a striking feature of my fieldwork in nocturnal Nai-
robi and it illustrates the dualistic binary conceptualization of gender that is present in Kenya. 
And it demonstrates that the night is not a “lawless” or “normless” space, but a space where de-
lineations are more permeable, where more is possible, while it is far from “anything goes”. 
Even though the existence of trans persons and the phenomenon of gender identity struggles 
linked to it is not part of a nationwide Kenyan discourse yet, I think in the future discussions will 
                                                 
23 This is a saying many of my informants used to describe why they feel free to do things at night which they would not 
be able to do during the day. 
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arise and media coverage will increase just as in South Africa. This might lead to more opportuni-
ties for LGBTIQ activists to push their causes and gain acceptance. Especially Nairobi as a fast-
growing, globally linked modern city offers opportunities for the queer community to live freely 
and engage with others. In the introduction of this article I mentioned that trans people clearly 
get more opportunities to live in the open in an urban context compared to rural areas.  
With this process it will be possible to conduct further research on trans people in Kenya as well as other African countries. This could contribute to the documentation of “the rich history of the 
struggles and successes of various trans-related events and work on the African continent” (The-
ron / Kgotisau 2015: 579). As Theron and Kgotisau rightly state  
there is no singular trans experience or definition, not in the global North and defi-
nitely not in English-speaking sub-Saharan African countries (Theron / Kgotisau 
2015: 579). 
Hence it is even more important to collect empirical material about trans people from different 
cultural contexts such as this paper did. This would also decrease the confusing perception of gen-
der identity and sexual orientation as the same phenomenon which is prevalent in the misin-
formed Kenyan public.  
It is crucial that anthropologists understand the dynamics of the night and illustrate that the some-what “bad press” (Schnepel 2005: 3) it incorporates only covers one perception people have when 
they think about the night. Especially for marginalized groups like trans people in the context of 
this article, the night offers opportunities to feel included, safe and visible.  
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1 Introduction  
This study is situated in the southwest region of Nigeria, which is generally considered as the 
homeland of the Yorùbá. The Yorùbá are largely a diverse group with different but similar dialects, 
shared histories, economies and socio-political organisations (Eades 1980; Johnson 2010). At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, nearly all of this group had come under British colonial rule. 
Colonialism facilitated the growth of modern economic and socio-political systems and led to 
wider social changes. At the same time, it impacted relatively on the course of religious conversion 
of the Yorùbá, even though the efforts of local agents were significant in this process (see Peel 
2000: 2-7). Thus, by 1960 when Nigeria became independent, many Yorùbá had converted to Is-
lam. The Islamization process dates to about the seventeenth century through gradual proselyti-
zation by traders and clerics from Mali and the region which became northern Nigeria (Gbadamosi 
1978: 4; Ryan 1978: 104-106). From the 1840s, some Yorùbá also began to convert to Christianity 
through the efforts of Christian missionaries such as the Church Missionary Society (CMS) (Ajayi 
1965; Peel 2010). Generally, the process of conversion involved stiff competition, and often 
clashes, between the Muslim and Christian missionaries on one hand, and between the two reli-
gious groups and the devotees of various local Òrìṣà (deities) on the other hand. Even though they 
came late to the scene, the Christian missionaries led this competition in much of the colonial pe-
riod such that by the closing years of colonialism the number of Christians was very close to the 
Muslims. This was due to their strategic organisational structures and ability to provide for the 
socio-economic needs of the people. The introduction of Western education was their biggest in-
fluence in this regard (Gbadamosi 1978: 124-146).  However, a number of people referred to as the ‘Traditionalists’ by the Yorùbá remained devoted 
to the òrìṣà such as ogun (god of iron) and ọsun (river goddess). Despite their conversion, it was 
not uncommon to find many Muslims and Christians who participated in the worship of these local 
deities and sought their services. Not only did they accommodate local cultural practices during this period, but also married from one another and participated in each other’s religious festivals 
such as Christmas and the festival after the month of Ramaḍān. This form of interreligious inter-
action underscored the notion of religious tolerance which is assumed to be peculiar to the Yorùbá 
(Falola 1998; Laitin 1986). That this tolerance is hardly an achievement, as Peel rightly argues, 
will however be shown in a deeper understanding of how followers of the three religious groups 
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have encountered each other over time (Peel 2016: 125-126). The experiences of Muslim women 
in veils such as ḥijāb (lit. screen, referred to as headscarf) and niqāb (veil with face cover) is a case 
study that also questions that notion of religious tolerance in Yorùbá society, particularly in recent 
times.  This paper uses ‘veil’ to denote various types of clothes that Muslim women use to cover their 
heads and bodies.1 As a practice, the use of veil is understood by many Yorùbá Muslim women as 
part of God’s command and the sunna or ways of life enjoined by Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.). 
From the 1980s, a significant number of young women began to use the veil in place of the local 
and western dresses. This large-scale adoption of the veil was facilitated by the reform led by 
many Islamic movements and individuals who studied in Nigeria and outside the country. The 
reform was also inspired by series of transnational Islamic revivalist movements which acceler-
ated after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Islamic movement, Muslim Students Society of Nigeria 
(MSSN), played a major role in inspiring this reform among many female Muslims. Established in 
1954 by secondary school students in Lagos, the movement today has members which include 
artisans, academicians, engineers and civil servants (Abass 2016; MSSN 2009). Although the re-
form played a major role in facilitating the use of the veil, many of the women who adopted it are 
nevertheless of the view that it should be based on their own deep understanding of what it means 
to veil rather than being forced to embrace it.  
Adopting the veil encouraged many female Muslims in Yorùbáland to challenge many aspects of 
the globalised modern cultures and practices which are considered immoral and less modest (Ad-
eniyi 2015: 24-37). However, this did not mean they rejected the ideals of modernity as most of 
them continued to acquire Western education and embraced the use of new technologies. On the 
contrary, the adoption of the veil represents their idea of modernity which contrasted with how 
it is understood by other people. This has therefore positioned them differently from their Yorùbá 
Christian fellows (Peel 2016: 160). In reaction, many Muslims, including clerics, have opposed 
their practice of veiling. Among the Muslim community, some have questioned the suitability of 
certain kinds of veiling adopted by these women such as niqāb within the context of Yorùbá soci-
ety. Some Christian groups also showed Islamophobic attitudes by discouraging the use of the veil. 
Islamophobic tendencies against them are also present in public institutions including workplaces 
and government-owned schools. Owing to this, many Muslim women in veil have had their em-
ployment opportunities declined. This paper thus posits that the contestations by many Muslims, 
and the Islamophobic reactions by Christians and the public are some of the major challenges 
which female Muslims in veil are facing within the Yorùbá society today.  
But these women do not always accept the challenge. They usually defend their rights to use the 
veil on many occasions. This includes seeking justice in the court, advocacy, negotiating within 
political circle and resisting attempts by institutions to ban its use. As it will be shown later, the 
quote in the title of this study is one of the expressions they used to advocate for their rights to 
                                                 
1 It should be noted, as Siddiqui (2006: 412) pointed out, that while the ḥijāb has evolved in meaning to denote the idea 
of a Muslim woman’s veil, the word is also used for different types of clothes that Muslim women use to cover their 
heads/hair and bodies. 
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use the veil. The major aim of this study is thus to discuss how the new Islamic identity of these 
women was assailed in the Yorùbá society and how the women reacted to this challenge. To this 
extent, this study is connected to the wider discourse on female Muslims and agency. Some femi-
nist theorists consider veiling as the object of passivity of Muslim women and one of the ways in 
which they are subjected to patriarchy. This argument has been heavily contested by scholars like 
Saba Mahmood (2005, 2011) who argued for the need to reconsider passivity as a form of agency. 
The case study of Yorùbáland further showed that veiling did not prevent women from acting on 
their own. Moreover, the women in veil also activate its use to contest their discrimination. This study will thus build on Mahmood’s discourse of female Muslims’ agency and piety. It must be 
noted that the focus of this study, the veiled Muslim women challenges and their reactions, is not 
the same as Mahmood proposes. In this regard, this study also builds on debates which situate the understanding of female Muslims’ agency within the point of view of resistance. In addition, this 
study will also show how the rise of Islamic reform encouraged the women to adopt the veil.  
Beyond this, this paper seeks to draw attention to the less known but a significant Muslim com-
munity in Nigeria. Over the years, research on Islam in Nigeria has mostly focused on Muslims in 
northern Nigeria, even though there is a long history of Islam in the region. And, where there have 
been studies of religion among the Yoruba, the focus has mostly been on Christianity and Tradi-
tional religion (Loimeier 2017). In addition to understanding the history of Islam among the Yo-
ruba, this study also shows the nature of interreligious encounter in Yorùbá society today. The 
study draws on personal experience, newspaper reports and ethnographic data collected between 
2016 and 2017 on some female members of the MSSN and other Muslim organisations for my 
doctoral research. 
2 Muslim women, agency and veiling 
Female Muslims in veil are understood in many Western feminist discourses as being subjugated 
under patriarchal culture, and thus lacking agency over their own lives. This view is part of the 
recurrent public debate on the veil in many European countries like Germany and France (Bilge 
2010: 14-18; Duval Smith 2004). However, this understanding of agency is contested in Mahmood’s (2005, 2001) ethnographic study in Egypt which examined Muslim women’s agency 
in the piety mosque movement and their involvement in the previously male-centred da’wa (in-
vitation to Islam) activities. Challenging such feminist discourses, her study answered the ques-
tion why women engage in practices such as veiling, modesty, humility and shyness which many 
feminists consider as a form of perpetuating their subjugation. Based on the notion that agency 
requires free will, feminists associate these practices with docility, passivity and submissiveness 
of women to a male-centred culture. But Mahmood contends that agency should not be under-
stood in the Kantian sense which underlines the notion of freedom in the West as well as the fem-
inist goals of equality and realization of oneself. She argues for the need to move away from merely 
equating agency with resistance against domination, but as a capacity for action that is produced 
and activated by historically specific relations of subordination (Mahmood 2005: 210). Her argu-
ment therefore questions the assumption that the desire to be free is universal one.  
102  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 23 
For Mahmood, the women she studied are concerned about achieving piety in their everyday lives 
which requires the cultivation of shyness or being docile. Rather than lacking agency, she insists 
that they are not “docile agents” because “docility” does not imply abandonment of “agency.” Building on Foucault’s work on ethics, she contends that docility is the ability to condition or train 
oneself to become a willing subject of a specific discourse, which may also be a form of agency 
(ibid: 212). This view of docility means that the women in the piety movement have control over 
their own lives in the way they live in patriarchal society and how they resist the norms of that 
society that may affect their achievement of pious disposition. The norms they are resisting in-
clude those of the secular life and the traditional system, which resonates with the experience of 
many Yorùbá Muslim women in veil. 
It is useful to point out that piety is considered a key element in Islamic ethics. It is conveyed in 
Arabic term as taqwā, understood as "virtuous fear" or "fear of God" (Mahmood 2005: 145). It is 
a condition of being close to God and it is regarded as the most discernible virtue a Muslim could 
have. It is also believed to be the most important attribute and means to achieving prosperity and 
salvation. In addition, it is regarded as a key factor that could help a Muslim to attain self-perfec-
tion and purification of soul (Amini 2009: 129-132). Many Muslims believe that the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth have recommended several practices for attaining piety. This range from what are consid-
ered the basic principles of Islam and being a Muslim to other things that may seem ordinary to 
the secular mind. These include belief in Allah (Iman), observing the obligatory ṣalāt (prayers), 
fasting in the month of Ramaḍān which many Muslims regard as the basic pillars of Islam. They also include practices that are contested by Muslims such as lowering one’s gaze in public, veiling, 
humility, shunning suspicion, dressing modestly, observing self-restraint from sin, remembering 
God, and doing things that pleases God. These acts are considered rewarding for Muslims because 
they help to free them from such acts as greed, lust and prejudice. They are also regarded as means 
for mastering self-control while bestowing honour and power on Muslims who have them (ibid. 
2009: 135-137). One of the major arguments in Mahmood’s study is that veiling is a key symbol of piety and it is 
instrumental to practicing the ethic of modesty or shyness. Veiling often serves at first to be a 
measure to train oneself on the attribute of this ethic, and it is not a practice that can be separated 
from this ethic because it is integral to practicing it. Consequently, veiling cannot be discarded 
when a modest comportment is achieved (Mahmood 2005: 158). However, even though 
Mahmood acknowledges the studies that have focused on other reasons for veiling (Mahmood 
2005: 209), the practice may not only be regarded as a symbol of piety as she contends. Many 
women have different motivations and meanings behind their use of veil depending on the histor-
ical and social context in which they live. In Morocco, it is discovered that some women consider 
the ḥijāb as part of their religion which guarantees them justice in a world that has failed them 
(Bullock 2004: 9). In Algeria, many women used it to protest secularization and Western elite 
programmes (Bullock 2010: 11; El Guindi 2003: 169-173). Herrera (2000) also discovered in 
Egypt that the decision of many women to use it or not is based on different practical reasons; 
some unmarried women did not use it in order to attract men for marriage, while some women 
used it because it is required by their profession. It is also discovered in Dakar that some women 
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used it to attract pious and wealthy men (Nyamnjoh 2005: 305). These different experiences show 
that besides their agency to employ the veil to achieve pious disposition, women also have the 
capacity to subvert the objectives of veiling beyond the religious context, which includes activat-
ing its use for political protest and socio-economic gains. With regards to the Yorùbá society, as this study will show, the Muslim women’s motivation to veil is also not limited to the concern for 
piety. It is often based on what is recommended by different Islamic movements which the women 
belong and what is socially accepted. 
Given that this study is focused on the challenges of veiling among Muslim women in Yorùbá so-
ciety and how they reacted to them, it also builds on the debates which examined the agency of 
the veiled Muslim women from the point of view of resistance. It must be noted that Mahmood made a strong critique of an understanding of female Muslim’s agency from the standpoint of re-
sistance, which she considered as only one of the possibilities in which the veiled women act. Yet, as Bangstad (2011: 42) suggests, Mahmood’s study gives more priority to the achievement of piety over women’s rights which many female Muslims are engaged. The resistance view of agency, as 
Bilge (2010) points out, is embodied in postcolonial feminist studies that only portrayed the veiled women as symbols of opposition to Western hegemony and commodification of women’s bodies 
(Bilge 2010: 14). The problem with this understanding of the veiled women is that it gives little 
attention to their religious motivations and a narrow appraisal of their agency. Despite this prob-
lem, however, the resistance view cannot be dismissed altogether because the everyday experi-
ences of Muslim women in veil in different social contexts are not only focused on achieving piety. 
The women also demonstrate varying acts of opposition to social norms, institutions and other 
obstacles which may not necessarily obliterate the religious motivation of the veil. Thus, this study 
considers the agency of the veiled women both from the standpoints of piety and resistance. This 
understanding of agency supports the kind of reactions of many female Muslims in veil in Yorùbá 
society. The next section discusses the historical reform that facilitated the wide scale adoption of 
the veil by these women before discussing their encounters. 
3 Islamic reform and veiling  
In most Yorùbá Muslim communities today, some aspects of the traditional political institutions 
and cultural practices have been accommodated into Islam. This is noticed in the creation of chief-
taincy titles for prominent Muslim chiefs and alfas (cleric) like Oba imale (Muslims’ king) and baba 
adinni (patron of the religion and head of the Muslim community). Many Muslims also participated 
in cultural festivals for different deities which for them did not conflict with their Islamic faith. In 
the colonial period, the practice of gbigbohun-tira (listening to the Voice of Scripture) at the be-
ginning of every year at the palace of the king, was the norm in many towns where the alfas had 
access to the kings. This replaced the practice called Ifá ọdun among òrìṣà devotees (Danmole 
2008; Akitoye 2014). Indeed, these practices were condemned by different scholars who refer to 
them as shirk (association of partners with God). Among them was Alhaji Alifat Mustapha (1987), 
popularly known as Ajágbemo ́kèfèrí (literally “the one who shouts at unbelievers”), who became 
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notorious in Ìkòrodú for his intolerance of Muslims’ syncretic practices. He was also a strong cri-
tique of Christians and Traditionalists in the town (Balogun 2017: 82-83). The critique of these 
clerics often led to clashes between them and the Traditionalists. In 1953, one of such clashes led 
to the murder of a fiery Muslim preacher, Alfa Bisiriyu Apalara in Lagos (Daily Success 1953). Over 
time, the emphasis on reform by these scholars were supported by the emergence of different Islamic groups and associations referred to as ‘ẹgbe ́’ by the Yorùbá. The leading groups were the 
Ahmadiyya movement which began in Lagos in about 1914 and the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society 
founded in 1923, also in Lagos (Adekilekun 2012: 24-40; 218-226). Unlike the alfa, most of these 
new associations were also concerned with providing schools which combine Islamic and secular 
education for Muslim children. These schools were used to challenge the Christian missionary 
schools which were attracting many young people into Christianity. 
Islamic reform usually emphasized the need to go back to Muslim practices in the past, during the 
time of the formation of the first Muslim community. This has been a central focus of several move-
ments of reform seeking to address contemporary challenges that were brought about by the post-
colonial state system and socio-economic ruptures (Lapidus 1997; Loimeier 2016). Islamic reform 
also involved the conception of what is orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Islam. The history of Muslims 
in Yorùbáland shows that the conception of Islam and how it is lived are discursively produced. This argument builds on Talal Asad’s (1986) thesis that Islam is not dramatized by Muslims based 
on what they read in Islamic texts. Rather, it is produced through debates on what they read in 
these texts in relation to their social contexts. Islam is thus a ‘discursive tradition’ which “ad-
dresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present” (Asad 1986: 14). It is through such discourses that certain practices came to be understood as ‘correct’ and differentiated from what is ‘incorrect.’ The criticism of scholars 
and Islamic movements such as the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-ud-Deen could be understood as part 
of this discourse.  
In the same vein, the wide scale adoption of the veil by many women from the 1980s is also part 
of this discourse. The adoption of the veil followed another wave of reform that was shaped by 
some historical developments among the Yorùbá Muslims. This includes the efforts of the Iranian 
government, following its 1979 revolution, to promote Islamic revival and Shiism among young 
Muslims in Nigeria. Although few Muslims in Yorùbáland embraced it, Shiism was successful in 
northern Nigeria under the Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakyzaky led Islamic Movement of Nigeria. How-
ever, several journals and literature were distributed in Yorùbáland which introduced many 
young Muslims to different topics on Islam and the social experiences of Muslims all over the 
world. A major example is the monthly periodical Mahjuba (the covered woman) which explores 
the exemplary character of Muslim women, their legal positions in Islam and their duties in the 
society. The magazine also introduced many young Muslims to the images of women in ḥijāb and 
niqāb. Around this time, many young Muslims who studied abroad, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Sudan and Kuwait also returned to Nigeria. Some of these returnees were members of different 
transnational Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the World Assem-
bly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Saudi Arabia. On their return, they embarked on da’wa through 
study circles and sermons in mosques and in different Muslim organisations. They include Sheikh 
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Abdul-Fatai Thani who studied in Kuwait and became an influential figure in the MSSN. He pro-
vided inspiration for many young female Muslim students who embraced the veil, and the male 
students who established an Islamic reform movement called The Muslim Congress (TMC) in 
1994 (Interview, Sheikh Abdul Fatah Thani, Lagos, 22.05.2018). Some of the returnees also estab-
lished madrasas (Qurʾānic schools) to facilitate the development of Islamic education. One of them 
is the Salafi inspired Sheikh Bin Baaz Shariah College of Nigeria in Iwo, founded by Sheikh Abdur-
Rasheed Hadiyyatullah in 1988. Together, these returnees were responsible for introducing dif-
ferent and often conflicting interpretation of Islam based on prophetic sunna and Salafism (an 
understanding of Islam based on those who are regarded as pious predecessors, al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ).  
With all their da’was, these returnees did not teach an uncontested interpretation of Islam. They 
did not also impose their knowledge on the students. Local madrasas such as the Arabic and Is-
lamic Training Centre, popularly known as Markaz in Agege Lagos also produced many young 
scholars who became scholars in many communities. Many of these young scholars were also ad-
mitted into tertiary institutions. Together, these local graduates also engaged the returnees on 
various subjects in different Islamic educational contexts. It was therefore through the discourses 
and teachings of both returnees and graduates of local madrasas that a new understanding of Is-
lam which emphasises the use of different veils emerge. Among these veils are the ḥijāb, niqāb, 
khimar (a long, cape-like veil) and burqaʻ (an outer garment which covers the body and face with 
a mesh for the eyes). Many of the discourses that produced the use of these veils were articulated in published texts such as Ibrahim Uthman’s “The ḥijāb of the Muslim woman and a call to every 
reformer”, which examines whether the type of veil recommended for the wives of the prophet 
can be adopted by other women (Uthman 1997). Another point worth mentioning is that some of 
these veils were in use in Yorùbáland before this period. For instance, the black burqaʻ was com-
mon among women called eleha (the local word used to describe Muslim women in veil), of Salafi-
minded reformist group known as the Bamidele movement or Zumratul-Mumineen (Adetona 
2010: 25).  
Despite the arguments of the reformists, there was only a gradual shift towards veiling between 
the 1980s and 1990s. This is because of the challenges and criticisms against the introduction of 
the veils, discussed in the next section. However, the number of women using the veil increased 
tremendously from about the 2000s. Appearing in different colours and sizes, the veil is either 
used as a replacement or together with local and western dresses, which include shirts and gowns. 
For many female Muslims, the decision to adopt either of the two, or even to veil, depends on 
several factors. These include the level of Islamic knowledge and what is supported by different 
religious movements. Amina Adisa, a student of Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife who 
uses the khimar with socks, draws attention to the importance of knowing what the veil means 
before using it. She explained that the decision to veil should not be based on which size or colour 
is best. Rather, a woman must have a deep “understanding”2 of what it means to veil before making 
a decision. This involve knowing the different types of veils that meet the conditions of modesty 
and why female Muslims are enjoined to cover their heads. Also, while some female Muslims 
                                                 
2 I discuss this notion of “understanding” in my doctoral thesis: “Being a ‘Good Muslim’ “ at BiGSAS University of 
Bayreuth (Balogun unpublished).  
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would prefer one type of veil over the other, Adisa is of the view that this is also a function of their 
different levels of understanding. Using her own example, she insists that her level of understand-
ing is the only reason why she chooses the khimar over the niqāb and burqaʻ, and not because she 
feels like using it. By drawing attention to the importance of knowledge, Adisa also contested the 
idea of using the veil based on peer influence which is considered to inform the decision of many 
female Muslims. She also challenges the ideal of many Islamic movements who recommend a par-
ticular type of veil for Muslim women. The MSSN, for instance, required women to choose from a 
variety of veils that meet the criteria of modesty. However, in the Zumratul Mumineen, mentioned 
above, the burqaʻ is common among the wives of the alfas. Also, in the women’s Islamic movement called Al Mu’minaat (The Believing Women) Organisation founded in 1995, nearly all female 
members used the khimar as well as socks. The movement, which includes teachers, entrepre-
neurs and medical practitioners, is the female wing of The Muslim Congress (TMC), mentioned 
above.  
While the discourses that inspired veiling usually attempt to separate the values of “modernity” 
from Islam, the women who used the veil do not totally reject many aspects of modernity. For 
instance, most of them received their education in western educational institutions and have be-
come professionals in different sectors of the economy including media and health care. This also 
suggests that the use of the veil is not limited to non-literate market women. The veil has also been 
adopted as part of the school dress for female pupils in private primary and secondary schools, 
especially those owned by Muslims. In addition, there are many women in veil who used the social media for sharing educational content, marketing of goods and social interaction. Al Mu’minaat, 
for instance, has a Facebook page which not only connects members, but also used to share videos 
of its events and other information. Using the veil does not also mean that the women reject the Nigerian state system. For instance, during Nigeria’s annual Independence Day celebration, many 
young females in veil participated in the activities that are used to celebrate the event in many 
social gatherings. A case in point are the female students of Vanguards Academy, a Muslim school 
in Ogun State where the veil is part of the dress code. They celebrated the event in their schools 
with display of congratulatory messages to the nation in 2017. The use of the veil in these different 
contexts thus ensured that veiling is largely represented and visible in the public sphere. It also 
ensured that veiling co-exist with modern institutions and practices, and it does not limit the 
agency of female Muslims to private spaces.  
Yet, many of these women also faced different struggles in the use of the veil. Worth noting is the 
contrasting experiences of two friends, Rashida Hammed and Jelila Hassan, who are both students 
of the University of Lagos. Rashida wore the jilbāb which covered her entire body. In contrast, her 
friend Jelila wore the turban hat and kept a loose scarf in her bag which she used during prayer. 
When I asked Jelila why she did not use the jilbāb like her friend, she explained that her decision 
not to use it was due to her parents’ protest against it. The opposition to the veil by her parents is 
an example of many cases of female Muslims who do not use the veil. But more importantly, Jelila 
also expressed her worry about the social expectation that those using the veil were ‘saintly’ in 
character. Although this expectation is not limited to female Muslims in veil in Yorùbá society, it 
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also extends to males who wear the Pakistani kaftan and keep beard, referred to as alfa, irrespec-
tive of their age and knowledge of Islamic texts. Nonetheless, the expectation that people should 
demonstrate the embodiment of their religiosity with good character and in their utterances is 
higher for the veiled female Muslims. The thinking that many veiled women have fallen short of 
this has thus given rise to a disparaging remark, abori mabowa (literally “the who covers the head 
but leaves her character open”) among the Yorùbá. Given such expectation, Jelila explained that 
she was not ready to wear it because her Iman (faith) was weak and she did not want to appear 
as a symbol of “piety” if her personal character says otherwise (Interview, Jelila Hassan, Akoka 
Lagos, 14.01.2017). By recognizing the symbolic meaning of the veil, Jelila’s fear confirms Mahmood’s argument that veiling is a key symbol of piety.  As a matter of fact, Jelila’s fear was affirmed by Rashida’s experience of the use of the veil. Rashida 
explained that many people expected her to be a symbol of her veil, which she did not deny. But 
that people do not understand that despite using it, she is still human and could make mistakes. 
In addition, she insisted that people do not consider that using it is like her own personal battle 
against temptations and her strong will to train herself to be pious (Interview, Rashida Hammed, 
Akoka Lagos, 14.01.2017). To this extent, Jelila and Rashida’s experiences support the findings in 
other Muslim societies that while Muslims strive to be pious, they also face challenges which im-
pose different negotiations on them and determine how they actually live (see Janson 2014: 12; 
Schielke 2009: 24-26; Soares / Osella 2009: 10-11). Thus, rather than largely focusing on piety, 
these studies showed the significance of taking the range of struggles, ambivalences and failures 
of Muslims seriously in their religiosity.  
4 The challenges and reactions 
Despite the increase in the use of veil, it has remained a highly contested topic among Muslims in 
Yorùbáland. Although most Muslim scholars do not denounce the importance of modest dress and 
the role of the veil in achieving piety among Muslim women, but they consider many of the veils 
that were recommended by the reformers to be mainly for the wives of the prophet, and therefore 
not obligatory for other Muslim women. According to Uthman, whose argument refers to the niqāb 
and the burqaʻ, “the veiling of the face, the two hands and the two feet is not mandatory on Muslim women” (Uthman 1997: 33). Some Muslim scholars also dispute the relevance of certain veils 
within the context of Yorùbá society and culture. They are of the view that veiling has been ele-
vated by the reformers to a fundamental issue in Islam while they neglect the more important 
aspects of the religion. For these scholars, it is important for Muslims to purify their souls and be clear about the “intentions” of their actions because God is more interested in these than their 
outward appearance (Interview, Alhaji Sheriffdeen Adenuga, Ifako Lagos, 02.02.2017). Some scholars also argue that the ‘traditional’ dress of women, which include blouse, wrapper and scarf, also meets the Qurʾānic interpretation of modesty. This underlines the bold argument by Muhib Opeloye, an academic and member of the Muslim community in Osun state that “since the under-
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lying principle for the concept of ḥijāb is the need to cover essential parts of the body, the tradi-
tional Yorùbá dress (consisting of bùbá, ìró, gèlè, and ìbòrí)3 satisfies the requirement” (Opeloye 
2011: 15).  
These various arguments add to the concern by some Muslims that those who put on the veils are ‘extremists’, often understood in Yorùbá as alasèju. Being referred to as an ‘extremist’ is a catego-
risation which many frowns at for different reasons. These include the stereotype by non-Muslims that Muslims are ‘jihadists,’ ‘unforgiving’ and ‘aggressive’ in character. This stereotype has in-
creased due to the incessant interreligious violence from the 1980s which involved some Muslim 
groups in northern Nigeria, as well as other parts of the world. There is also the concern that such 
veils might lead to the erosion of Yorùbá dress identity which they consider Islam to respect, alt-
hough many of the so-called ‘traditional’ Yorùbá dress had northern Muslim origin (Peel 2016: 
163). For many Muslim scholars in Yorùbáland, Islam does not frown at any local culture and 
practices that do not conflict with the teachings of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth (Interview, Prof. D.O.S. 
Noibi, Ibadan, 09.02.2017). Owing to these criticisms, it became difficult for many women to aban-
don the traditional and western dresses for the veil.  
However, those who adopt the veil have continued to defend its use as part of the Qurʾānic injunc-tions that enjoin women to dress modestly: “O ye children of Adam! We have bestowed raiment 
upon you to cover your shame, as well as to be an adornment to you. But the raiment of righteous-ness” (Q. 7:26). Meanwhile, they considered the traditional Yorùbá dress to fall short of this. They 
contended that the veil is not an Arabian cultural import but a religious obligation (Balogun 2018). 
In the same way, they condemned the clothes that are considered to reveal the shape of the female 
bodies and those that subject them to modern economic system. The all Nigerian Muslim women 
movement, Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) established in 1985, 
is one of the major voices in this debate. The movement, whose members include academics, bank-ers, civil servants, medical practitioners and lawyers, is also an advocate of Muslim girls’ educa-
tion and the socio-economic upliftment of Muslim women. In defense of the ḥijāb, the national 
amira (leader) of the movement, Hajia Aminat Omoti argues that:  
When a Muslim woman wears ḥijāb she is obeying and submitting to Allah. When a 
woman wears ḥijāb; she liberates herself from the vain and selfish desire to show off 
her beauty in competition with other women around her. The innate desire of wanton 
display of opulence is tamed by modesty of ḥijāb covering. The tendency of being en-
slaved by the corporate capitalistic industry known for publishing naked women to 
sell anything is removed. When we wear ḥijāb, we deprive privy eyes from scrutiniz-
ing our physical appearance and foreclose the possibility of passing comment about 
our beauty (Omoti 2016). 
Besides the criticism in the Muslim community, the women in veil also faced Islamophobic reac-
tions in many public spaces. This notion of Islamophobia builds on the definition of Allen (2010) 
                                                 
3 Bùbá – blouse, ìró -wrapper, gèlè – head tie, ìbòrí – scarf. The ìbòrí is like the Shayla, a long and rectangular scarf 
popular in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. 
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who consider it as “an ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other simi-
lar phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and 
Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not 
necessarily as a continuum, subsequently pertaining, influencing and impacting upon social ac-
tion, interaction, response and so on, shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and 
attitudes in the social consensus - the shared languages and conceptual maps - that inform and 
construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other” (Allen 2010: 190). He argues further that 
Islamophobia is not restricted to the direct relationship of power and domination, but also in the 
less explicit everyday relationship of power which often makes it difficult to identify in social en-
counters. This, however, allows perpetuation of practices that discriminate against Muslims in 
social, economic and political spheres. Allen pointed out that the practices will be considered Is-
lamophobic if there can be  an acknowledged ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ element - either explicit or implicit, overtly ex-pressed or covertly hidden, or merely even nuanced through meanings that are ‘the-ological’, ‘social’, ‘cultural’, ‘racial’ and so on, that at times never even necessarily name or identify ‘Muslims’ or ‘Islam’ (ibid). 
In 1999, Ogunbumi (1999) reported the cases of discrimination of Muslim women in veil in many 
work places. One was Hajarat Usman, who was interviewed for a bank job but was denied the 
position due to her dress code. This was despite her brilliant performance and having emerged 
with the best graduating result in her class. Usman narrated that she was aware of the reasons 
why she did not get the position because a staff of the bank had intimated her before the interview 
that she might not be interviewed and that if she was eventually, she would not be offered the job. 
This was later confirmed by one of the panellists who asked her if she would dress in ḥijāb if of-
fered the position, which she affirmed.  
I could see they were impressed by my performance. This was later confirmed when 
the leader of the panel told me after the interview that I was the best candidate they 
had interviewed that day and that I would be best for the job. He however wanted to 
know if I intended to dress the way I was to the bank if employed (Ogunbumi 1999). 
The report also showed that many employers were averse to employ ḥijāb wearing women be-
cause of the peculiarities of their job. One confounding argument was provided by a senior exec-
utive in an advertising firm who suggested that women in ḥijāb might not be employed in that industry because “advertising thrives on dynamism and the readiness to be creative, such women 
might be seen as being old-fashioned and incapable of being creative" (Ogunbumi 1999.). Apart 
from these cases, there were also those who used the veil in their work places but were requested 
to stop using it by their employers. Ogunbumi’s report referred to Professor Abdul-Kareem Hus-
sein, president of the Islamic Study Group of Nigeria (ISGON), who said he met two ladies who told 
him that the bank they worked for asked them to change their mode of dressing or risk being 
sacked. He confirmed that one of them resigned while the other lady engaged the bank to fight for 
her right to wear it (ibid. 1999).  
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I also interacted with some members of the MSSN who narrated the various forms of discrimina-
tion which their female members in veil are confronted with in the search for employment. The 
MSSN, which has made a significant contribution to facilitating the turn towards veiling by many 
Western educated Muslim women has also been largely involved, together with other groups, in 
the fight with schools and establishments which discriminate women in veil. Despite the fight, 
Taofeek Yekin who is an academic and the national leader of the movement (from 2018), narrated 
to me that their female members continued to be discriminated (Interview, Taofeek Yekin, Uni-
versity of Ibadan, Ibadan, 20.01.2017). But rather than giving up, some of them started small en-
terprises to empower themselves and contribute to the upkeep of their families. I met some of 
these women who displayed what they offered for sale including clothes, food items and shoes, 
around the University of Ibadan mosque during the weekly Friday prayers and during MSSN 
events. Some of them are also engaged in catering, decoration and event planning as well as dress 
making. By opting for other enterprises rather than abandoning their veils for the paid jobs, these 
women demonstrated that veiling is not a barrier to women’s visibility and capacity for self-em-
powerment in the public sphere. They also showed their capacity to negotiate for an economic life 
that accommodates their struggle to attain piety. 
In educational institutions, female Muslims in veil also face discrimination and harassment. This 
mostly occurs in schools run by the government. The discrimination they face in these schools 
usually depends on the attitude of the authorities in such schools, which in turn, might depend on government’s policy on the use of veil. State governments like Lagos have a policy in their schools 
that allowed its use during Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) classes. This policy emerged from the plea by Muslim groups like the MSSN that Qurʾānic texts are taught in these classes and it is 
required for female pupils to use a veil when the texts are recited (Interview, Adekoya Ibrahim, 
Yaba, Lagos, 30.01.2017). The school also allowed female Muslims to use the veil when they want 
to perform their prayers. However, this policy is often violated. In 2013, for instance, the Lagos 
State government banned the use of ḥijāb in public primary and secondary schools on the premise 
that it was not part of its approved uniform for pupils. The state also argued that the ban was 
necessary to protect the “secular” nature of the schools and the state (Dania 2016). The fillip to 
this ban was the public outrage by Muslims in the state in February 2013 over the public flogging 
of Aisha Alabi, a student of Kadara Junior High School, by her school principal. The principal re-
sorted to punishing Aisha Alabi for wearing the ḥijāb beyond the restricted hours (Abubakar 
2016: 1-4). About the same period in February 2013, further resentments by Muslims were rec-
orded when the principal of Mafoluku Senior Secondary School removed the ḥijāb of Bareerah 
Tajudeen in public on her way to school and suspended her from school (ibid: 6).  
On February 28, 2013, hundreds of female Muslims, mobilized by the MSSN, staged a protest at 
the office of the governor of the state over the harassment of these students. With placards and 
banners, they registered their displeasure with such expressions as “My Hijab, My Right,” “Mus-lims say No to oppression,” and “What is wrong with the Hijab?” They also called for the resigna-tion of both principals for what they called “child abuse and human rights violation” (Abubakar 
2016: 8-19). Apart from using protest, many students also seek redress in court. This happened 
in 2014 when two students, Asiyat Kareem and Mariam Oyeniyi of Atunrase Junior High School in 
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Surelere who were molested in their schools, challenged the ban on ḥijāb in court with the support 
of MSSN Lagos Area Unit. They won the case at the appellate court in 2016 after a lower court had 
earlier upheld government’s policy in 2014. Although the state government challenged this judge-
ment at the Supreme Court, it later directed principals in its schools to allow the use of the ḥijāb. 
In some cases, the protest over the use of ḥijāb in schools was made by the Christian group. In 2016, for instance, a court in Osun State ruled against government’s ban on the use of ḥijāb fol-lowing a case that was instituted in 2015 by the MSSN as well as other Muslim groups. The court’s 
ruling nearly led to a violent interreligious crisis when the principal of Christ African Middle 
School in Osogbo sent some pupils in ḥijāb away from school. Even though the school is govern-ment funded, the principal was of the view that the school was ‘Christian,’ which should not allow 
the ḥijāb. While the students and Muslim groups in the state protested this action, the umbrella 
body for the Christians in the state, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), further challenged the 
court judgment and encouraged Christian students to wear church robes and garments to school 
to enforce their own religious rights as the Muslims. For few days, many Christian pupils followed 
this directive (Olarinoye 2016; Onyekwere et al. 2016). The opposition to the veil by many Chris-
tian groups can be linked to their recurring fear that Muslims are trying to dominate Christians 
and Islamise Nigeria. This fear has been used by them to oppose other agendas such as Nigeria’s 
membership of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) in the mid-1980s and the introduction 
of Islamic law in the early 2000s (Vaughan 2016: 127-131, 179).  
In recent times, the use of the veil has also sparked national debates on Islamophobia. Amasa Fir-
daus, a graduate of law at Ilorin who was not called to the Nigerian bar in December 2017 by the 
Nigerian Law School is a major figure in this debate. The call to bar, which is formally used to 
admit law students into the legal profession, is marked with a ceremony that has a dress code. 
Firdaus was said to be aware that the ceremony does not permit the use of the veil, but she insisted 
on wearing it because she considered the discrimination against the veil had no basis in law 
(Olawoyin 2017). Her action probably represented the concerns of some members of MSSN, who 
I interacted with, that they wish a female Muslim in veil can challenge the Law School on this pol-icy. Firdaus’ case therefore stimulated the outrage of the MSSN together with other groups such 
as the Muslim human rights group, Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC), and the all-Nigerian Muslim 
body, Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). In their protest, they all accused the 
Law School and its Body of Benchers responsible for admitting prospective lawyers into the pro-fession of ‘Islamophobia’ (Vanguard 2017). The situation became tense in February 2018 after the 
public hearing called by the National Assembly to address the issue was aborted due to a court 
order, secured by the Body of Benchers, which restrained the Assembly from this exercise. Piqued 
by this order, some members of the Assembly challenged the jurisdiction of the court over their 
affairs based on the principle of separation of powers between them. The Muslim groups led by 
Prof. Ishaq Akintola of MURIC, also protested and insisted that the Assembly must proceed with 
the hearing because a public hearing on the matter had been aborted in the past (Emejo 2018). 
However, in June 2018, the matter was resolved when the Body of Benchers accepted the veil to 
be used for the call to bar ceremonies. Firdaus was thus called to bar with her veil in July 2018. 
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Beyond her victory, Firdaus’ case may be considered as one of the ways she activated both her 
agency as a female Muslim and the veil to resist institutional practice.  
Rather than resisting institutional practice, negotiation is also employed by many female Muslims 
where they face discrimination. This is common among female students in tertiary institutions. In 
public institutions where it is accepted, the dress code includes veils like the khimar which leaves 
the face open, while there is a ban on specific ones like the niqāb and burqa’ which covers the face. 
Similarly, in tertiary institutions that allowed the veil, some departments such as Nursing frown 
at it on the premise that it violates the dress code of the discipline. Owing to this, many female 
students in veil usually negotiate the type of institution and the course they want to study depend-
ing on the dress code. I interacted with many students who narrated to me that the MSSN and 
leaders of the Muslim community in their schools have supported them in such negotiation. As 
part of this negotiation, students who want to study nursing are advised to give up the use of veil 
within the period of their training for the “greater good”. The ‘greater good’ is understood as both their own ‘interest’ and the ‘benefits’ which the profession will bring to other Muslims. Although 
it should be noted that the non-use of veil by such students is only restricted to the periods when 
they are expected to be in the dress code of the profession (Field notes, Adeyemi Balogun 2017). 
But some students who find it difficult to embrace this form of negotiation have either changed 
schools or course of study (Interview, Kabir Ajadi, Ife, 12.11.2016). 
Besides this form of negotiation, the women in veil have also reacted to their discrimination by 
using the veil as a means of negotiation in political power contest. This happened during the elec-
tioneering process to elect the governor of Lagos state in 2015. In this period, the women were joined by several Muslim groups including the MSSN to lead a campaign titled ‘No Ḥijāb, No Vote’ 
(Abubakar 2016: 44-51). The stimulus to this campaign was the court judgement, mentioned ear-
lier, that upheld the ban on veiling by the state government in secondary schools and the inability 
between the government and the MSSN to settle the case out of court. The aim of the campaign 
was thus to ensure that Muslims in the state vote for a candidate that will support the use of veil 
in schools. Using various mosques in the state to promote this objective, these Muslim groups 
urged parents to vote for a candidate that will give unalloyed support to the use of veil and pro-
mote religious freedom in schools. However, the campaign achieved a relative success following 
the emergence of a Christian governor, Akinwunmi Ambode, whom they gave their support. Upon 
his assumption of office, the new governor directed heads of schools in the state to respect the use 
of veil, although his administration did not withdraw the court case (ibid: 51).  
Advocacy has been another form of action taken by women. This is done through many platforms 
such as the social media and through seminars where members of the public are informed on the 
importance of veiling for Muslim women. Today, the advocacy has been linked to the annual World 
Hijab Day founded by Nazma Khan in 2013, after her own experiences of prejudices in New York 
(Raihanah 2018: 97-98). The day is used to create solidarity among the global Muslim women who 
use the veil and are undergoing different forms of discrimination. During the event on February 
1, 2015, many women wore different kinds of veils in southwest Nigeria and embarked on a long 
walk in major cities like Lagos and calling attention of different communities to their discrimina-
tion in the society. The women included representatives of different organisations such as the 
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MSSN, Al Mu’minaat, FOMWAN, and the women’s wing of Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria. As 
part of the event, they issued press statements to protest discrimination against veiled women 
(Abubakar 2016: 33-43). In their demonstration, they used the veil to convey the objectives of the events. Few of them held cardboards and banners with messages like “My Ḥijāb! My Right” and “World Ḥijāb Day: join the movement.” There were many who wore veils with inscriptions like “World Ḥijāb Day”, while few others tied small banners to their veils with messages such as “Ḥijāb is my crown” and “I cover my head not my brain.” These various expressions illustrate their rejec-
tion of societal discrimination and stereotypes against the veil. More importantly, it demonstrates 
how the women linked the religious objective of veiling with the global agenda of human rights. 
In addition to this form of advocacy, some Muslim women established non-governmental organi-
sations to address discrimination against Muslim women in veil. Notable in this regard is the Hijab 
Rights Advocacy Initiative which is coordinated by Ms. Mutiat Toyosi Orolu-Balogun, a lawyer and 
entrepreneur. Her initiative operates through a network of Muslim students in educational insti-
tutions and Muslim organisations such as MSSN, Al-Mu’minaat and FOMWAN. It provides support 
to women who used the veil by ensuring that their rights are protected. Her initiative also encour-
ages them to report cases of assault. In addition, her initiative creates awareness in public and 
private establishments on the importance of the veil through seminars and lectures (Hijab Rights 
Advocacy Initiative 2018).  
5 Conclusion  
The adoption of the veil as part of the identity of Yorùbá Muslim women is one of the ways in 
which the public face of Islam in Yorùbá society has changed since the 1980s. It shows how these 
women have connected to transnational Islamic movements aiming to revive Islamic practices in 
the past to achieve pious dispositions. However, these women were met with different opposi-
tions which represents a challenge to the notion of religious tolerance among the Yorùbá, who are 
assumed to co-exist with each other with little or no conflict. Importantly, their experiences illus-trate the relevance of Nolte and Ogen’s argument in their study of the Yorùbá city of Ede on the 
need to move beyond the notion of religious tolerance in the Yorùbá context. Their study is im-
portant because it shows the varying degree of conflicts and intolerance among followers of three 
major religious groups despite their understanding of the need to live peacefully among them-
selves in the city (Nolte / Ogen 2017).  
Beyond the opposition they face, the experiences of these women show that the veiled Muslim women’s agency in Yorùbá society is not limited to achieving piety. The women also activated 
their agencies to resist societal discrimination and institutional practices. While they adopted the 
veil based on their understanding of Islam and the need to be pious, they also demonstrate that 
their struggles to be pious do not stop them from public engagement in the modern society. Ra-
ther, it is the society that seeks to limit their chances from this engagement. As a result, these 
women responded through the courts, resistance to authority, negotiation within the political cir-
cle and awareness creation on the use of their veils. Their experiences thus encourage us to think 
of female Muslims agencies both within the frames of piety and resistance.  
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The attitude of the state on veiling in Yorùbá society calls attention to the problem of the political 
system in the navigation of two positionalities in the modern world. The state governments in the 
region, and the Nigerian government, have always position themselves as secular. At the same 
time, they recognised the religious diversity of the people. The issue of veiling, however, shows 
that they face some conflicts in trying to balance the two positions. While the resolution of this 
conflict is crucial to peaceful interreligious relation among the Yorùbá, this difficulty challenges 
the assumption of secularism in the modern Yorùbá society.  
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